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ABSTRACT  
 
This dissertation focused on the links among micro-enterprise development (MD), 
social capital building, and the accompanying social lives of Chinese female 
entrepreneurs in two China's urban areas—Nanjing and Haikou. It engaged with a few 
important discussions concerning China’s liberal politics during the reform era, the global 
trend of neo-liberal capitalism, and the social construction of a new worker-subject—the 
Chinese urban female entrepreneur shaped by the hybrid marriage of state politics and 
global capital. The research findings from this research project contributed to the 
tradition of feminist theories, which endeavors to explore the relationship between neo-
liberalism and gender. In particular, gender was found to concretize the ways in which 
neo-liberal ideological forces have attempted to capture and exploit the productivity of 
women’s labor 
Drawing upon the data from in-depth interviews, participatory observations, and 
secondary data gathering, I examined the diffusion of the Western-centric concept and 
phenomena of social capital building in order to answer the question how Chinese 
women's life was inscribed in the larger context of China's relationship to global 
capitalism. My research findings manifested that the respondents considered affections 
(e.g., inter-dependence, obligation, and mutual trust) to be the foundation of establishing 
and maintaining their social networks regardless of the government's emphasis on market 
principles and the utility-based social capital conception. This opened up a new way of 
re-theorizing social capital. This dissertation also focused on how China’s integration 
with the global economy has affected women’s social identity construction. It 
emphasized the interaction between gender and class as one of the most salient sites 
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where ideal citizens of China are imagined. Drawing from the perspectives of the 
respondents, I found that femininity has never been eliminated by the Chinese 
government. It has existed in China’s MD to challenge the government’s attempt of 
promoting the agendered (gender-neutral), universal model of women’s participation in 
self-employment. Moreover, I asserted that class was individualized while penetrating 
into other dimensions of identity (especially gender). The transformed dimensions of 
identity constituted a set of stratification schemes that constantly reshuffled social 
stratifications for maximizing the state’s profits from the control of citizens. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
My dissertation research project focuses on the links among micro-enterprise 
development (MD), social capital building, and the accompanying social lives of Chinese 
female entrepreneurs in two China’s urban areas—Nanjing and Haikou.1 This study is 
especially sensitive to gender issues. It specifically considers the ways in which 
contemporary capitalist ideological forces try to capture the reproductive labor of 
activities, traits, norms, and affections linked to gender. To put it more succinctly, it 
intends to examine how gender is transformed into a form of capitalizable asset. Also, the 
research findings from this study are going to shed light on their resistances from below 
against the macro-level influence of China’s annexation with global capitalist economy.  
Since the Chinese party-state’s liberalizing of national socio-economic controls 
over the non-state economy started in the late 1970s, private-owned businesses at the 
grass-root level have been applauded as a new engine of economic growth.2 The 
aftermath of the 2008 global economic meltdown witnessed the Chinese economy’s over-
                                                 
1 A micro-enterprise is one with five or fewer employees and less than $ 20,000 in start-up capital (Jurik, 
2005). Micro-enterprise development is commonly defined as an economic development strategy that 
assists small business owners with small loans and technical/business training (Jones, 2004). Social capital 
phenomenon is usually exercised as a contingent, utility-based social inclusion/exclusion (see, for example, 
Putnam, 2000). Consistent with the principles of market-driven politics, social inclusion/exclusion is 
contingent on the contribution of people’s human capital to capitalist market. In my study, I will argue 
against the utility-oriented conceptualization and practice of social capital based on the research findings of 
my empirical study. 
2 The Chinese party-state captures the nature of China’s contemporary political reality, denoting that the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) controls all other major political institutions in China. The non-state 
economy in China generally refers to two types of ownership—collective-owned business and private-
owned business. China’s market-oriented reform began in 1978. Since then, capitalist market mechanisms 
have been gradually introduced in China’s state socialist regime in order to deal with the failure of 
totalitarian state planning.  
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reliance on the huge state sector investments and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for 
economic recovery (Y. Huang, 2008). Despite the long-term monopoly of SOEs in 
certain key sectors, the private sector has never stopped generating steady streams of 
growth and employment that represent a vital hedge against the government’s over-
emphasis on the state sector (Lardy, 2014).3 The share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
produced in the non-state economy exceeded two-thirds in 2010, and the share produced 
by private-owned enterprises alone accounted for more than 60% (Cheng, 2010). Further, 
private-owned enterprises created more than 70% of new jobs in China’s urban areas. 
Central to the robust private sector is women’s entrepreneurship during the post-1978 era. 
In pre-1978 China, the SOE was originally designed to be not simply an 
organization for job creation and social production, but rather a unit (Danwei 单位)—a 
self-sufficient community that supplies employees with an almost perfect working 
condition (e.g., competitive wage, lifetime job tenure, housing provision, comprehensive 
medical insurance, pension benefit, etc.) (Hoffman, 1974). Significantly, the unit concept 
demonstrated the Maoist party-state's working-class orientation in turning labor into a 
"badge of revolutionary honor" as well as a primary site for the proliferation of working-
class identities, strengthening SOE employees' sense of ownership of the socialist state 
(C. Lee, 2007, p. 61). Under such a socialist project, women were entitled to the same 
legal status as men, enjoying the same rights in nearly all respects such as political 
participation, family life, education, and employment (Johnson, 1983).  
                                                 
3 A few key sectors remain administered rather than market regulated for strategic reasons. These sectors 
include financial services, transportation services, telecommunication services, natural exaction, the energy 
industry, and so on. 
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Since the 1990s, however, an increasing number of SOEs found it difficult to 
make a profit. By 1996, more than one-third were unable to make money while the rest of 
them listed as profit-making in accounting ledges were in fact at the risk of incurring 
deficits (Yeh, 1998). These two types combined to constitute almost 60% of all SOEs. 
More than any other factor, the retention of superfluous labor force was cited as the cause 
of SOE unprofitability. A few surveys of selected SOEs found that redundant employees 
constituted nearly one-fifth of a given SOE's labor force (H. Lee, 2000). This situation 
directly gave birth to gendered layoffs, which illustrate the disproportionate cost paid by 
women as a consequence of the socio-economic reforms since 1978.4 A much larger 
number of females than that of males were either laid off or forced to retire a few years 
prior to the previously determined retirement age (for lower-level workers, 55 years old 
for males, 50 for females; and for higher-level professional or cadres, 60 years old for 
males, 55 for females). An official survey covering 15,600 households in 71 cities around 
the nation indicated that females accounted for nearly two-thirds of the laid-off labor 
force, while the proportion of total urban female employment was less than 40% (Wang, 
2003).  
Compared with other re-employment options most of which point to a downward 
social mobility, the national promotion of micro-enterprise development programs 
                                                 
4 China's post-1978 reforms refer to the national project of socio-economic transformations titled with 
"Socialism with Chinese characteristics" in the People's Republic of China (PRC). The reforms were 
initiated in December 1978 under the leadership of the nation’s communist elites—Deng Xiaoping and his 
comrades. With the collapse of the Soviet Bloc and centrally-planned economic systems in 1989, the 
Chinese party-state were pressured to self-transform its political and socio-economic structures for the 
purpose of continually maintaining its regime in China (Dorn, 2002). Principally, the Chinese dual-track 
economy was practiced during the post-1978 era, in which the party-state frequently exercised government 
interventions especially with the key sectors of the state's economy, while allowing the non-state economy 
to develop in accordance with market principles.  
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(MDPs) in urban areas serves as a seemingly viable solutions to various problems that 
both laid-off women and the party-state have to deal with. The Chinese MDPs are 
established and operated by the street-level governments in an effort to assist micro-
enterprise owners with technical training and asset building. The significance of these 
programs was further bolstered by national policies and propaganda in 2008. The 
shrinking demand of foreign markets after the economic crisis considerably squeezed 
China’s export market, weakening China’s economy. Self-employment and Chinese 
entrepreneurs (especially women) have gained unprecedented prominence and were 
stressed over exports as a surer route out of economic difficulty (Chow, 2010). 
China’s centrally regulated MD is consistent with a global emphasis on economic 
self-help in programs such as MDPs. To put it more specifically, China’s promotion of 
MD typifies the process often referred to as neo-liberalism wherein government seeks to 
open up markets and reduce responsibility for social well-being. Neo-liberalism is 
generally defined as a new mode of governing that emphasizes free market and minimal 
government in social service provision. Since the mid-1990s, China has gradually shifted 
to a regime more dominated by neo-liberal ideologies. With the absence of sufficient and 
stable employment opportunities and of government services that promote economic 
subsistence and social spending, neo-liberal ideologies promote only limited social 
programs aimed at fostering economic self-sufficiency through informal and self-
employment activities (Jurik, 2005). In this sense, MDP proponents argued that their 
programs succeeded by encouraging the building of social capital (i.e. social networks) 
for women within and across their communities. Some social capital theorists and MDP 
advocates promoted a utility-based theory whereby they argued that social capital 
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developed in MDP business support networks serve as substitutes for traditional 
collateral and other costly training (Rankin, 2002). Consequently, underlying China’s 
MD is the gendered assumption that in an era of unstable and declining economic support 
for families, women must hold up half the sky by being responsible for state and family 
economic well-being.  
Although existing studies of MDPs often stressed the importance of social capital 
building (see, for example, Servon, 1998), they adopted a very narrow and homogeneous 
definition of social capital and failed to examine the complex social dynamics of social 
capital building in MDPs over time. Worse still, these studies often ignored the 
experience and perspectives of entrepreneurs themselves and the social networks 
important to them and their businesses. Moreover, there is a paucity of research on 
female entrepreneurs and MD in China. In order to fill this void, this study endeavors to 
explicate the socio-economic dimension of China’s MDPs, their social capital building 
practice and the gendered dynamics involved. I plan to focus on the social construction of 
gender and entrepreneurship in the daily lives of Chinese urban female entrepreneurs.5 
More significantly, I attempt to trace connections between Chinese businesswomen’s 
daily lives and the much broader national and global contexts. In so doing, this project is 
able to not only offer policy suggestions to help improve China’s MD, but also contribute 
to feminist theorizing about gender, entrepreneurship, and an intersectional analysis of 
social identity construction.  
                                                 
5 When I talked to my respondents, all of them had acquired the urban household registration. Twenty-six 
of them were originally born and grew up in the urban areas, whereas the remaining 23 migrated from the 
rural areas and got the urban household registration through either getting married with urban males or 
purchasing a home in the cities. 
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MDPs and Women 
Despite its worldwide popularity during the past three and a half decades, the 
concept and social phenomenon of MD is absolutely not new. Actually, the history of 
MDPs can be traced back to the early 1700s when a number of savings and credits groups 
existed around the globe (e.g., Susus of Ghana, Chit funds in India, Tandas in Mexico, 
Arisan in Indonesia, Cheetu in Sri Lanka, etc.). All these prototypes of contemporary 
MDPs were targeted at poor people, who were not eligible for getting loans from formal 
financial institutions. For the same purpose, governments started to provide poor peasants 
with agricultural credit since the 1950s. Such a type of government initiative was 
revamped in the late 1970s when Dr. Mohammed Yunus established the Grameen Bank, 
a non-profit financial institution, in Bangladesh.  
Since then, this type of credit program has become a model for the vast majority 
of developing countries, and reported success around the world (Otero & Rhyne, 1994). 
For example, many saving and credit institutions were founded all over the world, 
operating a distinctive banking system based upon mutual trust, creativity, and 
community participation. In doing so, they opened up a new way of reversing 
conventional banking practice exclusively based upon collateral. More significantly, the 
poor became free from the enslavement of loan sharks, and were assisted to make profits 
by using loans to start small-scale businesses. Other influential MDPs include Bandhan in 
India, Banco do Nordeste in Brazil, Fundacion Mundial de la Mujer Bucaramanga in 
Colombia, Consumer Credit Union Economic Partnership in Russia, and Kazakhstan 
Loan Fund in Kazakhstan. Noticeably, the MDP model, which was originated in the 
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Southern hemisphere, has exploded in numbers and earned its reputation in the Northern 
hemisphere (Jurik, 2005).  
MDPs on the other hand usually targeted poor women, in some cases exclusively. 
Of the 115.6 million MDP clients reached until the end of 2012, nearly 85% (96.3 
million) were females (Reed, 2013). As a significant part of international efforts to 
address poverty, the MDP model fit nicely with the currently prevailing ideologies of 
neo-liberalism that defines poverty as an individual problem and thereby shifts 
responsibility for addressing poverty away from policy makers onto poor women 
themselves. Consequently, MDP proponents optimistically anticipated that poor women 
would be able to achieve economic self-sufficiency if they have access to credit. This 
serves as the rationale for the MDPs, like the Grameen Bank, to design and undertake the 
peer lending approach that replaces collateral requirements with the collective liability of 
the clients' groups. It means that loans were made to groups of borrowers rather than 
individuals. If a woman in the group failed to repay her loan, the others would either be 
declined to be served in the future or be held responsible for repayment. Also, loan 
circles were often advocated for creating networking support for their members primarily 
through collaborative problem solving and information sharing (Jurik, 2005). In addition 
to financial support, some MDPs also engaged in providing technical training and other 
social services (e.g., child care, transportation, etc.).  
Drawing upon the optimistic expectation that small loans can empower women 
and substantially change their oppressed social status, MDPs have already built up part of 
its reputation in making social transformations. As Torri (2014) pointed out, MDP 
practitioners tend to assume that everyone in this world has entrepreneurial spirits and 
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potentials but a vast majority of them do not have access to credit. That is to say, MDPs 
can serve as a viable solution to women's oppressions through expanding their access to 
capital and enabling them to make income independently and contribute to the economic 
self-sufficiency of their households and communities (Koenig, Ahmed, Hossain, & 
Mozumder, 2003). Women's empowerment, especially their economic empowerment, 
aims to produce self-efficiency, independence, self-esteem, respect, and other forms of 
empowerment for female MDP clients.  
A much closer inspection, however, tells us that this strategy of economic 
empowerment may not always hold true. It also shows that complacency in these 
optimistic expectations can probably result in overlooking not only opportunities of 
transforming women's lives more profoundly but also possibilities of disclosing MD as 
another way of continually exploiting female workers. For instance, despite the 
international community's attempt of giving entrepreneurial options to impoverished 
women, most detractors still argued that most of women-targeted MDPs had not made 
any important impact upon women's lives and even gender equality (Holvoet, 2005; 
Mayoux, 2001). A few MDP opponents even challenged that in many cases MDPs' 
efforts had failed to benefit impoverished females but were actually controlled by their 
husbands or other better-off females (Gupta, Turban, & Bhawe, 2005). 
Since limited access to financial resources is only one reason for women's 
disadvantaged positioning in social pyramid, an investigation into the possibility of a 
female MDP client to change her life has to take into account the multi-dimensional and 
complicated nature of her self-employment career. Consequently, I am interested in 
understanding how China's MDPs emerged and gained national popularity, how they 
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changed in the process, and how Chinese MDPs clients (especially female ones) were 
influenced by their entrepreneurship careers. Also, Chinese gender issues have been 
proven productive of new knowledge and confirmed the central place of “sexual 
difference and gender politics in international justice and social movements” (Barlow, 
2007, p. 301). This motivates me to further examine the gendered dynamics involved in 
Chinese urban women's massive participation in self-employment. Furthermore, while 
the rise of China's MD and Chinese female entrepreneurs is still attached to their own 
cultural and social conditions, it is rapidly shifting and being remade with the advance of 
China's integration with global capitalism during the neo-liberal era. The positioning of 
contemporary China as the world factory in the international division of labor is 
obviously a combined product of state power and global capital, which provides the 
bedrock for the social construction of the Chinese female entrepreneur. On this account, 
it is of great importance to examine how the increasing capitalization and marketization 
of Chinese society during the neo-liberal era has affected Chinese women's lives as well 
as their entrepreneurship careers.  
Neo-liberalism and the Making of the Chinese Female Entrepreneur 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the restructuring of SOEs since the 1990s and 
the global economic recession in 2008 combined to give momentum to the Chinese party-
state's adoption of the MDP model as a way of connecting to the global economy. Also, 
China endeavors to not only embrace the contemporary neo-liberal capitalism, but also 
persistently legitimate itself as one of the few socialist regimes, at least nominally, in the 
world. As a result, neo-liberal ideologies are central to China's regime during the post-
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1978 era, informing new matrices of governing practice geared to both China's adoption 
of market economy and its persistent commitment to socialist belief.  
The concept of neo-liberalism and its nation-state-level phenomenon take root in 
the specific context of the British and American political economies (Plehewe, Walpen & 
Neuhoffer, 2006). The emergence of neo-liberalism coincided with "structurally 
transformative transnational and globalizing developments", extending into not only "the 
political and ideological manifestation of economic structural change and public policy 
innovation at national level, but also the political driving force behind globalization 
itself" (Cerny, 2008, p. 2). In the human sciences and humanities, neo-liberalism has been 
widely accepted as the number one force that shapes multiple aspects of the 
contemporary social life. In this sense, neo-liberalism is not merely an economic 
phenomenon but rather a political philosophy.  
Neo-liberalism is comprised of two major tenets (Ong, 2006). The first is that the 
market rather than the state is in charge of distributing public resources. The second is an 
allegiance to individualism—a pattern of thinking that is held as a strong part of people's 
lives to stress such personal characteristics as competitiveness, self-care, self-enterprise, 
self-management, self-fulfillment, individual achievement, and so on. In my study, I refer 
to these characteristics as neo-liberal values that are often imbued in women's social 
identity construction. At this point, China's reforms since 1978 and its attendant 
restructuring of SOEs blended nicely with the neo-liberal trend prevalent in the whole 
world, replacing the centrally-planned economy with the market-oriented economic 
structure. Under this situation, my research findings will manifest that women have been 
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required to accept and incorporate neo-liberal values in order to facilitate the state's 
economic growth during the neo-liberal era. 
At the heart of the MDP model is the politico-historical process of globalization. 
In particular, dynamics of neo-liberal ideologies are crucial in shaping women’s mass 
participation in MD—especially in the underdeveloped nations of the world. As Jurik 
(2005) noted, the MDP model fit nicely with the globalized trend of neo-liberalism that 
enthusiastically advocates the privatization of government functions. The term 
privatization is defined as an economic development strategy for the reallocating of 
“assets…from the public sector to the private sector” and “the subcontracting of services 
formerly performed by government to privately owned firms and nonprofits” (Filipovic, 
2005, p. 1; as cited in Jurik, 2005, p. 8). In this way, the privatization trend has reshaped 
the orientations that government agencies have taken concerning aid to poor women.  
Promotion of women’s entrepreneurship has subsequently replaced heavy state 
investment in social service provision and state employment to be the dominant anti-
poverty strategy for poor women in developing countries. It means that the transformed 
state has tried to shift collective responsibility for the well-being of its citizens onto 
individuals. As many feminist critics explicitly pointed out (see, for example, Kabeer, 
1999; Prugl, 1996), such form of aid for the poor actually blended nicely with the neo-
liberal agenda of economic development, relying upon individual females rather than any 
reform or structural support. For this reason, women’s participation in self-employment 
has the effect of magnifying their burdens as not only bread earners for the family but 
also supporters of the state’s economy (Poster & Salime, 2002). In other words, 
underlying the national and global promotion of women’s self-employment is the 
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gendered assumption that women have to shoulder a double responsibility for both the 
family and the state.  
Gender has a pervasive influence in structuring society, and more importantly, 
this process more often than not gives birth to the disadvantaged positioning of women in 
social hierarchy. As pointed out by Calas, Smircich, and Bourne (2009), contemporary 
feminist scholarship is targeted as seeking an end to this situation. In order to pursue this 
goal, many feminist studies on women’s entrepreneurship have been devoted to 
examining the male-gendered nature of entrepreneurship and how it keeps women’s 
businesses in a secondary, complementary place in entrepreneurial activities (see, for 
example, Bruni, 2004; Bruni & Gherardi, 2001; Bruni, Gherardi, & Poggio, 2004; Bruni 
& Perrotta, 2009). As these studies have indicated, entrepreneurial practices are closely 
related to the concept of hegemonic masculinity: independence, innovativeness, 
aggressiveness, competitiveness, and being indifferent to pain (Connell, 2005). In this 
regard, Mirchandani (1999) added that most research on women’s self-employment was 
based upon a set of entrepreneurial theories deeply rooted in economics. Thus it resulted 
in gender differences being interpreted as how female entrepreneurs deviate from the 
seemingly gender-neutral yet fundamentally male-gendered norms of doing 
entrepreneurship. To put it simply, the supremacy of hegemonic masculinity is 
rationalized to promulgate entrepreneurship as a gender-neutral, individualistic activity 
and to perpetuate women’s subordination. 
All these studies on women’s entrepreneurship have encouraged to critically 
reflect on institutional factors outside the individual entrepreneur or her business through 
considering the relationship between political economy and women’s labor. Despite a 
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much broader focus on women’s work in general, Goodman (2013) showed a way of 
connecting women’s mass participation in social production to contemporary capitalist 
economy and identifying women’s disadvantaged socio-economic status. In particular, 
Goodman placed stress on an expanding paradigm of women’s work which contemporary 
social production has depended on. Women’s work refers to “a type of labor that in the 
industrial age was considered domestic, affective, immaterial, or reproductive, and 
having to do with functions of ‘care’ and socialization” (p. 139). Under neo-liberalism, 
the lines between public and private spaces have become fuzzy. Thus women’s work, 
which used to be exclusively within the purview of private life, has begun to entail public 
concerns primarily through the organization of the wage. Shifting focus to women’s 
entrepreneurship and the gender making of social identities, this study will further expand 
Goodman’s argument to consider how neo-liberal ideologies have attempted to reinforce 
the male-gendered nature of entrepreneurship and transform women’s entrepreneurial 
practice into a new productive terrain of capitalist accumulation.  
Through explicating the intersection of governmentality and subjectivity, my 
study follows an analytic approach proposed by Foucault (1987) to examine how neo-
liberalism affects human subjects (especially at the aspect of social identity construction). 
In his analysis of governmentality, Foucault's concern is concentrated on the procedures 
and techniques that are designed to govern the conducts of human subject at both 
individual and collective levels. Significantly, such a governance of people's minds and 
behaviors are not simply a matter of external determinations being imposed upon their 
corporeal bodies. Rather, governmentality is interpreted as practice of discourse, which 
works in a discursive way (in the sense of language). Here, discourses are defined as 
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systems of beliefs, thoughts, and knowledge claims, which exist independently from 
particular speakers (Foucault, 1987). Consequently, governmentality as discourses works 
like the grammar of a language that allows certain statements to be stated (Foucault, 
2004).  
Depicting the way of governing as the grammatical rules of language, Foucault 
made an explicit difference between discourse and ideology. In Foucault's (1994, 2000) 
words, ideology refers to the way in which a false picture of reality or false knowledge 
was created by one group to gain advantages for itself over all the other groups in the 
society. Arguing against the notion of ideology, Foucauldian discourse interrogates the 
production of truth/knowledge and refuses to link ideology with any immutable, settled 
complex of truth/knowledge. In fact, he gave up the use of ideology for his preferred idea 
of discourse. Despite a few remnants of the Marxist theory of ideology left in 
Foucauldian discourse (e.g., seeing capitalist structuring as a central problem), Foucault 
moved the analysis of power relations beyond economic structures of inequality, and 
developed it into an inquiry into the intersections of multiple differentiated discourses 
through exposing the knowledge/power model. Principally, Foucault's influential re-
theorizing of power and his approach to the power-knowledge-truth complex are central 
to explore the way in which governmentality as discourses functions to influence human 
subjects. 
Writing explicitly against the effects of power in negative terms (e.g., repressive, 
exclusive), Foucault (1978, 2003) offered an alternative understanding of power with 
three major features: first, power works not at the macro level but rather at multiple local 
sites; second, wherever power relations exist, there are opportunities for resistance; third, 
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since power relations operate at the local level, resistance at the macro level is 
impossible. To put them together, power, in my study, can be generally interpreted as 
social relations that operate "at the capillary level" via a complex of everyday practice but 
still impose a significant social and political influence upon human subjects (Fraser, 
1981, p. 279). Inspired by Foucauldian power and its features, I tend to beg a difference 
from Foucault's preference of using the term discourse exclusively. Specifically, I prefer 
to use ideology in this study to describe the macro-level influence of the party-state's neo-
liberal policies and propaganda, while utilizing the term discourse to depict the capillary-
level influence of them. As Van Dijk (2001) argued, the interpretation a human subject 
makes of a given communicative context subjectively brings to bear the social and 
political interaction with other human subjects within the same context. That is to say, 
power relations operate to exert and transmit the influences of multiple discourse at 
multiple individual local-scale sites that would add up to be a cumulative ideological 
influence at the macro level.  
Further, Foucault coined another term—biopower to specify the way that power 
relations are operating in the contemporary social life. As opposed to the juridico-
institutional power exercised through laws and violence, bio-power refers to a modern 
way of governing that intends to acquire the scientific possibility of managing, 
multiplying, and transforming human life at the population level into well-being and 
health (Foucault, 1980, 2010). Extending the use of concept to the context of neo-liberal 
China, I plan to examine the way in which the making of the Chinese urban female 
entrepreneur involves the party-state's way of governing that produces as many good 
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citizens as possible with the purpose of maximizing the state's profits from the oppression 
and exploitation of them.  
On the issue of our sense of self—subjectivity, I am interested in exploring the 
degree to which subjects are the effects of power relations by bracketing the autonomous 
potential of the subject. What is at stake is in what historical moment and in what 
institutional structure subjects are constituted as acceptable or desirable (Foucault, 1997). 
Shifting to the question of why human subjects attached to unequal power relations are 
subject to their differential social positionings, the answer has to draw upon the linkage 
of subjectivity to governmentality: people's acceptance of social inequality involves a 
dynamic process of the power-knowledge-truth complex whereby people incorporate 
discourses of domination into their sense of self—subjectivities. Such discourses 
corroborate large-scale mechanisms of inequality because they are accepted uncritically 
and strengthened consistently by individuals living in multiple local sites (in Foucault's 
cases, hospitals, prisons, schools, and so on). Equally importantly, my study will also pay 
attention to the possibility that women would resist the overwhelming influence of 
governmentality as discourses and therefore engage in a self-construction of subjectivity.  
MD and Social Capital Building 
This section presents a review of relevant literature that indicates the limitations 
of prior studies on the relationship between MD and social capital building. After that, it 
discusses the rationales and significance of my research project. Finally, it prepares for 
the research design through highlighting useful analytic tools or categories for 
operationalizing the key concepts of the research questions. A lot of literature on MD 
addressed the association of social capital building with entrepreneurship, and the ways 
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through which to examine how social capital phenomena and theories affect 
entrepreneurship.  
Empirical Studies on MDPs Influenced by Putnam’s Social Capital Theory 
Social capital is a hot issue in both academia and daily life. As a justification for 
the globally popularized phenomenon of MD, theories of social capital have to be 
critically examined with a special attention to their impacts of rationalizing and 
reinforcing neo-liberal ideologies. In the case of China’s adoption of the MDP model 
during the neo-liberal era, it is necessary for this study project to disclose the nature and 
influences of Chinese MDPs’ social capital building practice on women entrepreneurs. In 
order to do this, I have to review the historical development of social capital theories, the 
popularity of Putnam’s utility-oriented theorization of social capital, and the influences of 
social capital theories on the empirical inquiries of MDPs. 
Putnam’s influential tautology (1993; 1995; 1996; 2000; 2004) has earned the 
most credits for bringing the concept of social capital to the central place in academia and 
politics.6 According to him, social capital is “the connection among individuals—social 
networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them,” and this 
kind of social connection is exactly the repository of a common civic virtue through 
which to establish a democratic civic society in order to protect individual liberty from 
the coercive controls of liberal state (Putnam, 2000, p. 19; 2004). The overwhelming 
                                                 
6 Bourdieu’s (1984; 1986; 1998) theorization of social capital focused on the importance and the ways in 
which the social and political structure of a hierarchical society is examined. In contrast, Coleman (1988) 
pursued the economic perspective from which social capital is studied as an important resource embedded 
in family and community. Social capital, in Coleman’s viewpoint, is of great importance in its potential 
benefits to children’s development. 
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influence of Putnam’s works has finally universalized all the differentiated perspectives 
into a consensus on the utility-based nature of social capital (Somers, 2005). These 
studies have been influenced to consolidate an epistemological agenda of developing 
social capital as “a new theory and vocabulary that would name, explain, and ‘make true’ 
for political knowledge a source of value (inherent in social networks or norms) that 
would serve as an alternative to the power of the state” (Somers, 2008, p. 216). Putnam’s 
utility-oriented social capital theorizing has been recognized in the academic and political 
fields by virtue of being able to manage social interactions, open up an autonomous 
social space from the double control of market and state, and eventually benefit our 
society as a whole.  
Putnam’s utility-based social capital theory has driven many empirical inquiries 
(especially in the disciplines of sociology, economics, and political science) of indicators, 
trends, and influences of social capital building at the national and cross-national level 
(Patulny & Svendsen, 2007). Collaborating with several Italian researchers, Putnam’s 
pioneering study of Italian regional governing offered an empirical evidence to buttress 
his theoretical hypothesis that democratic governance is associated with considerable 
social capital embodied in a vibrant associational life together with trustworthiness, 
normative reciprocity, and mutual assistance (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1994). 
Following Putnam, many scholars conducted their research projects to test Putnam’s 
famous research findings in different countries around the world. For instance, a sharp 
decrease of social capital in English speaking countries was captured by some large-scale 
quantitative analyses and considered as harmful to the democratic running of political 
institutions (see, for example, Inglehart, 1999; Uslaner, 2002). In contrast, a high level of 
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social capital accumulation in the European welfare states (e.g. Norway, Denmark, etc.) 
was empirically found to be the most important reason for people’s democratic 
participation in democratic governing (Paldam & Svendsen, 2006; Wollebaek & Selle, 
2002). 
Putnam’s ideal conceptualization, which overemphasizes its benefits to political 
democracy, actually glosses over the downside of the social capital phenomenon. 
Bourdieu was one of the first to advance a critical examination of the exploitative and 
repressive aspect of the utility-based social capital theories. He explicitly placed 
emphasis on the relationality of capital. Individuals could not be able to produce capital, 
and the primary focus of study on capital is social space. For Bourdieu (1984, 1989), 
social space is defined as the complex clustering of differentiated social groups, each of 
which is made up of individuals with the same amount and combination of capital (e.g., 
economic, cultural, social, and symbolic). As indicated in this definition, individuals 
positioning in differentiated social spaces are unequal in acquiring and taking advantage 
of various resources. Also, this inequality in possessing and utilizing capital further 
perpetuates the individuals’ social space. To put it simply, the social position of an 
individual is both the cause and the effect of the amount and combination of various 
capital that he or she can accumulates. 
Based upon this relational perspective of capital, Bourdieu (1984, 1986, 1998) 
mapped out a critical perspective through which to see social capital as a resource with 
the potential of gaining an economic and political advantage. This is because an 
investment into developing social networks can provide an individual with an access to 
much more economic and political resources. Moreover, this political and economic 
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advantage in social capital construction can be transferred across generations. Thus, 
social capital building has to be critically examined as a historical and power-laden 
process in which social, economic, and political inequalities could probably be produced 
and perpetuated.  
Challenged by these critiques, Putnam (2005) acknowledged a few deficiencies in 
his initial theorization of social capital, “I now think that my analysis overlooked three 
important factors: the growth of inequality, the growth of diversity, and the decay of 
mobilizing organizations” (p. 1). As a result of his concession, Putnam (2000, 2004) 
made one of the most significant improvements in his social capital theory—the 
bridging/bonding typology in order to disclose the adverse consequences of the social 
capital phenomenon. While bridging social capital was defined as outward networks that 
are kept open to “people across diverse social cleavages”, bonding social capital was 
described as inward networks that “reinforce exclusive identities and homogenous 
groups” (Putnam, 2000, p. 22). Any study on the nature of a certain social capital 
phenomenon has to depend upon a clear differentiation of one from each other. For 
instance, a society with no bridging social capital would probably collapse into multiple 
hostile social groups (Putnam, Feldstein, & Cohen, 2004).  
Putnam’s bridging/bonding typology was adopted by many researchers as an 
analytic tool to examine the nature and consequence of social capital building in 
differentiated contexts. The controversial social-capital-building initiative of MDPs is 
one of the most significant topics that these studies focus on. MDPs, as a new kind of 
post-welfare social service provider, pursue values consistent with the tenets of welfare 
reform—independence and self-employment as way of moving up the social ladder 
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(Bhatt, 2002; Jurik, Cavender, & Cowgill, 2009). As I will show, this description of 
MDPs exactly corresponds to Chinese government’s objectives of establishing the Re-
employment Service Centres (Zaijiuye Zhongxin 再就业中心) (RSCs) that encourages 
laid-off women not to depend on the government or social welfare but rather to become 
economically self-dependent.  
Advocates of peer lending found that the peer lending model had bonded 
individual clients to a collective responsibility of repayment and therefore had achieved 
collective empowerment through nurturing reciprocal relationships of trust among them 
(Ashe, 2000; Friedman, 2001). In contrast, some critics conducted their empirical studies 
on the social-capital-building activities of American MDPs (Jurik, Cavender, & Cowgill, 
2006; Servon, 1998). The bridging/bonding analytic rubric was adopted to investigate 
two types of social capital building—intra-program networking (social networks that 
bond clients within the program) and extra-program networking (networks that link 
clients with the outside communities). They concluded that the vast majority of American 
MDPs had failed to build social capital but simply encourage female entrepreneurs to 
pursue individual empowerment and economic self-sufficiency. Moreover, some 
researchers clearly cautioned that without any critical analysis of the existing hierarchical 
society the social-capital-construction efforts of MDPs would be likely to disguise and 
perpetuate various inequalities along the lines of class, gender, race, and ethnicity 
(Rankin, 2002; Young, 1994). 
Social Impacts of China’s Urban MDPs 
The proliferation of these empirical studies has created a crucial hedge against the 
popularity of Putnam’s ideal theorization of social capital. Also, it provided useful policy 
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suggestions for MD at the national and international levels. Further, the brief review of 
them brings attention to two major limitations that suffice to explain the rationales of my 
dissertation project. Firstly, the social impacts of MDPs and their social-capital-building 
initiatives on human subjects are insufficiently addressed in prior studies. Many 
researchers (e.g. Jurik et al., 2006; Jurik et al., 2009; Rankin, 2002; Servon, 1998) 
attempted to do it by examining the performance of MDPs in pursuing the feminist 
objectives. Their research findings, however, do not focus on how the impacts of MDPs 
and their social-capital-building activities have shaped the social construction of people’s 
identities. The intersectionality approach and a focus on social identity construction can 
be utilized to fill this void.  
The intersectionality perspective suggests that one should study the making of the 
Chinese urban female entrepreneur as a politico-historical process in which the rural-
urban divide, class, sexuality and gender intersect to simultaneously produce, reproduce, 
and transform human subject’s position is China’s social hierarchies. Along this line, 
Bruni et al. (2004) added another layer of complexity to the intersectional approach 
through examining “the social practice of co-producing gender and entrepreneurship” is 
investigated (p. 1). Their research findings indicated the intertwined practice of doing 
business and doing gender: entrepreneurship is socially coded as a male-dominated field, 
and the gendered system of behaviors and ideas simultaneously determines “the nature of 
the practice of entrepreneurship (who can be an entrepreneur, what entrepreneurship is, 
what or who is managed by that form of governance of economic relations)” (p. 11). This 
social constructivist perspective of conceptualizing gender and entrepreneur reinforces 
the anti-essentialist view of various social identities (e.g. gender, sex, sexuality, class, 
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etc.).7 In this sense, the formation of social identities is actually an aggregation of social, 
cultural, and material practice that are realized through and embodied in people’s 
experience of their daily lives.  
Valdez’s (2011) further developed this view in her empirical study on the social 
identity construction of Latino/a American immigrant entrepreneurs. Drawing from a 
contextual thinking of analytic categories, Valdez disclosed the process in which race, 
ethnicity, class, and gender are constructed through their situated experience of doing 
business. To put it simply, all these categories of social identity intersected to 
simultaneously create, maintain, and transform people’s socio-economic status. 
Moreover, she proposed the concept of market capacity that refers to the combined 
product of three types of capital—government, market, and social. It provides an analytic 
framework that people’s business experience were considered to be condition outcomes. 
In other words, they weaved their daily lives within social structure and thereby mapped 
out a link of their daily experience at the local level with the much larger context of race, 
class, and gender.  
My study will also apply this intersectionality approach to an inquiry of 
multifaceted and complex nature of social identity construction that interacts with MD 
                                                 
7 Foucault’s (1979) analysis of discourse has greatly influenced the theorization of social identity 
construction and reinforced the anti-essentialist fashion in feminist theorizing. Discourse is analyzed as a 
“discursive fact”, unpacking the ways that sex is subject to power relations (p. 11). A proliferating 
discourse of sexuality gives birth to multiple differentiated sexed subjects. Drawing on the Foucauldian 
notion that discourses function as a “regulatory ideal” to produce docile bodies, Butler (1993) thought of 
sex and gender as repeated cultural performances “which enact or produce which it names” and finally 
engender the effect of identity (p. 13). Lorber (1994) also disrupted the distinctions between sex and 
gender, and argues that gender, sex, and sexuality are all social constructs. Following the social 
constructivist perspective, Bourdieu (1990) conceptualized class as constituting a hierarchical social space 
in which people “…according to [the objective] position they occupy…understand the logic of their 
practice and…how they will classify themselves and others...” (p. 50). 
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and the accompanying activities of social capital building. It will attempt to trace these 
interaction shaped by both the national adoption of and the global diffusion of neo-
liberalism. Social identity construction has been recognized as an essential dimension of 
neo-liberal governmentality which manages population as a whole. Ong (2006) 
contextualized Foucauldian governmentality within the specific Asian context during the 
neo-liberal era.8 She re-conceptualized the practice of neo-liberal governmentality as a 
problem of optimization that aims at and justifies the maximization of profits from the 
subjugation of human bodies and the control of populations.9 
There have been few prior studies that addressed the social influences of China’s 
MD on the social lives of Chinese female entrepreneurs. My dissertation project is 
expected to fill in this gap in order to not only offer valuable policy suggestions to the 
improvement of Chinese MDPs but also contribute to the feminist theorizing of social 
identity construction. A review of the relevant studies conducted in China’s context 
indicates a failure to sufficiently explore such a fertile field. Overall, the existing studies 
                                                 
8 In Foucault’s (2010) viewpoint, governmentality was broadly defined as the complicated process in which 
a proliferation of manipulative techniques of governing are imposed upon populations for the specific 
purpose of maintaining a stable, progressive society. Meanwhile, this way of governing is justified by a 
particular political rationality. In this process, the state itself undergoes a gradual evolution into a modern 
administrative state with complex bureaucracies. 
9 This optimizing principle is substantiated as two optimizing strategies—“technologies of subjectivity” 
and “technologies of subjection” that manipulate the making and self-making of ideal social identities in 
the specific time-space context for maximizing the profits of global capital. “Technologies of subjectivity” 
suggest an optimization of an individual, replying on knowledge and expert systems to induce self-
government so that human subjects can “optimize choices, efficiency, and competitiveness in turbulent 
market conditions”; “technologies of subjection” refer to an array of macro-level spatial strategies that 
carve special spaces in order to achieve strategic goals by integrate a special part of population with market 
forces (Ong, 2006, pp. 6-7). Consistent with Butler’s (1990, 1993) complement to the post-structural 
perspective of social identity construction, Ong’s notion of the two optimizing strategies can be utilized to 
keep a balanced focus on both the existing social structures and human agency’s self-construction of his/her 
own identity. 
  25 
did not recognize the association of social capital construction with MD. Worse still, they 
missed the social dynamics and perspectives of entrepreneurs themselves due to an 
isolation of social from economic. These researchers shared a common focus on 
measuring the economic returns of participating and developing social networks (Bian, 
2004; Bian & Qiu, 2000; Bian & W. Zhang, 2001, 2012). These returns involve job 
hunting, business opportunities, and social welfare benefits at both the individual and 
enterprise levels. In prior studies on Chinese urban MDPs, scholars attempted to assess 
the economic performance of the programs and provide suggestions for their economic 
sustainability (J. Yang, 2010; F. Zhang, 2004; Zhuang, 2004). 
Since I will study the social formation of the Chinese urban female entrepreneur 
as a newly constructed/reconstructed social identity, special attention has to be paid to the 
multi-faceted, complex, and nuanced account of human agency. Despite multiple 
differentiated perspective of theorizing agency, it is commonly defined as a human 
agent’s mediatory, contested relation to the existing social structures (McNay, 2000, 
2004). Drawing upon agency, human subjects can respond actively to a variety of 
uncertainties unleashed in their dynamic interactions with the existing social norms. 
Resistance literature tended to interpret agency as a combination of resistance and 
accommodation. Some studies found that clients usually had preferred to protest in a 
subtle way in order to maintain a negotiating relationship to program staff (Fraser, 2011; 
McColgan, 2005). That is to say, while resisting the repressions and exploitations of an 
unjust social structure, human agents would simultaneously accept some of the dominant 
influences. In other words, agency is practiced as a mutually conflicting yet undissolvable 
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aggregation of resistance and accommodation that suffice to substantiate human agent’s 
mediatory relation to the existing social structures.  
In a stark contrast to prior studies, this dissertation research project intends to 
undertake a much more grounded inquiry of Chinese urban female entrepreneurs’ daily 
lives, examining how they do their businesses in the specific context of neo-liberal China, 
how doing business constructs their daily lives, and how the increasing globalization and 
modernization of China influences their daily practice of doing business. By doing so, 
this study can better understand the complexities of the links of MD to today’s neo-liberal 
capitalism and engage in micro-range theorization about perceivable or observable 
human activities in today’s dynamic political and socio-economic circumstance. 
Research Questions 
As noted before, this research project is going to primarily study the daily lives of 
Chinese urban women entrepreneurs under the combined influences of the Chinese 
government and contemporary global capitalism. In order to do this, I plan to map the 
complexities and contradictions in the interactions among global neo-liberalism, China’s 
strategic adoption of neo-liberalism, and Chinese urban female entrepreneurs’ 
involvement in the politico-socio-economic arrangements at both the global and national 
levels. As framed by the literature review, the central research questions include:  
 In what ways do Chinese urban female entrepreneurs perceive that MD in China affects their 
lives at many aspects (e.g., career, family life, personal characters, inter-personal relation, 
etc.)? 
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 How do the female entrepreneurs describe social connections upon which they often depend 
to do their businesses– what words, behaviors, conceptualizations or even traditional/pop 
culture do they use to describe and understand social connections?  
  How do the female entrepreneurs describe a successful businesswoman—what words, 
behaviors, conceptualizations or even traditional/pop culture do they use to describe and 
understand the image?  
Plan of Study 
Chapter two is an introduction to the research methods and methodology. The 
extended case method (ECM) constitutes a crucial part of methodology, which calls for a 
reflexive consideration of the link between theory and empirical data. As noted in chapter 
one, the empirical study on Chinese female entrepreneurs’ daily practice of doing 
business sets up the foundation for problematizing and reconstructing prior theories. 
Given this assumption, the ECM is an appropriate framework that takes context as its 
departure, roots a researcher in theory, guides his/her everyday social interaction with 
participants, and finally seeks to problematize and improve preexisting theories based 
upon his/her empirical research findings. Also, the ECM provides a guide of designing a 
set of research methods for collecting and analyzing data. These methods include semi-
structured interview and participatory observation, which are conducted to collective 
sufficient qualitative data for the research. A snowball sampling strategy allows a small 
pool of key informants to refer other participants to the research project. Finally, this 
chapter ends with a discussion of grounded theory (GT) that is applied as the strategy for 
data analysis. Following the principles of GT, data collection in this study is a recursive, 
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reflexive process in which data gathering, data analysis, and research finding making 
interact with each other. 
Chapter three narrates a story of how the gendered discourses of state in pre-1978 
China has worked as a framing device significant in stipulating the gendered division of 
labor and producing normative forms of work for males and females. This is followed by 
an investigation into the widening and proliferation of gender inequalities during the 
post-1978 era. After that, I want to shed light on the historical process of how women’s 
self-employment has gained an unprecedented prominence in China’s socio-economic 
progress especially since the global financial crisis of 2008. Finally, I conclude this 
chapter with two thought-provoking questions, and each of them would be addressed in 
chapters four and five respectively. First, inspired by the gendered historical narrative of 
China's socio-economic and political transformations since 1949, I find it necessary to 
examine how the party-state's governmentality as discourses has strategically 
incorporated women's daily lives in the configuration/re-configuration of power relations 
during the post-1978 era. Second, given the party-state's management of women's lives, it 
is imperative to adopt the perspective of social identity construction, through which to 
scrutinize how Chinese women's lives have been constituted with the advance of China's 
integration with the contemporary global capitalism. 
In chapter four, my focus turns to Chinese women’s participatory experience of 
social networking under the macro-level influence of the Chinese MDPs’ advocacy for 
social capital building. Based on my interviews with 49 MDP clients and observations of 
their small-scale businesses, I intend to illustrate one way in which women's lives were 
incorporated in and shaped by the configuration/re-configuration of power relations. 
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Specifically, China’s MD and its attendant ideological influences have taken a gendered 
form whereby women’s lived experience and their social networking activities were 
counted into the perpetuation of the party-state's subjugation and exploitation of them. 
The research findings, on the other side, suggest that those women are far from being 
puppets. Rather, women’s agency has considerably shaped both their social identities and 
social connections. For instance, I find that those women, who were influenced by 
government’s propaganda about creating business support networks, resisted neo-liberal 
ideologies through their everyday acts such as nurturing non-utility based affections 
between kin, friends, and neighbors. Their conflicting responses to the centrally planned 
MD not only substantiate previous critiques of Putnam’s utility-based social capital 
theorizing, but also inform a reconstruction of social capital theory. Based on these 
findings, I argue that re-thinking the common can serve as the basis for radicalizing our 
understanding of social capital, where cultural factors, especially gender, are imbricated. 
Chapter five endorses a gender approach to analyze women's self-employment 
that is found to be featured as the intertwined practice of doing business and doing 
gender. The focus of this chapter is shifted to a politico-historical process of their social 
identity construction. This finding highlights the intersection of gender and class as an 
underlying principle of feminist theorizing about social identity construction. 
Particularly, it explicates the ways that gender becomes classed: class is individualized 
and articulated in other dimensions of identity (especially gender) as a series of 
classification schemes to organize social stratifications. The party-state's policies, as I 
assert, serve to organize social hierarchies in order to continue the domination and 
exploitation of female citizens. At this point, this research is important in today’s 
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academic and political discussions where intersectionality has gained an influence to be 
dominant but is still underdeveloped in theorizing how class interacts with gender. 
This study ends with chapter six that briefly reiterates my research findings 
concerning the link among China's MD, Chinese women's self-employment careers, and 
their social networking activities. Principally, it re-emphasizes to analyze the making of 
the Chinese female entrepreneur as a typical case that illustrates how the global trend of 
neo-liberalism has been invested in the specific context of post-1978 China. Equally 
important, this case study can also shed light on how human subjects have been 
influenced by such a socio-economic and political transformation at the macro-level. 
Lastly, I intend to discuss a limitation of this study based upon which future studies can 
be conducted to further the discussion on the same issues. It is necessary to study the 
making of the unsuccessful female entrepreneur that would probably add another layer of 
analysis to the ideological influences of the party-state's regime.  
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CHAPTER 2 
EXTENDED CASE METHOD AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
This chapter presents a systematic discussion of the research methods and 
methodology employed in this dissertation research project. Methodology refers to a set 
of either theoretical or philosophical assumptions that guide the research. It serves as the 
underlying principles that assist the design of much detailed techniques and strategies—
research methods—for data collecting and analysis. This chapter consists of three 
sections. It begins with a discussion of the ECM that serves as the methodology of this 
study for framing the design of much detailed research methods. After that, it provides a 
brief introduction to the field sites—Nanjing and Haikou where the fieldwork was 
accomplished and then turns to an in-depth discussion of both the strategies and the 
methods for data gathering and collecting. 
Extended Case Method 
My research questions and the critical review of prior research require me to seek 
an in-depth, detailed, and holistic view of the relevant social phenomena. Therefore, I 
designed data collecting and analysis strategies that give voice to human perceptions and 
allow for a detailed explanation of their thoughts. Underlying this research design is the 
assumption that respondents’ words have to be treated as a valid interpretation and 
understanding of their thoughts and actions (Maxwell, 2005). Furthermore, as noted 
earlier in this chapter, I intend to trace research participant’s daily experience at the local 
level to the much larger context at the national and global levels. Given these 
assumptions, I utilize the ECM in this research project not only as an essential part of 
methodology but also as a theoretical tool of guiding data collection and analysis.  
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Burawoy (1991, 1998) advocated it as a means to reflectively examine the 
relationship between data and theory, suggesting two ways of improving theories through 
their reconstructions. The first one requires a researcher to start from empirical work, 
search for theories that explain empirical issues inadequately, and finally let date analysis 
speak to theory reconstruction. By contrast, the second one allows a researcher to start 
with a critical analysis of a given theory. If a few deficiencies in the theory can be 
identified, they would be able to suggest appropriate cases for empirical research. The 
purpose of following the second way is to improve flawed theories through turning 
empirical inquiry into part of an agenda of theorizing new concepts. As noted in chapter 
one, my design of research methodology is epistemologically driven. In other words, the 
research methodology was designed with a purpose of refining some sociological and 
feminist theories based upon my empirical study. Therefore, the ECM was employed. In 
the remaining part of this section, I plan to incorporate the principles of ECM in the 
detailed discussion of my methods and fieldwork.  
Field Site and Research Methods 
The fieldwork was conducted in two Chinese cities—Nanjing and Haikou from 
summer 2010 to summer 2012. Nanjing is the capital of Jiangsu province and a heavy 
industry production center of East China. In contrast, Haikou is the capital of Hainan 
province in the South China Sea, intending to develop into an international tourist resort. 
Although I selected these two urban areas with differentiated economic structures, the 
limited and non-representative nature of the sample did not allow me to pursue a 
comparative perspective through which to examine how the Chinese party-state’s macro-
level influences upon women’s social identity construction has been diffused across 
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varied local contexts. In fact, my selection of field sites was a consideration of the 
convenience of sampling. As discussed in the following section of Semi-structured 
Interview, I had the acquaintance of a few key informants who worked in the street-level 
RSCs and knew many female entrepreneurs.  
Data Collection 
The notion of triangulation was endorsed to inform the design of data collecting 
strategies. As Denzin (1978) defined, triangulation is “the combination of methodologies 
in the study of the same phenomenon” (p. 291). This notion originally derived from 
“navigation and military strategy that use multiple reference points to locate an object’s 
exact position” (as cited in Jick, 1979, p.102). Namely, a combined use of multiple data 
gathering methods in this study enhances the accuracy of data analysis based upon a 
collection of convergent data bearing on the same research object. Following the 
principles of triangulation, I used a semi-structured interview, participatory observation, 
and secondary data gathering in an effort to collect sufficient qualitative data for 
answering the research questions of this study. The data that I gathered through these 
methods allowed me to disclose how these Chinese urban businesswomen’s lived 
experience are connected to China’s recent policies of embracing the globalized trend of 
neo-liberalism. Among the three data gathering methods, the semi-structured interview 
was the primary one, and the other two were undertaken to triangulate data uncovered in 
interviews.  
Sampling plan and procedures. Before proceeding to the detailed discussion of 
sampling strategy and procedures, it is noteworthy to point out that I found it very 
difficult to persuade Chinese urban female entrepreneurs to participate in my research 
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project. One reason is that many of them were unwilling to trust me. For instance, after 
knowing that I was a Chinese doctoral student from an American university, many 
potential research participants suspected that I was working for an American media outlet 
or even for an American intelligence agency. For them, talking to me would put them in 
trouble in cases that I could probably publish their discussions on politically sensitive 
topics and subject them to crippling sanctions. Such a permeation of cynicism and 
distrust in inter-personal relations caused barriers to effective communication and even 
recruiting enough research participants. This point will be further developed in chapter 
four. 
Unsuccessful urban female entrepreneurs were also reluctant to participate in the 
study. Once they knew my research objectives, they would refuse to talk anything about 
their past entrepreneurial experience. All the respondents I ultimately recruited were 
successful in running their businesses at least when they were interviewed. My research 
findings are to some extent constrained by such a sampling strategy, because interviews 
with unsuccessful urban female entrepreneurs would probably generate unexpected 
research findings concerning not only women's entrepreneurial experience but also the 
Chinese government’s advocacy for women’s self-employment. A few other reasons that 
potential respondents refused to join in the research project include being super busy with 
their businesses, interrupting with their businesses, having nothing to say, being too shy, 
and so on.  
In order to overcome these barriers, a snowball sampling method was undertaken 
to recruit as many respondents as possible in order to gain a clear picture of those 
businesswomen’s participation in the government-managed MDPs. This sampling 
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strategy is a perfect fit for the situation “when the members of a special population are 
difficult to locate” (Rubin & Babbie, 2009, p. 148). First, I decided to locate the specific 
RSCs where I could be able to utilize the acquaintance with two RSC officials and let 
them refer research participants through their own social connections. These two key 
informants include one friend of my father’s working in a Nanjing RSC and a friend of 
mine employed in a Haikou RSC. Both of them assisted me to set up and maintain field 
relations with those female entrepreneurs participating in the research project. After that, 
with the IRB approval issued by Arizona State University, I briefly explained my project 
to every potential research participant and then asked her for consent to an interview or 
be observed. At last, 26 urban female entrepreneurs were successfully recruited in 
Nanjing, and 23 in Haikou (see Appendix A). 
For the 49 urban female entrepreneurs, the vast majority of them were middle-
aged women, except seven of them in their twenties. Most of them had less than a college 
education, and there were only three females who had earned their Bachelor’s degrees. 
The three college graduates became self-employed for the purpose of earning a much 
higher income and enjoying a more flexible schedule than working for someone else. By 
contrast, the other women were actually pushed to get involved in entrepreneurship after 
either being laid off from the SOEs or migrating into urban areas without the original 
urban household registration. Despite this difference, the businesses in my sample 
specialized in a wide range of low-profit business fields, such as grocery store, 
convenient store, small restaurant, laundry, bakery and small computer repair store. 
When it comes to the ownership of these businesses, 33 of them were self-owned, 13 
  36 
were owned by couples, and the ownership of the remaining one was split equally among 
the three female college graduates who had been friends before starting their business.  
Semi-structured interview. The semi-structured interview method combines “the 
flexibility of the unstructured, open-ended interview with the directionality and agenda of 
the survey instrument to produce focused, qualitative, textual data at the factor level” 
(Schensul, S., Schensul, J., & LeCompte, 1999, p. 149). Therefore, I prepared a set of 
questions that directly derive from the central research questions of this study (see 
Appendix B). For example, to what extent do you think the MDP has helped you to make 
social connections? What kind of social connections, if any, does the MDPs has helped 
you to make? How have these social connections influenced your business or even your 
daily life? How has doing your own business influenced your daily life? How would you 
like to describe a successful business woman in today’s China? How do you describe the 
similarities or differences between you and a successful businesswoman? All of these 
questions will address the dynamic, complex interactions of women’s self-employment 
with the national and global promotion of the MDPs. Moreover, any emergent topic that 
arises in the interview process was taken into account, and then the interview questions 
was modified to collect more detailed data relevant to that topic.  
I interviewed them face-to-face in the workplace. Each interview took 1 to 3 
hours. I took detailed notes because they were not comfortable to be tape-recorded. Due 
to the nature of this sampling method, representativeness is not the most important 
criteria to assess the quality of my sampling. Instead, saturation determines when I have 
sufficient qualitative data for answering all research questions. The concept of saturation 
means that a researcher gathers sufficient data to include all the available elements “of a 
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given population with the characteristics in which the researcher is interested” 
(Rajamanickam, 2001, p. 84). Thus, I did not end my sampling process until I had found 
some key topics relevant to the research questions repeating in my gathered data. Also, I 
kept "open to what is happening in the field and be willing to grapple with it” in order not 
to foreclose analytic possibilities too early and construct superficial analysis (Charmaz, 
2006, p. 115). 
Participatory observation. Participatory observation provided a detailed 
depiction of daily activities in which the urban female entrepreneurs undertook on a 
typical day. As a matter of fact, it was an important part of my interaction with the field 
sites. I tried to request consent from the respondents that allowed me to take notes of 
what I had observed in the field sites. After they agreed to be observed, I started to 
“shadow” before and after my interviews with them. “Shadowing” is a set of observation 
techniques that are utilized to gather data about the contextualized activities of research 
subjects within a predetermined period of time (Sachs, 1993). Bruni et al. (2004) 
conducted an empirical research that provided a good example of using the technique of 
shadowing. They behaved “as an intruder” who adjusted “his level of intrusiveness from 
time to time… and [maintained] an attitude of what one might call ‘diffuse attention’: 
settings, members of the organization, aesthetic aspects, technologies, ritual and/or 
simply random events were all investigated to gain understanding of how/when the 
shadow of the entrepreneur was projected on to them or obscured by them” (p. 199).  
Following the shadowing method, I utilized my presence in the field sites as an 
interpretive lens in order to understand the process in which the respondents constructed 
their actions, words, and thoughts as institutional ones. Each observation of a business 
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took 0.5 to 1 hour. My observation focused on every individual present in the workplace, 
paying attention to what he or she did there. I was especially interested in any interaction 
among several individuals, such as substantial collaboration between a respondent and 
other helpers in the workplace, the respondent’s inter-personal communication with 
customers and nearby self-employed persons, and so on. Another source of primary data 
from participatory observations was the respondents’ facial expressions and bodily 
actions that were of great significance to the interpretation of their words. I took detailed 
notes of my participatory observations and triangulated data gathering through other data 
gathering methods.  
Secondary data gathering. Secondary data were collected to cross-check with 
the primary data gathered from semi-structured interviews and participatory observations. 
As Kothari (2009) defined, secondary data refer to the data that have already been 
collected and analyzed by someone else (p. 111). I carefully reviewed multiple sources of 
secondary data, including government documents and reports, laws, census reports, 
newspapers, and archived data sets. I obtained these secondary data from community 
libraries, street-level governments, MDP clients’ recommendations and Web-based 
searches. These data especially focused on the Chinese party-state’s public policies and 
propaganda which have influenced women’s participation in social production since the 
founding of the PRC in 1949. Therefore, they were apparently important in cross-
checking with the primary data. Particularly, they were useful in filling out the gaps left 
by interview and observation notes. For instance, it was more often than not difficult for 
the respondents to remember every detail of her affiliated MDP’s new service, so a 
relevant government document turned out to be a very significant supplement to the 
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detailed discussion concerning how this new service would influence women’s 
businesses and daily lives. 
Consideration of validity. As Maxwell (2005) defined, validity is “the 
correctness or credibility of a description, conclusion, explanation, interpretation, or other 
sort of account” (p. 87). Therefore, validity depends upon two factors: first, the 
relationship of the research findings to the data; second, the design and implement of the 
research methods. Based upon these two important factors, I considered two possible 
validity threats to my study project: first, I tied the research findings from studying a 
small size of sample to the national and even global context; second, the sensitive nature 
of my respondents spoke, acted or thought in the same way as they were not studied.  
In order to ensure the validity of my research, I paid special attentions to my 
interpretation of the data so that the ultimate research findings did not disjoint with the 
contextualized data. The basic principles of the ECM can complement my concern. 
Combining this approach in my dissertation project goes beyond a detailed description of 
routine activities to consider: first, what much larger politico-socio-economic 
arrangements are reflected in these activities; second, what insights about reconstructing 
pre-existing theories can be derived from an empirical study (Buroway, 1991). In 
addition, I discussed the issue of a voluntary participation with my respondents and let 
them feel free to quit at any time.  
Data Analysis 
Marshall and Rossman (2010) stressed that researcher have to deal with the messy 
and non-linear nature of qualitative inquiry. Miles and Huberman (1994) clarified this 
nature of qualitative research that studies have to recursively deal with data collection, 
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data analysis, and conclusion making throughout the whole process of research. I took 
these advice especially in my design of the data analysis method, so GT was adopted in 
order to enable me to engage recursively in data collection, data analysis, and conclusion 
making. 10 As Charmaz’s (2006) definition illustrates: 
grounded theory studies emerge from wrestling with the data, making 
comparisons, developing categories, engaging in theoretical sampling, and 
integrating an analysis…the entire research process is interactive, in this sense, 
we bring past interactions and current interests into our research, and we interact 
with our empirical materials and emerging ideas as well as, perhaps, granting 
agencies, institutional review boards, and community agencies and groups, along 
with research participants and colleagues.  Neither data nor ideas are mere objects 
that we passively observe and compile. (p. 510)  
Following GT, qualitative researchers have to go back and forth while gathering data, 
interpreting data, comparing data, writing, modifying research design and reconstructing 
the emergent theoretical ideas. In this sense, GT is multivariate, being practiced 
“sequentially, subsequently, simultaneously, serendipitously, and scheduled" (Glaser, 
1998, p. 1). As a result, ground theory provided me with an explanatory device through 
which to account for most of the change on time, context, and research subject’s 
subjectivities.  
According to Charmaz’s (2006) advice about conducting a GT analysis, my data 
analysis was conducted as a two-stage process. First, I did an open coding to identify key 
themes or categories through analyzing the data. After that, I did the second stage of data 
                                                 
10 The debate between GT and the ECM displayed two differentiated yet not mutually exclusive ways of 
dealing with the relation of empirical data and theory in a sociological inquiry. For Burawoy (1991, 1998), 
the ECM tends to be a theoretically driven ethnography with the purpose of developing pre-existing 
theories. In contrast, the GT tradition seeks for theoretical insights from the lived experience of the setting 
participants that are inevitably shaped by various structures and norms (Charmaz, 2006). Despite these 
differences, both GT and ECM can be utilized together in my study as a comprehensive theoretical 
construction of social life that privileges ethnography as an access to the empirical world.  
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analysis through focused coding. In this stage, these key themes deriving from the first 
stage guided my revisit of the data, and more importantly, I watched for any emerging 
categories of analysis. 
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CHAPTER 3 
GENDERED GRAND NARRATIVE OF THE PRC’S HISTORY—WOMEN’S EVER-
CHANGING SOCIAL STATUS 
The formation of the new worker-subject, the Chinese female entrepreneur, is the 
central theme of this research project. The Chinese female entrepreneur is a specific 
cultural-symbolic artifact as well as a worker-subject, socially constituted in neo-liberal 
China while the transnational capitalist economy and accompanying capitalist ideologies 
came to China during the post-socialist period. Therefore, the Chinese female 
entrepreneur is fundamentally a newly embodied social identity construction which is 
shaped by both the politico-socio-economic relations of contemporary Chinese society 
and the demands of global capital. This chapter seeks to provide a historical review of 
Chinese women’s ever-changing social status and the recent rise of MDPs in China.  
Prior studies (see, for example, Jacka, 2013; Summerfield, 1994; Walstedt, 1978; 
Z. Zheng, Zhou, L. Zheng, Yang, D. Zhao, Lou, & S. Zhao 2001;) on Chinese women 
and labor followed a similar trajectory of Western feminist scholarship. These studies 
began by highlighting women’s presence in the workplace and homes, and their 
contributions to both the state’s economy and family life. Such a dual presence at work 
and family life was found to be subject to the influences of the Chinese party-state’s 
official narratives concerning women’s political and socio-economic role in post-1949 
China. Chinese women’s increasing socio-economic mobility in return has constantly 
influenced the outcomes of revolutionary organizing and state initiatives. Also, these 
researchers commonly argued that the dimensions of identity (e.g., gender, class, urban-
rural divide) have been constructed as important components of a Chinese modernity. In 
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this chapter, I will argue that this is indeed a valid analysis and that, following this 
trajectory, the phenomenon and the way it has been addressed in Chinese women's social 
identity construction pose a challenge to the Chinese party-state's promise of gender 
equality and women's liberation. Unlike these prior studies, I will argue that the making 
of the Chinese female entrepreneur, a recent transformation of women's social identities, 
has resulted in a series of new changes of women's employment, and a much close 
inspection of these change is able to bring a brand new perspective to the issue.  
This chapter begins with a story of how the gendered discourses of state in pre-
1978 China has worked as a framing device significant in stipulating the gendered 
division of labor and producing normative forms of work for males and females. This is 
followed by an investigation into the widening and proliferation of gender inequalities 
during the post-1978 era. After that, I want to examine the historical process of how 
women’s self-employment has gained an unprecedented prominence in China’s socio-
economic progress especially since the global financial crisis of 2008. Finally, this 
chapter ends with two concluding remarks, which would be further substantiated in the 
following two chapters respectively: first, inspired by the gendered historical narrative of 
China's feats under leadership of the CPC since 1949, it is of great importance to examine 
the way in which the party-state has strategically inscribed women's daily lives in the 
organization of power relations during the post-1978 era so as to continually justify its 
domination and exploitation of women's productive labor; second, given the party-state's 
tremendous interferences with women's lives, it is imperative to adopt the perspective of 
social identity construction, through which to scrutinize how Chinese women's lives have 
  44 
been constituted with the advance of China's integration with the contemporary global 
capitalism. 
Women and Labor during the Mao Years (1949-1976) 
After the CPC took power in 1949, Chairman Mao Zedong envisioned a new 
China where women would hold up half the sky. Article 91 of the 1954 Constitution 
promised guarantees of women’s equal rights in every aspect of life. The gendered 
discourses of state were therefore utilized to legitimize the birth of a modern socialist 
China: gender equality was promoted by the party-state’s policies and propaganda as the 
fundamental differentiation of socialism from capitalism, and women’s liberation was 
championed as one of the key elements of the CPC’s revolutionary promise (Gilmartin, 
Hershatter, Rofel, & White, 1994). In other words, the CPC raised a wave of state 
feminism which aimed to justify China’s transition to socialism and established the 
gendered notion of the socialist state (Wang, 2005).  
Chinese women’s participation in the wage-jobs in a large scale, as some Western 
feminist scholars applauded, owned much to the effort of the Maoist party-state, which 
has over the years carried out a succession of progressive legislation and official policies 
(Hershatter, 2004). Major pieces of legislation include Labor Insurance Regulations of 
the PRC (1953) and the Announcement on Female Workers’ Production Leave by the 
State Council (1955). Additionally, the Chinese central government signed up to a large 
number of International Labor Conventions, joining a globally collaborated initiative of 
protecting women’s equal opportunity in employment. For example, the government 
signed the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms Discrimination 
Against Women, the International Labor Organization Convention No. 45 Concerning the 
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Employment of Women on Underground Work in Mines of All Kinds (1935), and the 
ILO No. 100 Concerning Equal Pay for Men and Women Workers of Equal Value.  
All these legislative efforts constituted the party-state’s attempt to establish a 
legal system. It aimed to promote equal opportunity regardless of gender difference and 
to reduce women’s vulnerability to all types of discrimination in the workplace. Efforts 
were also extended towards a radical transformation of women’s role in the family, in 
order to emancipate them from the coercion of patriarchal family norms and make them 
publicly available for the paid labor force. For instance, the central government 
promulgated and implemented the marriage law in 1950, which prohibited arranged 
marriage, stipulated a legal age of getting married, and gave women and men an equal 
right to divorce. In doing so, the party-state during the early age of the PRC 
enthusiastically insisted that women would achieve self-liberation through massive 
participation in social production, and more significantly, contribute to China’s objectives 
of modernization and industrialization (H. Evans, 1997).  
In a stark contrast to the party-state’s policy support and propaganda of women’s 
equality campaign, the entry of women into wage-jobs in fact was not constantly 
expanded. Women’s equality campaign during the Mao era was actually undertaken in a 
self-contradictory way: in periods of labor shortage (e.g. the Great Leap Forward of the 
late 1950s), a large number of females were urged to take on paid jobs, in many cases 
providing men with opportunities of doing more skilled jobs (Andors, 1983); during 
periods of economic recession (e.g., the mid-1950s and the early 1960s), however, the 
local and central governments fell short of their oath of drawing women into the labor 
force and emphasized women’s responsibility for family life (Hooper 1984). As this 
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twisted historical process indicates, the party-state’s way of manipulating women’s labor 
force during the Mao era was contextually contingent. That is to say, a large-scale entry 
of women in wage-jobs was mobilized by the central and local governments only when 
men’s labor force could not be able to satisfy the demand of the state’s economy. 
Whenever the demand tailed off, women would be immediately required to give up their 
job opportunities to males. Therefore, I argue that the Maoist party-state’s efforts of 
legalizing women’s equal rights in the workplace actually aimed to create and take 
advantage of the steady availability of a cheap, docile, and easily replaceable reserve 
army of labor. To put it bluntly, even though women’s access to paid jobs was sometimes 
widened during the Mao era, the purpose of the party-state’s initiative was not for 
promoting Chinese women’s socio-economic status, but rather for exploiting women’s 
productive labor in order to sustain the state’s economic development. On this account, it 
would be interesting to explore how those women’s lives were actually influenced by the 
party-state’s strategic management of women’s labor force. 
Overall, the classed discourses of state and the accompanying illusion of class 
equality could not be capable of silencing various types of gender inequality which 
caused considerable barriers to women’s employment in Maoist China. According to 
China’s legal regulation and propaganda apparatus during the Maoist era, class equality 
was prerequisite for gender equality at that time. In January 1953, the People’s Daily, the 
most influential and authoritative newspaper of the Chinese central government, 
published an article titled with “To work is to liberate: To struggle is to raise your social 
status” (Lan, 1953). This piece of news covered the first role model across the country for 
other local governments, which successfully set up a rough equity of wage between males 
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and females doing the same type of work. This explicitly gave birth to another major 
wave of social campaign, which focused with any depth on gender equality (especially in 
the workplace) since the ill-fated Marriage Law Campaign of the early 1950s.  
A large number of official policies were implemented to support the Maoist party-
state’s legal apparatus with the purpose of promoting gender equality. For example, 
during the period of the late 1950s, a public policy of “replacing male with female 
workers” was implemented in the commercial and service sector so as to expand 
women’s access to wage-jobs; this was followed by the period of the 1960s and 1970s, 
when the labor authorities at different administrative levels exercised a type of labor 
distribution based on a pre-determined quota of men and women in job allocations. In 
doing so, women and men were considered as almost equal due to their common 
affiliation with the working-class by working in the SOEs. As a consequence, class 
appeared to be the sole classification scheme. 11 In this sense, gender difference no longer 
served as a useful way in which people with different gender identities were differentially 
positioned in the social pyramid. This type of homogenous force climaxed in the Cultural 
Revolution (1967-1977), representing the socialist ideal of gender equality— “a kind of 
androgyny, a sexual sameness, based on the defeminization of female appearance and its 
approximation to male standards of dress” (H. Evans, 1997, p. 2). 
 Nevertheless, the socialist ideal image of gender equality, which was directed by 
the party-state’s policies and propaganda apparatus, failed to disguise or even eliminate 
women’s oppressions in pre-1978 China. Some feminist scholars found insufficient the 
                                                 
11 The working-class was seen as the only social class, because the bourgeois was totally eliminated after 
the 1949 liberation. 
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party-state’s efforts of fighting with the persistent gender inequality—that remnants of 
feudal thinking perpetuated, particularly within the peasantry (Hershatter, 2004). For 
instance, a gendered division of labor, as Andors (1983), Wolf (1985), and Y. Jiang 
(2004) noted, has always existed to track men into the higher-paying state sector and 
more skilled, socially prestigious vocations across all sectors: in the industrial sector, 
women were to a large extent confined in collective neighborhood factories, where wage 
and working environment were not as good as those in SOEs; in the agricultural sector, 
more work points were allocated to “heavy work” which supposedly involved the high-
level skills of using complex agricultural machinery or raising large draft livestock and 
thus should be performed by men, whereas rural women were concentrated in less-work-
point-earned jobs which involved more physical labor and often contributed more to the 
collective. Consistent with Jacka's (1997, p. 188) argument, the three gendered 
dichotomies with its root in the remnants of Chinese feudal thinking gained dominance in 
shaping people’s working experience: “inside and outside, light and heavy, and unskilled 
and skilled”, with the latter, more socially honorable attribute associated with men’s 
social identity making. Simply put, the gendered division of labor, which had been 
greatly informed by Chinese feudal remnants, apparently privileged men rather than 
women.  
Furthermore, Chinese feudal remnants influenced not only human subjects in the 
workplace but also those in the household. The remaining influence of feudal thinking 
was in particular obvious in an extensive existence of partrilocal marriage in the rural 
area of Mao’s China (Johnson, 1983). Given that a male family member was allocated 
with more raw materials, tools, and work points than a female one was, the persistence 
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and prosperity of peasant households during the collectivist period (1949-1966) to a large 
extent depended upon the number of male family members that they had. In order to 
sustain the growth of family size, parents tended to value sons rather than daughters who 
would marry out, and to keep in control the procurement of daughters-in-law who would 
be responsible for giving birth to the next generation of family members (especially male 
laborers). 
Even though an increasing number of both urban and rural women started to go 
out to work, domestic work and childcare were still the province of women, intensifying 
their burden especially after they got married, and decreasing their chance to earn more 
wages or work points and to engage in political activities (Andors, 1983; Hershatter, 
2003; Wolf, 1985). The heavy domestic burden imposed upon Chinese women was partly 
due to the party-state’s accumulation strategy which invested much more resources in 
heavy industry than in either light industry or social service provision (Croll, 1983). 
Having restored a viable economic basis, the First Five-year Plans (1953-1957) under the 
leadership of the Maoist party-state was carried out as a centrally-planned program of 
economic development, concentrating the state's available resources on the construction 
of 694 large and medium-sized industrial projects. 12 As a consequence, a lack of 
investment in producing consumer goods and social services was compensated by the 
party-state’s appropriation and exploitation of women’s devalued labor within their 
households. Take childcare for instance, Thorborg (1978) estimated that during the 
                                                 
12 The Five-year Plans of PRC refer to a series of the Chinese party-state's economic development 
initiatives, which were centrally planned through the plenary sessions of the Central Committee and 
national congresses. These plans generally focus on strategies of economic growth and growth targets. 
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period of the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961), which even represents the peak in the 
Maoist party-state's attention to social service supply, almost half of pre-school children 
were taken care of by their mothers within the household. Like childcare, women's lower-
paying jobs in the workplace and their unpaid domestic work were exploited by Maoist 
centrally planned economy as a necessary supplement to China's under-developed light 
industry.  
To sum up, the party-state during the Mao period, as feminist scholars condemn, 
practiced a reductionist theory of women’s liberation with an exclusive focus on 
mobilizing them into social production (Hershatter, 2004). According to Mao's (1978) 
well-known discussion about China's state feminism, to liberate Chinese women is 
primarily based upon the working-class's victory of founding a socialist state. At the very 
core of pre-1978 China's regime and propaganda apparatus, Mao's instruction strictly set 
such a reductionist trend as the tone for the party-state's relevant laws and policies 
concerning women's liberation. In this way, women would never be liberated unless the 
economic basis of the Chinese working-class regime is highly developed. Namely, the 
state's economic development rather than gender equality was considered to be of highest 
priority. The Maoist party-state, however, noticeably neglected that a complex of 
cultural, political, social and economic dynamics has to be factored into the practice of 
women’s equality campaign. The result of the Maoist party-state’s state feminism was 
simply to perpetuate gender inequality, which was particularly featured as the gendered 
division of labor deeply shaped by Chinese feudal remnants. In short, the newly 
established regime was founded and maintained in pre-1978 China at the expense of 
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Chinese women’s plight, and the following section shows that this situation remains very 
much the same during the post-1978 era. 
Women and Labor during the Reform Era (1978- ) 
This section provides a historical review concerning how women’s political and 
socio-economic status have been changed since China’s rapid economic growth began in 
1978. Also, it offers another critique of the party-state’s reductionist perspective of 
women's liberation, disproving the assumption that economic progress would readily give 
birth to women’s liberation and gender equality. The seeds of the reductionist trend, as 
the section above shows, were first planted back in the pre-1978 era and blossomed 
during the reform era. Economic growth took off with the advance of the market-oriented 
reform in 1978, and accelerated dramatically in the 1990s as a result of adopting large-
scale privatization programs and opening up the socialist state to global capital. 
Underlying this astonishing economic miracle was the unbalanced growth strategy 
centrally planned by the nation’s communist elites—Deng Xiaoping and his comrades. 
As Deng famously announced: “we must make full use of regional comparative 
advantages, enhance the strong points and avoid the weak points, so we must allow the 
imbalance” (Fujita & D. Hu, 2001, p. 19). Since then, various inequalities, including 
gender inequality, have been officially permitted or even encouraged in order to enable 
more advanced regions, sectors, households, and individuals to jump-start the state’s 
economic development.  
In such a situation, gender equality has been gradually set apart from the Maoist 
policies and propaganda of class equality, and an intensified attention to gender 
difference ensued. In this context, many have found the return of a discursive 
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circumstance where gender differences are multiplied and upheld by both men and 
women, as a clear reaction against the Maoist party-state’s silence of gender especially in 
the Cultural Revolution era. The result was a proliferation and widening of gender 
inequalities, accompanied by the party-state’s strategic appropriation and making of 
women’s social identities. The early years of the reform witnessed a rapid increase in the 
number of women employed in state-owned and collective enterprises (Robinson, 1985). 
Females constitute approximately 30% of the labor force in the SOEs and approximately 
50% in the collective and private enterprises combined (National Bureau of Statistics, 
1987). Official periodicals, however, reported a tendency that female workers with little 
kids were furloughed and sent back to home with only partial wages (Jacka, 1990). For 
instance, members of a province-level Women's Federation in Northeast China reported 
that a few SOEs urged pregnant women and women nursing little kids to take an 
extended holiday for one to two years on deduced pay (Luda Municipal Trade Union and 
Women's Federation, 1980). For those unwilling to take the extended holiday, they were 
possibly declined to be allocated with lighter work, breast-feeding time, or the breast-
feeding room.  
This tendency is a good case in point, illustrating the particular way in which 
urban women encountered gender discriminations in the workplace across all sectors. 
This type of job discriminations was often based upon a gendered assumption that 
women’s “inside” workload (e.g., childcare and household responsbilities) would cause 
extra costs to companies, and make them less competitive and productive compared with 
their male counterparts (H. Evans, 2000; Parish & Busse, 2000). This directly serves as 
an explanation of the fact that urban women were more likely to be employed in 
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collective rather than SOEs and in low-wage industries that were usually seen as an 
extension of domestic work (e.g., early childhood education, textiles, catering) (Bian, 
Logan, & Shu, 2000; Robinson, 1985). Gender discrimination in post-1978, as Burnett 
(2010, p. 298) put, has been increasingly visible in “hiring, dismissal, earlier retirement, 
fines for violation of family planning regulations, wage differences, denial of certain 
social welfare benefit, and sexual harassment”.  
As an essential part of the reform, the restructuring of SOEs since the 1990s has 
further undermined gender equality through smashing the life-tenured employment 
system, producing millions of past renowned SOE female employees, now socially 
abandoned laid-off females comprising a terribly large mass of newborn marginals 
(Overholt, 1999; Solinger, 2002). One-third of the prior SOE workers became a surplus 
according to the market principles of cost-efficiency and competitiveness, and many of 
them were laid off in the mid-1990s. With the exception of Parish and Busse’s (2000) 
optimistic expectations, other scholars (e.g., Jacka, 1990; Jiang, 2004) tended to be 
worried about the result of this economic change—worsened social stratification, both 
between males and females, and among women (married vs. unmarried; migrant vs. 
originally urban), because women retired at earlier ages or were laid off (Xiagang 下岗) 
in higher numbers compared to men. Especially for middle-aged and old women, they 
were more often than not treated as unskilled, and therefore most vulnerable to 
unemployment (H. Evans, 2002).  
As is shown by a random survey conducted by the Ministry of Statistics in 1997, 
nearly 60% of laid-off SOE workers were female whilst female workers constituted only 
40% of the labor force of those SOEs surveyed (M. Zhang & L. Zhao, 1999). 
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Employment statistics also indicate that the number of female workers noticeably 
decreased since the party-state's structuring of SOEs in the 1990s with the proportion of 
women in the whole workforce in 1998 (38%) 7% lower than that 3 years ago (The 
Ministry of Statistics, 1999). More unfairly, women being laid off or retiring at an earlier 
ago have to endure a substantial reduction in their pension, because their retirement 
income is proportional to their previous wage as well as to their length of service in work 
units (e.g., 88% for 35 years of service; 82% for 30-34 years of service; 75% for 20-29 
years of service) (Cooke, 2001). Therefore, the cost of the restructuring has fallen upon 
women disproportionately, and more significantly, the discourses of class equality based 
upon women and men's equal access to the SOEs have actually dissipated and therefore 
could no longer sustain the Maoist party-state's policies and propaganda concerning 
gender equality.  
In the rural areas, land was given back to individual households, but men were 
allocated with more than women were (Judd, 1994). As opposed to the pessimistic 
conclusions that returning to household farming would probably push rural women back 
to isolated labor under patriarchal family structure (e.g., Andors, 1983; Davin, 1989), 
rural women have actively participated in household-based enterprises (Judd, 1994), 
vending agricultural products at periodic markets, running small-scale stores, and 
opening small restaurants (K. Zhou, 1996). Moreover, as restrictions to urban-rural 
migration were lifted in the reform era, those without urban household registration—
effectively illegal aliens within the territory of their own nation—commonly known as 
floating population have gained an unparalleled importance in contributing to the Chinese 
phenomenally rapid economic growth. The term "floating population" is used 
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interchangeably with "rural-to-urban migrants" all throughout the dissertation to 
specifically refer to this group of Chinese people. Predominantly rural-to-urban migrants 
rushing into the industrial centers of China’s southeastern coast, this internal migratory 
population (both inter- and intra-provincial) has exceeded 245 million until 2013 and 
nearly one third of them are female (Armstrong, 2013; H. Hu, 2014; Jacka & Gaetnao, 
2004; Ngai, 1999; Solinger, 1999).  
Despite the contribution of the rural workforce to the state's economy, prevalent 
urban discourses on the floating population are considerably negative (Solinger, 1999; W. 
Sun, 2004). Rural migrants, even those who have already acquired their urban household 
registration, were held responsible for all kinds of social problems, such as crime, city 
crowding, sanitation problems, and an inadequate supply of public goods (education, 
health care, water, etc.); female migrants have to struggle with extra pressures: they are 
usually described as easily subject to abuse and sexual harassment, and more worse, as a 
potential threat to marriages for being involved in sex industry and extramarital 
relationship with urban married men (Chao, 2003; Tan, 2000). The local and central 
governments failed in effectively responding to the cries of their main labor force 
because the party-state nowadays continues to share Mao’s fears back in 1958, when the 
Household Registration (Hukou 户口) policy was first promulgated by the central 
government to keep in control the mobilization of the labor force. 13 Like the Soviet 
                                                 
13 Since the twenty-first century, the party-state has started to realize that the discriminations towards rural 
residents caused by the HRS actually lead to serious barriers to rural economic growth and tarnished the 
image of China's human rights as well. Therefore, the central and local governments issued a series of 
influential policies to improve the social status of rural residents. For instance, Document No. 5 of the State 
Council 2006 was implemented to protect migrant workers from being discriminated in the workplace. In 
spite of this, the HRS still remains to be the equivalent of an apartheid system between rural and urban 
citizens because it has never stopped being justified by the party-state as an effective instrument of social 
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propiska system, the Household Registration System (HRS) works as an internal passport 
which categorizes citizens as either urban or rural. Given the large number of poor rural 
residents, it also legitimizes the state to specify a rigid urban-rural divide through which 
to treat urban residents much better than their rural counterparts. Significantly, this urban-
rural divide ensured an adequate supply of cheaper labor force to industrial cities at the 
expense of rural citizens' oppressions (Armstrong, 2013).  
We should look no further than their low income. The urban labor market for low-
skilled jobs primarily consists of migrant workers, providing difficult working conditions 
and a subsistence-level wage rate. The results of many surveys indicate that the wage rate 
for migrant workers in the Pearl Delta has not obviously increased during the last decade, 
which in fact means their actual income decreased a lot compared with China's rising 
inflation rate (Research Office Project Team, 2006). In 2002, the average monthly wage 
of migrant workers was only $100, which is nearly a half of the average wage of urban 
laborers. More unfairly, in order to make ends meet, rural-to-urban migrants working in 
the urban areas had to accept much more working hours per day which could probably 
even decrease their hourly wage. This has already been evidenced by a large-scale survey 
conducted in a few mid-western provinces: the hourly wage rate for rural-to-urban 
workers is only a quarter of that for urban laborers (Research Office Project Team, 2006). 
Given all these work-related discriminations against rural-to-urban migrant workers, they 
have exactly constituted a big part of the disadvantaged lifeblood of China’s socio-
economic reforms.  
                                                 
control (especially through supplying demographic data for the party-state's central planning) (Laquian, 
2005). 
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Despite the central focus of this research project on urban female entrepreneurs, 
those currently “legal” female city residents with original rural household registration 
comes to provide another layer of analysis through which to explore the overwhelming 
influence of urban-rural divide on those women’s bumpy business careers. Significantly, 
the disadvantaged social status of migrant workers during the reform era deteriorates a 
series of gender-related discriminations particularly against those females temporarily 
working and living in cities. Among all these gender-featured discriminations, the 
gendered division of labor still remains to be a predominant way in which Chinese feudal 
thinking organizes female rural migrants living in post-1978 China’s cities. According to 
the outside/inside dichotomy, men were more likely than women to go out and look for 
jobs in urban areas (Fan, 2003). As was reported by China's 2014 Census, the propensity 
of women to migrate continues to be lower than that of men. During the period of 2009-
2014, 3.2% of Chinese women aged 15-59 (9.1 million) migrated, compared with 3.8% 
of Chinese men (12.9 million) (National Bureau of Statistics, 2014). More seriously, most 
female migrants had limited and lower-paying job options (Tan, 2004), preferred to 
migrate before they had been married out (Liang & Chen 2004), and did not go as far 
away from home as men did (Davin, 1989; Jacka, 1997).  
As men of all ages and unmarried girls went out of home in increasing numbers 
for jobs in industrialized cities or towns, agricultural production has become much more 
feminized, in particular the purview of older married women (Croll, 1995; Fan, 2003; 
Jacka, 1997; Murphy, 2004). In this sense, the inside/outside dichotomy was far from 
being eliminated by the socio-economic reforms since 1978 as the proponents of the 
reductionist approach assumed. It is because China's astonishing economic growth during 
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the reform era has not redeemed the Maoist party-state's promise of women's 
(self-)liberation. In contrary, a double disadvantage is currently imposed upon rural-to-
urban female migrants in ways that the gendered division of labor is intertwined with the 
urban/rural divide to affect their lives. 
 To sum up, the double disadvantage of gender and rural origin in fact features the 
party-state's subjugation and exploitation of women during the reform era, particularly 
serving as a way of justifying China's socio-economic transition since 1978 from a 
centrally-planned economy to a socialist market economy. As the section above indicates, 
it is in pretty much the same way that the Maoist party-state's appropriation of women's 
devalued labor was justified by Maoist China's transition from a semi-colonial and semi-
feudal state with a crumbling economy to a socialist state with a preliminarily 
industrialized and independent economy. Accordingly, Chinese women's oppressions 
throughout the PRC's history indeed served as one of the most important foundations, 
upon which China under the leadership of the CPC carried out two major comprehensive 
restructurings of political and socio-economic system. The next section analytically 
attends to a continuation of the history of the party-state's appropriation of women's labor 
force, which is particularly exemplified by the rise of the Chinese female entrepreneur.  
Rise of the Chinese Female Entrepreneur 
When official newspapers cover the stories of women’s involvement in self-
employment, there is frequent reference to the fact that nearly half of the country’s 
private business owners are female (Wallis, 2006). When such women are highlighted, 
the Maoist rhetoric of “holding up half the sky” is readily invoked, and this re-appearance 
of the Maoist gendered discourses of women’s emancipation seems to be another promise 
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that the post-1978 party-state has made to work for gender justice. Nevertheless, the 
outcome, as my empirical study will suggest, has been the continuation and perpetuation 
of women’s subordination. In other words, women’s active participation in self-
employment has in fact opened up a new field in which women's oppressions remain. 
Generally, the development of the private sector has been a long journey of ups 
and downs since the founding of the PRC. The economic reforms since 1978 brought 
about a revival of the private sector and self-employment after private ownership had 
been almost eradicated during the first thirty-year of the PRC. In a stark contrast to the 
radical large-scale privatization programs in post-1989 Russia and its affiliated Eastern 
European countries, an incremental approach of gradually fostering private ownership 
was adopted in post-1978 China without privatizing the whole public sector (Qian, 2000). 
During the early age of the reform era, the central and local governments imposed many 
regulations and restrictions on the growth of the private sector. For instance, legal 
registration was granted to only individual or household-based businesses (Getihu 个体
户), and such small-scale businesses was required to hire no more than eight employees. 
For larger-scale privately-owned businesses (Siying qiye 私营企业), they did not exist 
lawfully until the mid-1980s.  
Undergoing the stunning reversals during the period from 1989 to 1991, the 
private-sector growth gained new momentum after Deng called for all Chinese people’s 
dedications to furthering the market-oriented reforms in his widely-known tour to the 
southern coast of China in 1992. Since then, non-state-owned enterprises at the grassroots 
level have been granted with a fully legitimized status, starting to serve as a new reliable 
engine of the state’s economic development. Though the Chinese economy has renewed 
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its reliance on the huge state sector investments and SOEs for economic recovery since 
2008 (Ramzy, 2009), the goal of constructing a balanced economy different from the 
state-centric growth model persistently emphasizes the economic importance of the 
private sector (Zhu & Wan, 2012). The share of GDP produced in the non-state-owned 
economy exceeded two thirds in 2010, and the share produced by private-owned 
enterprises alone constituted more than 60% (Cheng, 2010). Further, private-owned 
enterprises created more than 70% of new jobs in China’s urban areas.  
The rebirth and prosperity of the private sector in China’s economy during the 
past few decades constituted the global trend of the new economy. The new economy 
refers to a globalized phenomenon, resulting from a relocation of the manufacturing-
based economy in developing countries and a fast growth of both high-tech industries and 
the service-based economy in developed countries (V. Smith, 2001). As Jurik (2005) 
observes, not only developing countries from the southern hemisphere but also wealth 
northern countries have witnessed the advance of the new economy during the past three 
decades. The widespread and influential rhetoric of the new economy advocated a 
reorganization of national and international divisions of labor. By doing so, it intensified 
the worldwide competition for decent jobs, and relocated good-paying industrial jobs to 
the south in an efforts to reduce labor and production costs. In countries like the U.S., this 
meant an increased reliance on the non-state-owned sector and small-scale businesses to 
create jobs and improve citizens' economic well-being. As a result, the explosion of 
women's self-employment programs across the globe blended well with neo-liberalism, 
which applauds the free market philosophy of a minimalist state as the central principle 
of addressing socio-economic problems.  
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MD is usually ascribed to a southern hemisphere invention that was later adopted 
by their counterparts located in northern hemisphere countries (Coyle, Houghton, M. 
Evans, & Vindasius, 1994). This simplified description of the diffusion of the MDP 
model, however, glosses over both global and local economic structures (Jurik, 2005). 
More importantly, it ignores a much closer inspection of neo-liberal ideologies and 
policies that has considerably shaped the spread and development of microenterprise 
development model. Accordingly, the rise of MDPs in post-reform China cannot be 
simply seen as an outgrowth of southern hemisphere forerunners. Rather, the adoption 
and spread of MDP model is examined in this study as a highly contested planning 
strategy through which globalization articulates with national cultural-political structures 
(Rankin, 2002).  
The context of economic and cultural strain formed by China’s reform since 1978 
has been a fertile ground for the adoption and diffusion of MDPs into post-reform China. 
This national promotion constitutes the global trend of “defining, on one hand, 
microcredit as the primary strategy for empowering women economically, and on the 
other hand, women as the primary or exclusive members for microcredit programs” 
(Poster & Salime, 2002, p. 217). Simply put, underlying the national and global 
promotion of MD, especially women’s entrepreneurship, is the gendered assumption that 
women are responsible for economic growth. The costs accompanying this responsibility 
include “magnifying women’s burden as providers for the family, discouraging male 
responsibility in household maintenance, and increasing the household workload for 
other family members, especially daughters” (p. 217). In other words, MD earns its 
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reputation through mapping capitalist ideology and practice on women’s productive 
bodies (Ehlers & Main, 1998).  
As global neo-liberalism became China’s defining economic regime in the mid-
1990s, the restructuring of SOEs and the accompanying social problems of women's 
disproportionate job loss triggered the establishment and promotion of state-sponsored 
MDPs in Chinese urban areas as a rapidly growing segment of non-state-owned economy 
(Overholt, 1999; Ru, Lu, & Dan, 1998). Also, it was designed as an essential part of the 
Re-employment Project (Zaijiuye jihua 再就业计划) (RP). Despite declaring China’s 
self-employment sector as a new source of economic growth rather than a refuge of 
marginalized people (Mohapatra, Rozelle, & Goodhue, 2007), the MDPs have been 
operated especially in cities since the mid-1990s as a response to the social problems of 
laid-off workers (Ru, Lu, & Dan, 1998). In 1997, Shanghai pioneered the RSC as the 
prototype of Chinese MDPs (Solinger, 2002). Unlike those MDPs in other countries 
which are sponsored and operated by multilateral institutions, non-governmental 
organizations, or non-profit organizations, the counterparts in China are primarily 
managed by street-level government agencies. The MDPs replaced the SOEs as 
“trustees” for laid-off people and other unemployed persons for a certain period of time. 
During this period of time, the MDPs were responsible for providing basic livelihood 
allowances, paying medical expenses and pensions, and most important, supplying new 
re-employment opportunities and trainings for those people. Though the target of the 
Chinese MDPs was later expanded to serve unemployed city residents and rural-to-city 
migrants, all these services have remained almost the same until now.  
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According to the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF), 40% of the millions of 
women who had been laid off from jobs in SOEs were assisted in being re-employed in 
getting off the ground their own businesses (Getting laid-off, 2003). Based upon this 
stunning number, the MDPs were therefore advocated as a big success of dealing with 
unemployment in an innovative way. Noticeably, the government mentioned that the 
ACWF and its affiliated street-level branches had to do a good job in persuading laid-off 
women to practice a mental conversion (Sixiang zhuanbian 思想转变). By doing this, the 
local and central governments persuaded laid-off women to get rid of their remnants of 
feudal thinking according to which going outside their households to do business is 
demeaning (Wallis, 2006).  
The significance of MD in China was further intensified by the party-state’s 
policies and propaganda during the aftermath of the global financial meltdown of 2008. 
The dramatically shrinking demand of foreign markets since 2008 squeezed China’s 
export market (Wong, 2011). It also required the Chinese government to seek for other 
viable ways of continuing the state’s economic growth. Withstanding an increasing 
worsening of global economy, governments across the globe, with no exception of the 
Chinese government, demonstrated a willingness to undertake unprecedented market 
interventions (Rudd, 2009). Policymakers from western countries primarily focused on 
credit market, and nurtured favorable conditions of both domestic and global capital 
accumulation, mainly through fiscal consolidation, tax reduction, and balanced budget 
(Dumenil & Levy, 2006; Glyn, 2006; Harvey, 2006; Peters, 2012). By contrast, the 
Chinese party-state did not endorse those Western countries' economic recovery plan. 
Rather, it embarked on a unique way of seeing women's self-employment as one of the 
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most important engines of the economic recovery. In other words, MD came to offer 
another avenue for continuing China's rapid economic growth through incorporating the 
economically marginalized (especially female ones) into the market economy. 
The party-state proclaimed an array of policies through which to further support 
growth in women’s businesses. On one hand, the government’s policy support focused on 
an expansion of women’s access to lending services. For instance, in 2009, the ACWF, 
China’s central bank, and Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security jointly 
announced the policy of expanding lending for female entrepreneurs (ACWF, 2009). On 
the other hand, the central and local governments promoted women’s entrepreneurship 
through adopting a strategy for social capital building. Many MDP proponents argued 
that pioneering MDPs, such as the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, succeeded in 
encouraging their clients to build social capital (i.e., social networks) (Ash, 2000). Taking 
this argument to heart, the Chinese government has implemented many public policies 
during the past few years through which to stress the importance of setting up the MDPs 
alliances (Dong, 2011; Gong, 2011). These MDP alliances are mainly targeted at bonding 
female entrepreneurs with each other as well as with the larger community for a better 
chance of subsistence and further development. For instance, Hebei Province Women's 
Federation reportedly endeavored to set up a province-wide female entrepreneur alliance 
in 2009, with the purpose of specifically urging better-off female business owners to 
connect with a small group of newcomers, and to share various resources and business 
experience with them (Gong, 2011); in Zhejiang Province, an increasing number of 
government-led female entrepreneur mutual aid alliances, which especially catered to the 
demands of university graduates, sprang up during the past several years and were 
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reported to considerably increase their chance of achieving business success through 
bonding them with other individuals and organizations from the larger community (Dong, 
2011); the founding of the Chinese Entrepreneur Forum in 2012 was repeatedly 
acclaimed by the central government and China's central bank for its timely and unfailing 
advocate of mutual assistance among female entrepreneurs in such a post-crash global 
economy (Z. Wang, 2012).  
All these policies point to a government-directed endeavor that actually exerted 
formidable influence far beyond the economic sphere. Noticeably, the party-state adopted 
neo-liberal values (e.g., self-management, self-enterprise) in women’s social identity 
construction that has gained an unprecedented prominence as a way out of the economic 
slowdown (Chow, 2010; Y. Li, 2009; Lin, 2009). Like working-class women socially 
honored during the Mao era, Chinese female entrepreneurs were also subject to the 
ideological influences of the party-state's policy making and propaganda apparatus. These 
two types of women’s social identity constructions both exemplify the way in which the 
Chinese party-state undertook an essentialized making of women's social identities in an 
effort to specify the dispositions and activities of women’s labor force (Hanser, 2005).14 
Also, it served as a convenient way of differentiating productive female bodied from the 
others. For instance, despite the Maoist party-state's several sporadic mobilizations of 
women back to home, it intended to set up working-class women as the benchmark 
through which to assess the progress of women's liberation/self-liberation through 
                                                 
14 By the term essentialized, I want to illuminate on the way in which the Chinese party-state’s policy 
making and propaganda apparatus have affected women’s social identity construction. Through the national 
promotion of Chinese urban female entrepreneurs as exemplary women, their behaviors and spirits were 
refined as a set of gender norms that morally regulated other women in the society.  
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participating in social production. Following the similar trajectory, the party-state during 
the reform era established female entrepreneurs as the role model that Chinese women 
(especially those laid-off women and migrant females) were expected to emulate. 
Principally, the party-state throughout the PRC's history has been obviously committed to 
generating a series of gender norms that morally regulate women's entry into the state’s 
socio-economic development.  
Gendered Grand Narrative of the PRC’s History 
Consistent with Hershatter’s (2004) conclusion, this brief historical review of 
Chinese women indicates that women were put at the central site where the PRC’s 
national modernity was imagined and practiced, more often than not through a language 
of crisis: only if the political and socio-economic status of Chinese women was raised, 
the newly established socialist nation would survive and even flourish; only if Chinese 
women were emancipated, the PRC could be remarkably different from, and more 
accurately, superior to the previous sovereignties of semi-colonialism and semi-
feudalism. As I discussed in the previous sections, the historical transition from feudalist 
China to the new socialist China was to a large degree justified and reinforced by the 
socially privileged working-class identity in the Maoist party-state's state-feminism. Also, 
the making of the Chinese female entrepreneur was appropriated as an evidence, showing 
that China's endorsement of the neo-liberal global agenda is beneficial to the vast 
majority of Chinese citizens (even including those marginalized women). 
Furthermore, the historical analysis in this chapter clearly shows that the ever-
changing status of Chinese women is featured by both progress and reversals. Many 
women certainly benefited a lot from the founding of the PRC and the later socio-
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economic reforms since 1978, such as a much higher standard of living, a considerably 
access to social production, and greater flexibility. Such progresses, however, are found 
to co-exist with a feudal-thinking-stereotyped image of woman that has paradoxically 
been intertwined with an increasing expansion of women’s rights and opportunities 
(Wallis, 2006). To put it differently, a gendered hierarchy can be found in not only the 
Maoist discourses of state, but also neo-liberal discourses prevalent in post-1978 China: 
during the Mao era, the Maoist state feminism purposely ignored gender inequality 
without making any efforts to change it, assuming women’s liberation as a finished work 
bequeathed by the modernized and industrialized nation (X. Li, 1999; Rofel, 1999); in 
neo-liberal China, an acquiescence or even an unabashed support of gender inequalities 
has in fact contributed a lot to China’s integration with global capitalism, while 
sweatshops and the sex industry did promote women’s economic self-sufficiency and free 
them from household burdens (X. Li, 2001).  
With hindsight, Chinese women’s liberation has been always utilized by the 
party-state not as an essential component of the state’s pursuit of modernization, but 
rather as an excuse to mobilize as many citizens as possible in working for the interests of 
the nation’s socio-economic development. The party-state’s policies and propaganda 
have engaged in promulgating the seemingly completed project of gender equality, toning 
down the widely existence of women’s subordination and thereby justifying a universal, 
agendered image of the rise of China. Without exaggeration, Chinese women’s labor 
force, or more specifically, their subordination is fundamental to the founding of the PRC 
as well as the contemporary phenomenal success of economic growth. Extending 
Hershatter’s (2004, p. 1034) argument that “the grand narrative of twentieth-century 
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revolutionary history cannot be understood without reference to gender discourse and 
women’s participation”, the grand narrative of the Chinese history of the second half of 
the twentieth century and the early twenty-first century comprises a gender subtext that 
makes gender invisible and reproduces women’s subordination.  
On this account, it would be of great importance to explore the way that Chinese 
women's lives during the neo-liberal era have been inscribed into the configuration of 
power relations in order to continually justify the Chinese party-state's intension of 
perpetuating women's oppressions. In chapter four, the state’s advocacy for women’s 
social networking initiative in the MD field exemplifies a major way of weaving 
women’s daily lives with the party-state’s policy making and propaganda apparatus. 
Through an in-depth investigation into Chinese urban female entrepreneurs’ daily 
practice of social networking, I am interested in examining how the party-state has 
strategically incorporated the global trend of neo-liberalism in an effort to continue its 
subjugation and exploitation of women’s productivity. Equally importantly, my analysis 
will keep open to any possibility that women's self-employment is not only subject to the 
ideological influences of such power relations, but also could probably change the 
configuration of power relations.  
Chinese Women’s Social Identity Construction 
Drawing upon the historical review in this chapter, I tend to argue that to 
manipulate Chinese women’s social identity making has been the primary way in which 
the party-state controlled and exploited them for the sake of the state’s socio-economic 
development. To be specific, women’s social identities along the lines of class, gender 
and urban-rural divide have been frequently subject to the shaping force of the party-
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state’s policies and propaganda, and more significantly, have been utilized by the party-
state as ideological evidence to justify China’s peaceful rise since 1949. During the 
Maoist era, women’s liberation was closely linked to the classed discourses of state. That 
is to say, when the party-state’s policies and propaganda concerning women’s equal 
social status were promoted, the collective—Chinese women were praised for their 
massive participation in social production as members of the working-class. Their social 
identities were to a large extent shaped by the discourses of class equality, so the 
overwhelming influence of class equality has considerably drowned the hoary crises of 
gender inequality.  
In contrast, it is the individual Chinese woman who is celebrated when the famous 
Maoist slogan “women can hold up half the sky” has been invoked again during the post-
1978 era. As opposed to the monotonous image of the revolutionary working-class 
women, women’s social identity making during the reform era have been featured in 
multiple ways according to their differentiated placements in the Chinese-featured market 
economy. Typical of this kind of gendered social identity making is to hold up exemplary 
women who succeed in their own ways within the circumstance of the socio-economic 
reforms (especially when they conquered a variety of difficulties), therefore reinforcing 
the correctness of neo-liberal China’s integration with global capitalism.  
Among all those role models, the making of the Chinese urban female 
entrepreneur has repeatedly been showcased because they can exactly exemplify the 
historical transition from the “old” centrally planned China to the “new” market-oriented 
China. As Wallis (2006) depicted, this type of success story “has all of the familiar 
elements” as it narrates how the woman struggled with all kinds of difficulties during the 
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early years of the reform era (e.g., being laid off from the SOEs), how she matures to be 
unwilling to fail, how she relies on herself and ultimately becomes successful (e.g., 
achieving economic self-sufficiency, being able to sustain her whole family, creating jobs 
for others) (p. 100). To socially construct Chinese women in this way comes to serve the 
purpose of assuaging any guilt or even affirming the wisdom of the party-state’s strategic 
decision of transforming the mechanism of the state’s socio-economic development at the 
expense of women’s plight. Accordingly, it would be of great importance to adopt the 
perspective of social identity construction through which to better understand how the 
Chinese party-state’s frequent inventions in women’s daily lives have shaped their social 
identity construction. In chapter five, I become interested in examining the politico-
historical process in which the socially privileged construction of the working-class 
woman gave its way to that of the Chinese urban female entrepreneur with the advance of 
China’s annexation with contemporary capitalist economy.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RE-THINKING THE COMMON 
This chapter focuses on the Chinese party-state’s strategy of adopting social 
capital building in MD. Drawing from the perspective of the respondents, it begins with 
an investigation into women’s daily practice of guanxi (social connections 关系)—the 
embodiment of social capital in Chinese society. More specifically, I intend to examine 
the nature of women’s social networking experience. My empirical data reveal that 
making friends was not out of self-interest but rather was to a large degree affectively 
charged. This research finding would pose a challenge to the popular utility-based 
assumption that socializing with other individuals or members of a certain institution is 
tingled with instrumental considerations.  
Following the ECM approach, an in-depth investigation of women’s social 
networking experience at the local level provides a window into the national/global 
promotion of social capital building strategy in the MD field. Responding to the first 
question raised at the end of chapter three, this study particularly attempts to illustrate a 
major way in which the party-state has weaved women’s life with the ever-changing 
configuration of power relations through influencing their social capital building 
experience. Though the term of social capital has been in circulation for many years, it 
did not become one of widely popular ideas around the globe until Putnam launched it as 
a popular focus for academic debate and daily life in1993.15 As discussed in chapter one, 
                                                 
15 In 1993, Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti (1993) published the book—Making Democracy Work: Civic 
Traditions in Modern Italy.  
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the instrumental orientation of Putnam’s social capital thesis has recently become much 
more obvious when social capital is widely advocated as an indispensable complement to 
the contemporary capitalist economy. As a result, social networks have been found to be 
a source of value that are often utilized to offset the costs of government malfunction and 
market failure (Somers, 2008). In the MD field, utility-based social capital thesis 
frequently serves as an expedient theoretical framework to legitimize MDPs’ lending 
services, with the purpose of socializing “the costs of lending to poor women by 
providing them access to credit on the bases of social collateral obtained through 
membership in borrower groups” (Rankin, 2002, p.12).  
Many MDP proponents credited their program successes with their 
encouragement of clients to build social capital (i.e., social networks) for women. In the 
same way, the Chinese government has implemented many public policies during the 
past few years through which to stress the importance of setting up the MDPs alliances 
(Dong, 2011; Gong, 2011). These MDP alliances are mainly targeted at bonding female 
entrepreneurs with each other as well as with the larger community for a better chance of 
subsistence and further development. Since my data indicate the affective nature of 
women’s social connections, it would be interesting to explore the tension between 
women’s social networking experience and the government’s promotion of utility-based 
social capital building in the MD field.  
While utility-based social capital framework generated an industry of inquiries 
about social capital, its capitalist ideological posturing and neo-liberal roots have not 
been sufficiently addressed. Adopting the ECM approach, the research finding about 
Chinese women’s affection-centered social networking experience is especially important 
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in inspiring me to create a new way of problematizing utility-based social capital thesis 
deeply grounded in neo-liberal ideologies. In particular, I intend to examine how the 
prevalence of affection-centered social networks in the MD field can exemplify the crisis 
of neo-liberalism when the forms of immaterial, affective labor have emerged in the 
central place of the contemporary economic production but have been marginalized by 
neo-liberal ideologies.  
To put it more accurately, neo-liberalism, as I will argue, constitutes a fragile 
ideological foundation implicit in utility-based social capital thesis, rendering affective 
social relations external to the contemporary capitalist production grounded in the 
common. Here, “the common” refers to not only material resources which are shared 
among all inhabitants but also immaterial assets which are produced for social 
interactions (Hardt & Negri 2009, p. viii). As Hardt and Negri (2009) explicitly asserted, 
the common has become the core of the contemporary capitalist system, emphasizing 
immaterial capital as the paramount source of social production. Principally, this 
indicates a history transfer from neo-liberal capitalist economy to the contemporary 
biopower-based social production. As I mentioned elsewhere, Chinese women’s 
entrepreneurship has started to play a key role in the state’s economy. Also, my data 
illustrate the importance of affection-centered social capital building in their self-
employment careers. Accordingly, it is necessary for this study to follow Hardt and 
Negri’s arguments and thereby re-theorize social capital concept. 
Perfect Storm of the Social Capital Phenomenon 
This section briefly reviews the historical development of social capital theory, 
particularly presenting the gradually increasing popularity of the social capital 
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phenomenon instigated by the publication of several Putnam’s ground-breaking works 
(1993, 1995, 1996, 2001). Though Putnam is most well-known for his research on social 
capital, he is by no means the first to coin the term. It is commonly believed that this term 
was first defined by Hanifan (1916) during World War I: 
In the use of the phrase social capital I make no reference to the usual acceptation 
of the term capital, except in a figurative sense. I do not refer to real estate, or to 
personal property or to cold cash. But rather to that in life which tends to make 
these tangible substances count for most in the daily lives of people, namely 
goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy and social intercourse among the 
individuals and families who make up a social unit. (p. 132) 
Putnam nodded in the instrumental orientation of Hanifan’s conceptualization of social 
capital (Rae, 2002). This instrumental nature casts social capital as an investment that is 
made beforehand in the hope of benefiting individuals or the public someday in the 
future. Though Putnam’s works were underestimated by some scholars as a repetition of 
Alexis de Tocqueville’s well-known attempt of “managing the tension between liberty 
and equality by balancing our individualism with a healthy dose of working together” 
(Monti, 2007, p. 35), we cannot be blind to the contributions of his scholarship to the 
unprecedented popularity of social capital. 
Generally, Putnam has alternated between seeing social capital as a private good 
at the individual level and as a public good at the collective level. In his well-known 1993 
research Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Putnam suggested 
that social capital is in fact a both individual and collective good. The definition of social 
capital was refined as “those features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and 
networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” 
(p. 167). The research purpose of this study was to compare the causal significance of 
different nation-wide institutional transformations in affecting democratic progress. After 
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ruling out any causal significance of political power, he finally arrived at the widely 
known yet controversial research findings that the southern part of Italy lagged behind 
the north in economic growth and governmental performance. Putnam attributed this gap 
to the much greater number of social capital in the north. Based upon this cause-effect 
relationship, he shed light on the instrumental orientation, concluding that people are 
willing to engage in social capital building because it has instrumental value for not only 
individuals but also the community as a whole.  
Although Putnam successfully brought attention to the positive impact of social 
connections at both individual and collective levels, he seemed to indulge in a celebration 
of finding out the wider economic and political implications of social capital. This 
directly speaks to why his theorizing of social capital was labelled as ideal. Further, his 
empirical research on the social capital phenomenon was often criticized for virtually 
ignoring the possibility that social capital building could probably have a negative effect. 
Taking some of these critiques to heart, Putnam wrote another famous essay titled with 
“Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital” (1995) as a sounding response to 
his detractors. Together with the publication of his landmark monograph—Bowling 
Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (2000), Putnam carefully 
enriched and improved many of his earlier arguments with the purpose of addressing the 
decline of civic participation in the United States.  
In these two publications, Putnam brought out two differentiated way of looking 
at the social capital phenomenon, which he termed as bonding versus bridging (Putnam, 
1995, 2000). It is noteworthy to mention that bridging and bonding are “not ‘either-or’ 
categories into which social networks can be neatly divided, but ‘more-or-less’ 
  76 
dimensions along which we can compare different forms of social capital” (Putnam, 
2000, p. 23). For him, bridging refers to outward-going networks among a heterogeneous 
group of individuals, whereas bonding refers to inward-going connections among similar 
people (Putnam, 1995, 2000). Also, Putnam (2000) suggested that these two different 
types of social capital cause different influences and consequences. Unlike bonding, 
which reinforces exclusive group identities within a certain homogenous social group, 
bridging social capital spans much more “diverse social cleavages” (p. 24). 
Consequently, bridging can give birth to an inclusive institutional structure which is more 
democratic in political arrangement and which therefore has benign impacts for economic 
growth. In contrast, bonding would even produce negative outcomes on the condition that 
people from outside are deprived of an equal opportunity in accessing various resources. 
Shifting attention to both benign and negative types of social capital, Putnam did not 
change his utility-based approach to the social capital phenomenon. Instead, Putnam 
(2000) further emphasized it by saying that the “core idea of social capital theory is that 
social networks have value” for individuals and even the larger community (p. 24). 
Somers (2008) characterized the popularization of Putnam’s social capital 
framework as “a perfect storm” (p. 215). Until the term was made popular by Putnam, it 
had not gained an overwhelmingly crowding-out power to monopolize the conceptual 
space through drowning out the other contested voices. The social capital phenomenon 
has finally culminated in an epistemological agenda of developing social capital as “a 
new theory and vocabulary that would name, explain, and ‘make true’ for political 
knowledge a source of value (inherent in social networks or norms) that would serve as 
an alternative to the power of the state” (Somers, 2008, p. 216). In this way, the utility-
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based social capital theory has begun to gain a hegemonic influence in the social and 
political fields by virtue of its capability and potential of benefiting the society as a 
whole.  
The hegemonic influence of Putnam’s utility-based social capital thesis is deeply 
grounded in neo-liberal ideologies. Assuming a symbiotic relationship of between capital 
and the industrial paradigm of capitalist economy, neo-liberal ideologies narrowly define 
social capital as “an aggregation of contractually interacting individual agents” (Somers, 
2008, p. 223). From this perspective, individuals get access to social capital when they 
are willing to nurture their social networks through investing in them. In order to 
maximize the returns, they make instrumental decisions contingent on how their 
investments of time, money, affections, and so on can generate much more profits at a 
future point. In this sense, social capital, which used to be an important concept and 
social phenomenon in the realm of sociological inquiry, has been incorporated in and 
justified by economic theories. Consequently, the utility-based social capital theory—the 
marriage of social to the economist term of capital—is constructed upon neo-liberalism 
that prescribes utilitarian ethics for the basic rules of social life. 
There are two other major sources that further reinforce this hegemonic impact in 
the socio-economic and political aspects. First is Coleman’s (1988, 1990) theorizing 
about social capital. From the economic perspective, Coleman framed social capital as 
the resources embedded in both family relations and community organizations. For him, 
social capital building benefits individuals and even the larger community in a way of 
facilitating children’s development. Second is civic thought inherited from Tocqueville, 
Almond and Verba. Putnam’s (1993) social capital thesis explicitly agreed with them, 
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regarding common civic virtue as the cornerstone of a robust American democracy. 
Despite Putnam’s emphasis on civic value that can be traced back to either Tocqueville or 
Almond and Verba, his theories differ from all of them in several significant ways. The 
most important difference lies in the meaning of “social” that is at the central place of 
Putnam’s social capital thesis. By the way, as many other critics (see, for example, 
Arneil, 2006) noted, this difference actually opens up a major way of critically examining 
Putnam’s scholarship on social capital.  
According to Putnam (2001), the social dimension of social capital goes beyond 
the forerunners’ liberal notion of civic participation. Social capital building, for him, 
prescribes that “we transcend our social and political and professional identities to 
connect with people unlike ourselves” (p. 411). Simply put, it is an appeal for civic 
virtues, or more specifically, unity. This unity points to a transcendence of any 
differences, summoning individual people together under a homogenized set of shared 
civic values. Based on this, Putnam’s social capital theory goes beyond the economist 
perspective of seeing social networks simply as cooperative self-interest. It is because 
that “our thirst for great community life outweighs our hunger for private backyards, 
discount megamalls, and easy parking” (Putnam, 2001, p. 412). Indeed, this resonates 
with the original intension of Putnam’s social capital theory, claiming that social capital 
involves both an individual good and a public good. 
Examining Prior Critiques of Putnam’s Social Capital Thesis 
Although the scholarly acceptance of Putnam’s works gave the concept of social 
capital a superstar status, it has provoked many critiques that primarily concentrate on 
Putnam’s ideal perspective of how social capital contributes to political democracy and 
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socio-economic prosperity. The critical review of these prior critiques in this section aims 
to disclose their common limit in ignoring Putnam’s capitalist ideological posturing. On 
this account, my empirical research on Chinese female entrepreneurs’ social networking 
experience would clearly illustrate this limit, and more significantly, suggest a new way 
of re-theorizing social capital.  
Bourdieu was one of the first to advance a critical perspective through which to 
examine the instrumental feature of social capital theory. At the heart of his analysis, 
Bourdieu (1985) added social capital as another form of capital to reinforce his argument 
concerning the fungibility of capital: economic value and power are not necessarily 
produced by economic capital. In this sense, social capital was raised by Bourdieu to 
capture part of economic value and power that is produced and reproduced by social 
networks. Moreover, he made the theory of social capital a central component of his 
theory of class reproduction—the theory concerning the reproduction of the class-based 
social hierarchies and even as an essential element of his later argument about the 
hegemonic influence of neo-liberalism (Bourdieu, 1984, 1998). Here, Bourdieu drew 
attention to the role that history and power play in the construction of social capital. This 
resonates with the much earlier advocacy, urging scholars to “represent the consequences 
of social position” as an investigation into the historical formation of the socio-economic 
and political differences (Loury, 1977, p. 176). As a result, all forms of capital, with no 
exception to social capital, has to be examined through a critical lens so as to uncover the 
easily overlooked impact that historical power relations have on different social groups, 
especially those who were negatively influenced. 
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Adopting and furthering Bourdieu’s critical perspective, many scholars embarked 
on persistent search for various injustice problems that are caused and disguised by 
Putnam’s social capital theory. For instance, Arneil (2006) expanded Bourdieu’s critical 
perspective beyond the limited focus on economic and political issues, highlighting racial 
and gender inequalities involved in the historically accumulated social capital; Somers’s 
(2005, 2008) critique took a further step, and attributed the dark side of Putnam’s social 
capital to a central principle of neo-liberalism—market fundamentalism according to 
which both economic and non-economic spheres of society should be managed solely by 
market principles. These critiques, though by no means an exhaustive list, are briefly 
reviewed here to indicate that social capital theorizing has been considerably encroached 
by ideological influences (especially neo-liberal investments). Somers (2008) added that 
inflicted by neo-liberal capitalism, social capital was often utilized to appropriate, 
reconstruct and tame Tocquevillean precepts of civil society—the once unruly nurturing 
ground for the goals, practice, and normative ideals of political democracy. Introducing 
and applying social capital into the political public sphere, Putnam’s influential 
theorizing of social capital marks an invasion of market fundamentalism into the once 
autonomous territory of civil society and the study on social dynamics. As a result, civil 
society has been reduced to an aggregation of instrumental social network. Such a 
deliberate political project foreshadows a consequence of undermining the resistant 
potentials and capabilities of the Tocquevillean-inspired civil society. That is to say, civil 
society has begun to fall short of Tocquevillean precepts that originally expected an 
autonomous third place independent of both state coercion and market control. In 
response to the demands of neo-liberalism, the political project of establishing a social-
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capital-based civil society has managed to shift the costs and risks of social problems 
from market and state to the shoulders of individuals, social groups, and communities. 
Simply put, civil society has been transformed by neo-liberal ideologies into the utility-
driven aggregation of social connections, which are exploited to pay the costs of market 
externality and government failure. That means once a social problem occurs, civil 
society would resort to neither market nor government but rather blame itself for a failure 
in profiting from social connections. 
Despite all the aforementioned critiques, Putnam’s social capital theories have 
still gained an influence to be dominant as both a theoretical construct and a politico-
socio-economic phenomenon due to his stubborn commitment to how social capital can 
contribute to social stability, political democracy, and economic growth. It is particularly 
noteworthy to mention that Bourdieu’s critical perspective has almost gone from 
distinction to extinction as Coleman, Gary Becker, and Eleanor Ostrom rose to the 
prominence in the academic field of social capital theory. This change is significant 
because it foreshadows a trend of silencing the critical perspective through attracting 
most attentions to the benefits of social connections or collective activities. In this way, 
Putnam’s theorization of the social capital phenomenon is further reinforced.  
The increasingly overwhelming influences of Coleman (2000), Becker (1990, 
1996), and Ostrom (1990) have led to the ascendancy of rational-choice/utilitarian 
perspective to the central field of social capital theory. The instrumental rationality is 
central to the rational-choice/utilitarian principles, involving people’s pursuit of the most 
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cost-effective way to achieve a specific goal.16 In this sense, social capital is regarded as 
an aggregation of socially regulated behaviors that are utilized to deal with the negative 
consequences of market and governmental regulations, especially those relevant to the 
provision of public goods and assistances. This would be sufficiently exemplified by my 
research findings, especially by those concerning the women’s responsibilities for both 
family sustainability and the state’s socio-economic growth. Based upon these findings, I 
will assert that the rise of rational-choice/utilitarian trend is mainly due to the limited 
focus of prior critiques exclusively on the negative impact of Putnam’s ideal theorization 
of social capital.17 In contrast, my critique comes to grapple with the vulnerability of the 
ideological foundation of Putnam’s social capital thesis. Importantly, it has to be deeply 
grounded in Hardt and Negri’s (2005, 2009) arguments about the rise of biopolitical 
social production and the accompanying ascendancy of immaterial resources (affection-
centered social relations in this case). It is the historical transition from the industrial 
paradigm of capitalist economy to the contemporary biopolitical economy that gives an 
end to the hegemonic impact of neo-liberalism in contemporary capitalist accumulation. 
Rise of Biopolitical Social Production 
This section presents Hart and Negri’s (2005, 2009) theoretical discussion about 
the emergence of biopolitical economic system. The affective nature of women’s social 
capital building, which is indicated by my data on their social networking experience, 
                                                 
16 The word “instrumental” refers to an interest in gaining a full mastery of nature which would be expected 
to proceed in a predicted direction. 
17 Though Somers’s critique touches upon neo-liberal ideologies, it tends to identify the destructive 
outcomes that neo-liberalism has caused, rather than thwart the theoretical construction of social capital 
through challenging the fundamental role of neo-liberalism in social capital theory. 
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would be theorized by Hart and Negri’s arguments as the basis for re-theorizing social 
capital concept at the end of this chapter.  
The hegemonic effect of Putnam’s social capital theory largely depends on the 
predominant role that capital is assumed to play in the neo-liberal capitalist economy. 
Socio-economic and political changes since the 1970s, however, have transformed 
capitalist society so that the material relations of production and exchange are not as 
hegemonic as they used to be in industrial capitalism (Hardt & Negri, 2005). 18 Further, 
these changes have led to the fact that the material relations of production and exchange 
are “…subordinated to immaterial factors and goods” (Hardt & Negri, 2009, p. 132). In 
fact, the contemporary world capitalist economy is primarily defined by biological labor 
power, and more accurately, by the productivity of subjectivities and forms of life. In 
other words, the common, which acknowledges the central role of immaterial resources, 
has replaced the economic term of capital to be the foundation of contemporary social 
production.  
To put this historical transition more specifically, Hardt and Negri (2009) 
proposed three major trends of the contemporary biopolitical social production, claiming 
that “biopolitical labor power is becoming more and more autonomous, with capital 
simply hovering over it parasitically with its disciplinary regimes, apparatus of capture, 
mechanisms of expropriation, financial networks, and the like” (p. 142). First, economic 
crisis is an effective way in which capitalist accumulation frequently operates to 
transform socially shared wealth or resources (e.g., natural resources) into private 
                                                 
18 Here, the relations are specifically those explained by the Marxian theory of value. 
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property. Second, in addition to tangible wealth like natural resources, the contemporary 
biopolitical production equally depends upon an exploitation of intangible socially-
owned wealth (e.g., knowledge, information, affects, and social relationships). Third, 
contemporary capitalist accumulation takes place not so much at the level of an 
individual laborer as at the collective/collaborative level of social labor, mainly through 
“information flows, communication networks, social codes, linguistic innovations, 
practice of affects and passions” (p. 142). Taking these theoretical ideas to heart, my data 
analysis in the next section would be further theorized to explicate how women’s 
affective social capital building has emerged in the central place of the contemporary 
world capitalist economy with no regard of the party-state’s promotion of utility-based 
social capital theory in the MD field.  
Searching for Social Capital in China’s MD 
In order to locate the concept and social phenomenon of social capital building in 
the context of neo-liberal China, there has to be a detailed discussion of the indigenous 
guanxi (social connections 关系) phenomenon. Social capital, as a western-centric 
construct, has received widespread resonance in the academic research on Chinese social 
connections due to its apparent similarity to guanxi activities (Avery, J. Sun, Swafford, & 
Prater, 2014). Many scholars have jumped on the social capital “band wagon”, and 
conceptually associate guanxi with social capital through simply seeing guanxi as a 
Chinese interpretation of social capital (Qi, 2013). Nevertheless, adopting Western-
originated concepts and scales and applying them to a Chinese sample miss opportunities 
for gaining a finer-grained and contextualized understanding of complicated politico-
socio-economic phenomenon in China's context. Therefore, this section attempts to 
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explore how social capital conceptually relates to popular notions of guanxi and how this 
type of relation facilitate the operationalization of social capital concepts in the specific 
circumstance of post-1978 China. 
Given the complexity, flexibility, richness, and even ambiguousness of the 
Chinese language, a plethora of guanxi definitions have been made—intellectual, 
epistemological, cultural, economic, sociological, religious, and political, each departing 
from various origins, each under different circumstances, and each with differentiated 
objectives. Several significant typologies further complicate the conceptualization of 
guanxi, guiding my research to depict and explore the multi-faceted nature of social 
capital building in the case of Chinese female entrepreneurs. For instance, the family vs. 
non-family guanxi distinction is closely associated with Chinese traditional culture. To 
put it more specifically, Confucius’s teachings are popularly associated with family-
based guanxi (e.g., family, kinship, birthplace) as a basic and cardinal framework of 
social relations in a state, and therefore, as a prototype of non-family guanxi (e.g., 
friendship, colleagues, schoolmates) (Blau, 1964; C. Yang, 1999). The affective vs. 
instrumental dichotomy provides another perspective of Chinese inter-personal relations. 
The former is primarily driven by a commitment to the intimacy of social relations, 
whereas the latter involves an exchange of use-value (M. Yang, 1994, 2002; Pye, 1999). 
The informal vs. formal typology differs social networks characteristic of affect from 
those featured by legality and impersonality (Blau & Duncan, 1967; X. Zhou, Li, Zhao, 
& Cai, 2003).  
Adopting a social-capital approach to the Chinese guanxi phenomenon, guanxi is 
defined as an array of social connections among individuals, which emphasize the central 
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place of Chinese feudal ethics in inter-personal networking activities. Popularly 
Confucius’s teachings are viewed as stipulating a regulatory and supervisory paradigm of 
five cardinal relations (Wulun 五伦) — ruler-subject, father-son, husband-wife, elder-
younger sibling, and friend-friend (Confucious, 1915). The first four are hierarchical, and 
the last one is an equal one. Situated in a Confucian concept of society, social relations 
are all governed by such a paradigm, and in this way, there are no strangers since the 
basic relation is at least friend-to-friend. These five cardinal relations work together to 
weave complex, interlocking human networking activities. This has been proven to be 
effective until today (S. Yang, 1993). Many scholars (e.g., Tu, 1985, 1998) wrote about 
Confucianism as a social and political philosophy. By contrast, Confucius’s teachings are 
analyzed in this research project as a system of popular cultural beliefs that continue to 
have an influence on inter-personal relations in contemporary Chinese society. 
Seeing from the lun perspective, S. Yang (1993) proposed a condensed taxonomy 
of guanxi in an effort to explicate the impact of Chinese traditional cultural upon 
contemporary inter-personal relations. A list of different types of guanxi ordered by 
increasing social distance is was presented as jia-ren (relations among family members 
家人), shou-ren (relations with relatives, friends, neighbors, classmates, colleagues, etc. 
熟人), and sheng-ren (relations with strangers生人).19 Drawing from the three types of 
guanxi, this study intends to examine how Chinese traditional culture primarily in the 
form of Confucian ethics has affected Chinese female entrepreneurs’ daily practice of 
guanxi. 
                                                 
19 Social distance implies a continuous measure of intimacy or closeness among individuals (Akerlof, 
1997). 
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Furthermore, the understanding of the guanxi phenomenon has to take into 
account the fact that the Chinese party-state has repeatedly tried to transform inter-
personal relations through policy making and propaganda apparatus. Until now, the 
norms and behaviors of inter-personal relations in China have actually remained to be 
under the remaining influences of the Maoist party-state’s tough control on inter-personal 
relations. The period from 1949 to the late 1970s witnessed a historical transformation of 
inter-personal relations from being featured by friendship to being featured by 
comradeship (Gold, 1985; Vogel, 1966). Friendship is particularistic insofar as it 
connects a person with some special individuals due to their uniqueness. In such a type of 
social relation, people trust each other, and are willing to help others if necessary. By 
contrast, comradeship refers to “a universalist morality in which all citizens are in 
important respects equal under the state, and graduations on the basis of status or degree 
of closeness cannot legitimately interfere with this equality” (Vogel, 1966, p. 407). 
Apparently, comradeship supposedly transcends any particularistic inter-personal 
relations based upon locality, kinship, descent, and so on. More importantly, comradeship 
was politicized to a large degree when the Maoist party-state tried to incorporate it in the 
making of the new Chinese socialist man and thereby pursue the state’s gigantic project 
of establishing the new socialist China. In a sense, despite comradeship literally involves 
mutual help and concern for each other, these moral values were made into a way, in 
which individuals pressured each other to comply with the norms and behaviors of 
becoming a qualified comrade.  
As Vogel (1966) pointed out, the emergence of comradeship to replace friendship 
was accomplished through fear. The Maoist party-state effectively intensified the risks 
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that private communication would probably subject one to severe sanctions if such a type 
of information sharing posed a threat to ideological control and regime legitimacy in 
China. In such a situation, people gradually became unwilling to trust each other, because 
intimate inter-personal relations would put their friends as well as themselves in trouble. 
The Cultural Revolution of 1966-1976 marks the climax that the Maoist party-state’s 
control over private communication reached (A. King, 1991). More than any other period 
of time since the founding of the PRC in 1949, the party-state during the era of the 
Cultural Revolution made an effort to completely remove the public/private divide and 
bring all aspects of private life under its political regulation. The regulation of inter-
personal relations through fear was further intensified when most Chinese people 
participated in surveilling/self-surveilling private conversations as well as identifying 
friends and even family members as counter-revolutionary. The dispersion and 
penetration of gossip and surveillance techniques into people’s social life gave birth to 
one of the most important Cultural Revolution legacies on people’s social life—the 
pervasive existence of distrust and cynicism in the Chinese society. 
One aspect of the 1978 socio-economic reforms focused on a removal of part of 
the Cultural Revolution legacies that caused an erosion of the social order and public 
civility. The politicization of inter-personal relations during the pre-1078 era, however, 
has had a remaining yet discernable influence on social life until today (Gold, 1985). On 
the one hand, since political power began to loosen its grip on social life and economy, 
the survivors of the Cultural Revolution resumed their friendship. On the other hand, 
tension and distrust have never faded in all types of inter-personal relations. Fearing the 
re-emergence of the political and social turmoil in the future, Chinese people have never 
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forgot to keep vigilant on others. Under leftist influence, they not only avoided any 
discussion on potentially sensitive issues, but also collected information on others as a 
preparation for the next political campaign.  
There has been an optimistic prediction that easy access to the Internet around the 
world has the potential in increasing the frequency and quality of inter-personal 
communication in the New Millennium. The remnants of the Cultural Revolution legacy 
on inter-personal relation, however, have not disappeared but rather have been to some 
degree reinforced by the government’s Internet surveillance and censorship. Surveillance 
measures enable authorities to identity, warn, or even or imprison those individuals held 
accountable for sharing any sensitive information (MacKinnon, 2011), and the censorship 
program is specifically aimed at forestalling any transfer of dangerous information at the 
collective level (G. King, Pan, & Roberts, 2012). By doing so, the widespread use of the 
Internet has actually opened up a new area where the Chinese leftist legacy on inter-
personal relations take effect. In the rest of this section, my data on Chinese women’s 
social networking experience analytically attend to this issue, examining to what extent 
the party-state’s repeated interventions in social life have shaped the nature of those 
women’s inter-personal relations. 
Compared with the aforementioned concept of social capital, it is easy to 
understand that guanxi is analyzed in this study as an embodiment of social capital 
heavily laden with not only Chinese traditional culture but also Chinese political 
dynamics. In other words, studying guanxi would serve as a lens through which to 
explore how the concept and phenomenon of social capital building has been adopted and 
adapted in the specific context of post-1978 China. There is a lack of widely accepted 
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approach, if possible with international comparability, of identifying and measuring 
social capital, largely caused by too many ways of defining it (Siegler, 2014). Also, 
recent works on guanxi in general focus on to what extent guanxi can be effective or 
instrumental at inter-personal level or firm-to-firm level (Avery et al., 2014), and there is 
a lack of studies that explore how guanxi has actually been shaped by the party-state's 
official ideologies and has caused changes, if any, to people's lives, that is Chinese 
women's daily and business lives in this case. Having identified the gaps in guanxi 
research, this study has to design a new set of research strategies contingent on the 
context of neo-liberal China.  
As I reviewed prior studies on social capital building in chapter one, my research 
design has to learn from the studies of Servon (1998) and Jurik et al. (2006) on the 
American MDPs' initiatives. These two research projects commonly focused on 
organizational-level initiatives of social capital building. Significantly, they both drew 
upon Putnam’s bridging/bonding analytic rubric, examining two types of social capital 
building—intra-program networking (social networks that connect clients with each other 
within the program) and extra-program networking (social networks that connect clients 
to both individuals and institutions outside the program). My study joins this line of 
inquiry, attempting to examine the two major forms of social capital formulated in those 
women’s daily practice of social networking. Also, my research design and findings 
would come to serve as a comparative empirical work on this issue, investigating how the 
MDP model and its accompanying ideologies of social capital building have been 
strategically deployed in the specific circumstance of neo-liberal China. 
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Before proceeding to the presentation of my research findings, it is necessary to 
succinctly explain why this study continues to rely on Putnam’s bridging/bonding 
analytic framework despite it ultimately endeavors to problematize his utility-based 
perspective of social capital. As is manifested by the review of Putnam’s social capital 
theory, he expanded his original argument through the bridging/bonding analytic rubric in 
order to highlight how social capital may not always produce benign outcomes. The 
purpose is primarily for reinforcing the instrumental orientation of his social capital 
theory. My use of the bridging/bonding analytic framework serves as a convenient way of 
explicating the multi-dimensionality of women’s social capital building. The purpose, 
however, is not to follow Putnam’s attempt of justifying utility-based social capital, but 
rather prepare for an exploratory investigation into the nature of social capital building in 
China’s MD. More accurately, I want to examine if their social networking initiatives 
were targeted at bonding them with those who they had already known prior to their 
involvement in self-employment—what I refer to as bonding social capital, or if they 
went beyond their prior social networks and connected with individuals or organizations 
from the larger community, what I refer to as bridging social capital. In doing so, my data 
would gain a much greater analytic potential to approach the complexity in the nature of 
Chinese businesswomen’s social capital building.   
In order to answer the aforementioned questions, my interview topics were 
deliberately tailored to concentrate on what the focus of women’s social networking 
experience is, how the respondents nurtured their social networks, why they did this, and 
with whom these social networks were fostered. As is presented in the next few section of 
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my research findings, the respondents were found to place much more emphasis on 
bonding social capital  
Bonding Social Network 
In this section, I examined the extent to which the respondents engaged in 
maintaining their social connections with those individuals that they had already known. 
Significantly, all my respondents were actively engaged in such a type of social capital 
building, primarily through keeping or even strengthening social connections with their 
family members, old friends, colleagues prior to being laid off, or school classmates. This 
served as a convenient way of providing them with both tangible (i.e. capital) and 
intangible resources (e.g., access to business or policy information, consulting service, 
emotional assistance). For instance, when I walked into Xiaowei’s restaurant close to a 
primary school for the first time, I saw an old couple preparing several kinds of 
vegetables under her instruction. Because they both looked like Xiaowei, I guessed that 
they were her parents. After she briefly told me her five-year experience of running the 
restaurant, I got to know that she, as a middle-aged urban woman, had been laid off from 
a SOE and then had started to do business due to economic difficulties. Also, my guess 
was confirmed that the old couple were her parents, and she talked a lot about how they 
had helped her business during the past few years:  
 If you asked from whom I have gotten most help while doing business during the 
past few years, I would admit that my parents are indeed an important part of my 
business and daily life... My parents have always been my most reliable support 
whenever I made any sudden and big changes of my life that were not understood 
by anyone else. Although they are retired SOE workers and can only make ends 
meet, they almost gave me every cent they had saved when I first started my 
business... More significantly, they really cared me, and this absolutely cannot not 
be measured by money. As you saw a few minutes ago, they are always trying 
their best to come here and help me with anything that they can do. To be honest, 
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I really do not want them to do this for me, because the long and contentious 
chore of running a small restaurant is not good for their heath at all…In spite of 
this, they would look for any excuse to come here, such as doing some cleaning 
simply for killing time, helping me with my business as a way of working out, 
and so on. I really appreciate their assistance and do not know how to pay back 
their benevolence.  
All the other respondents agreed with Xiaowei, making an endless list of all kinds of 
assistance they had acquired from their parents. Significantly, working for them without 
being paid, as I found, is one of the most common ways in which their parents gave their 
help to them. As is clearly shown by Xiaowei’s response, her parents had assisted her 
business with not only a limited amount of financial resource but also free work. 
Interestingly, it is especially noteworthy to point out that Xiaowei’s parents were not 
required by her to work with no pay. Rather, they assisted their daughter’s business 
against her will, and more importantly, considered such assistance to be a way of caring 
their daughter.  
Though I did not happen to meet the female entrepreneurs’ parent in the 
workplace every time I went there to observe and interview them, the responses from all 
the other respondents indicate a crucial role of their parents in their self-employment 
careers. For instance, Xiaofang, the middle-aged urban female owner of a small-scale 
laundry, started to get involved in entrepreneurship once she had been laid off from a 
large-scale SOE ten years ago. During the past decade, her parents had almost worked for 
her as two regular employees, but they had never been paid. As Xiaofang talked to me 
with mixed feelings: 
Honestly speaking, I have never stopped to persuade to leave here. My mom 
retired sever years ago, and my dad retired two years later than her. Ever since 
they retired, they showed up almost every day to help me… I am always feeling 
fortunate to have such good parents who will never hesitate to give me whatever 
they own, but this indeed makes me feel guilty sometimes. Having worked in the 
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SOEs for thirty or even forty years, they are supposed to take a good rest and 
enjoy the rest of their life right now. Sometimes, I wanted to pay them, but they 
were reluctant to get any payment from me. I know, what I owe to them is 
definitely not a matter of money. I will never pay up such debt since they had 
almost given me a second life by a persistent support of my business.  
Like Xiaowei’s parents, Xiaofang’s mom and dad actually had become two major 
helpers, and more accurately, two major employees of her laundry. Different from the 
only regular employee working in Xiaofang’s business, her parents almost did the same 
work but refused to be paid. In her words, such assistance gave her a kind of mixed 
feelings that persistently maintained and strengthened her close relationship to her 
parents.  
 In addition to working together in the workplace, my data indicate another way 
that the female entrepreneurs stayed connected to their parents is through frequent visits 
back to their parents’ home. Take Xiaofang for instance, since she employed a young 
female employee there, it was convenient for her to visit her parents when they did show 
up in her laundry. Especially during a few Chinese traditional holidays, she would rather 
stay with her parents and offer overtime pay to her employee for working on holidays. As 
she said: 
I visit them once a week and have a family reunion dinner with all the other 
members of the extended family. Indeed, this is one of the most significant ways 
to keep maintaining a close relationship with all of them in such a fast-paced 
society… More significantly, my parents can get a chance to discuss with me 
about something intimate that may not be appropriate to be said in the workplace. 
Especially when I encountered difficulty in either doing business or living my 
personal life, they would comfort me with unaccustomed gentleness. Only in this 
situation, can I behave like a daughter under the protection from their parents, 
rather than a strong, competent businesswoman. 
As this quotation illustrates, Xiaofang would like to prefer staying with her parents rather 
than spending all her time in the workplace because she insisted on seeing an intimate 
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communication with her parents as a big part of her business and daily life. All the other 
respondents were closely tied with their parents no matter how far away from home they 
were living and working. For the respondents with the original urban household 
registration, they said that they had visited their parents in person at least twice a month. 
For instance, Xiaowei had to visit their parents not as often as Xiaofang did. One of the 
most crucial reasons is that she did not hire anyone else to take care of her business when 
she was out.  
Even for the respondents with the original rural household registration, they 
currently lived far away from their hometowns but were still in a very close contact with 
their parents. For instance, Hui have migrated into Nanjing nearly 10 years ago and 
acquired urban residency status 5 year ago, but her words clearly illustrated a strong tie 
associating her with her hometown and parents:  
I will never forget my lovely hometown since my parents are still there. Though I 
go back there at most twice a year, I am keeping in touch with my old parents and 
caring them in many other ways. For example, I give them a phone call at least 
once a week. Since the year before last, they have learned to make a video call via 
the Internet. In that way, I can hear their voices as well as see them. Additionally, 
I sent my son back to my hometown on summer and winter breaks. My son is 
indeed a perfect medium through which to strengthen the link between my parents 
and me. By doing all of these, I do not feel we are living too far away from each 
other. 
For Hui, living a long distance away from her hometown was absolutely not a problem 
with her close tie with her parents. Drawing upon a few common methods of 
communication (i.e. phone call and video call), Hui and her parents kept each other 
informed on what had recently happened around. Also, the grandson was appropriately 
utilized as an effective way of winning her parents’ hearts and thereby reinforcing the 
relationship among them.  
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Apart from keeping in touch with their parents, my data show that maintaining 
friendship constituted another way to the building of bonding social capital. For Xiaowei, 
a jam-packed schedule was never an excuse for staying away from her best friends. In 
such an inter-personal relationship, she acquired both material and immaterial support 
from her close friends especially during a rough patch. As she recalled:  
 No matter how busy I am with my business, I would never ignore my friends…I 
cannot promise to meet them up every week, because you know that everyone has 
to take care of his or her own personal life. Nevertheless, if they give me a call 
and ask me out for a dinner, I would try my best to adjust my schedule…I firmly 
believe that a friend in need is a friend indeed. This good saying tells the exact 
story that happened to me. Some of my good friends constitute a really invaluable 
treasure for my self-employment career. Not to mention financial support, more 
often than not emotional assistance is much more important and sometimes 
cannot be acquired from my parents. You know, not everything is appropriate to 
be confessed to my parents, so my good friends can be a trash bin for my 
complaints. They are always encouraging me to move on. 
Like her, all the other research participants reported that a few good friends were in a 
close and frequent contact with them even though business life in fact did not allow them 
to spend too much time undertaking social networking activities. For instance, Hehua, the 
middle-aged female owner of a barber shop, talked about an equal importance of 
maintaining friendship to doing business: 
Although I cannot spare as much time as I did before to hang out with my friends, 
I always see friendship as important as my business career because my persistence 
in pursuing my business success is largely derived from my best friends’ unfailing 
encourage. 
In the same way, Yawen, who was laid off six years ago and currently owned a small 
convenience store, was impressed by one of her best friends’ emotional support when she 
was laid off. As she said, this motivated her to maintain a frequent contact with those 
friends even though doing business often left her drained: 
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She kept telling me her story of being re-employed in a private enterprise and 
later starting her own business, and it did help me a lot to move on and resume my 
life. Such help during the difficult moment will forever be treasured, and I cannot 
afford to lose contact with her no matter how busy I am with my business. 
Furthermore, it is very interesting to notice that the vast majority of the women 
agreed with Xiaowei and Xiaofang to affirm that financial aid was considered not as 
important as emotional support while they were nurturing their bonding social capital. As 
Xiaowei’s and Xiaofang’s responses indicate, emotional support was commonly seen as 
the bedrock upon which their self-employment careers were established. To put it in 
Xiaowei’s words, they were able to behave as either a daughter or a fellow woman in 
front from their friends and parents. In doing so, they felt much more relaxed and 
comfortable than sticking to the stereotyped image of a strong, self-dependent, and 
competent female entrepreneur. This interesting finding inspired me to explore why 
immaterial assistance was much more appealing than material resources to them, and 
how this preference has affected the nature of social networking in my sample of female 
entrepreneurs. A detailed discussion will go back to this point later. Also, their situated 
performance urges me to examine how doing entrepreneur and doing gender have 
combined to shape their social identity construction. An in-depth analysis of this issue 
will be presented in the next chapter.  
Bridging Social Network 
When it came to broader forms of social networking such as linking them with 
individuals or organizations outside the women’s previous social networks, the female 
entrepreneurs in my sample were less active. My respondents reported that they had 
known a few other self-employed persons while doing business, and to link with them 
constituted these women’s accumulation of bridging social capital. For example, 
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Xiaohua, a middle-aged owner of a small restaurant, discussed her personal attitude 
toward expanding her social networks in the workplace as follows: 
I have been super busy with my business. Not to mention getting to know many 
new friends, I do not even have time to take care of my family. However, I 
happened to, and more accurately, had to know a few other self-employed persons 
after starting my self-employment career. After all, you cannot completely ignore 
someone very close to you. Even though I do not have to beg for help from other 
businessmen right now, I have no choice but to smile and say hello to them whose 
shops are located close to mine. After all, a harmonious environment nearby is 
good for my business. They may help me out one day. Who knows?  
Her words of "have no choice but to smile and say hello to them" suggest that the 
extension of her social networks under such a circumstance, if any, was to some extent 
against her will: she did not want to spend any time to know new friends but rather focus 
on her own family and business life. The other respondents agreed with her on this point. 
For instance, Xiaowei insisted that “to be honest, I do not want to waste any time to chat 
with them and would probably never get any help from them because we are not in the 
same line of business”; Weiwei, who was running a small restaurant together with her 
husband, complained, "It would save me a lot of time if I do not have to get along with 
them, and I really do not want to do it if there is any other choice available"; Fangfang, 
who was a middle-aged businesswoman running a barbershop, optimistically considered 
such a form of social capital building as no more than “a windfall which would possibly 
hand you good fortune one day in the future but your daily life absolutely cannot depend 
on”. 
Interestingly, a few other studies (see, for example, Chuang, 2013) on bridging 
social capital were conducted in the Pan-Chinese context, finding that people had to work 
and live their family life that did not leave any time to make new friends. These 
researchers, however, were inclined to interpret this finding simply as a dimension of 
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work-life conflict. The similar finding, however, was interpreted in my study as women’s 
unwillingness to extend their social networking in the workplace for two major reasons. 
First, as the above quotations explicitly showed, the female entrepreneurs were inclined 
to see making new friends in the workplace as the last choice if they really could not be 
able to avoid. This viewpoint is much more obvious in Xiaohua’s explanation that 
making friends with nearby self-employed persons was to a large extent out of courtesy. 
Xiaohua used to be a kindergarten teacher, and this past working experience further 
strengthened the first impression that she left with me—a very easy-going middle-aged 
urban woman with a soft voice. Due to the privatization of the public kindergarten in the 
early 2000s, she lost her job and began her small restaurant near a primary school. Since 
many of her customers were students, she said that “a kind and easy-going image is very 
important, and to get along with nearby self-employed persons is a large part of it”. As an 
old Chinese saying goes, "harmony brings wealth (Heqi shengcai 和气生财)". She just 
put this saying into practice, recognizing that it is good for her business by treating 
nearby self-employees with courtesy. In her words, she was unwilling to “waste any time 
making friends with them, but did not want to be an inaccessible woman who would 
frighten those little kids away”.  
Similarly, as is revealed by Weiwei's discussion about her way of getting along 
with nearby business owners, she was inclined to consider it to be the last option that she 
could have, and more accurately, a basic principle of becoming a successful 
businesswoman that she had no choice but to observe. She said:  
 Although many people say that businessmen specializing in the same line of 
business are impossible to make friends with each other, I am trying to have a 
friendly relationship with them. I do not want to see this type of social networking 
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initiative as completely money-driven, since I have not earned any money from 
connecting with them and do not expect to do that. Nevertheless, who knows 
exactly? If future customers come by my shop and see our fellow businesswomen 
talking to each other happily, they are more likely to see me as an easy-going 
woman and to do business with me. On the contrary, to shouting expletives at 
each other probably scares away customers…More importantly, every 
businessman has to understand that this is a basic principle of succeeding in doing 
business. Even though I am not that type of person who enjoys making new 
friends, I have to do it. 
As this quotation shows, Weiwei's way of getting along with other businessmen was 
boiled down to the bottom line that the respondents had to follow in order to succeed. 
Once she embarked on entrepreneurship, she even had to conform her ways of inter-
personal communication to the basic norms of becoming a successful female 
entrepreneur. For her, the divide between private life and work was blurred. Given all 
these responses, there is no reason to ignore many possible benefits that making new 
friends in the workplace could bring to their businesses. These benefits include a good 
strategy of attracting customers, leaving future customers with a good first impression, 
future help from nearby self-employed persons, and so on. In spite of this, my data still 
show that the respondents were more or less pressured to engage in the building of 
bonding social capital, because getting along with nearby self-employed people was a 
prerequisite for their business successes.  
Second, my interpretation has to be historically contextualized in the much 
broader context that the Chinese party-state’s policy making and propaganda apparatus 
have frequently tried to transform people’s social life. As I mentioned elsewhere, the 
penetration of cynicism and distrust in inter-personal relations resulted from the worn-out 
yet still existing socialist control on inter-personal relations, imposing barriers to an 
extension of social networks (Gold, 1985; A. King, 1991). Despite the respondents did 
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not directly touch up the residue of such Cultural Revolution legacy on social life, an 
unwillingness to trust new friends is clearly stated in their discussions about the 
ambiguous and flexibly transformed meaning of “friend”.  
They called nearby self-employed persons “just friends”, while “real friends” 
were their childhood friends, classmates, and prior SOE colleagues. The difference 
between these two types of friendship is that the respondents considered nearby self-
employed friends not as trustworthy as their old friends or family members. For instance, 
Fangfang’s clarification of a clear-cut difference between “real friends” and “just friends” 
is a good case in point. She said:  
My parents taught me the art of making friends when I was very young. They said 
I had to learn to make friends with all kinds of persons in this society. I can give 
you a warm hug when I met you, but it does not mean that we trust each other.… 
In fact, there is a very clear sheet in my mind that reminds me to treat my friends 
differentially. I would sacrifice everything for my real friends, but I will never 
give anything more than a hug to those who are just friends. 
As this quotation suggests, Fangfang placed much less emphasis on “just friends” than on 
“real friends” because she did not consider the former as much trustworthy as the latter. 
Further, she drew a clear line between “just friends” and “real friends” in a euphemistic 
way of refusing to make friendship in the workplace. In a sense, she downplayed the 
importance of her daily practice of bridging social capital. For her, it was not worthwhile 
to waste too much time making friends with those who she was not likely to trust in the 
future. As she explained:  
I never expect to make real friends in the workplace. First of all, it is a common 
sense that we should not easily trust any stranger nearby because you cannot 
know what he is thinking about. As a good saying goes, “a distant journey tests 
the strength of a horse and a long task proves the character of a man” (Luyao zhi 
mali, lujiu jian renxin 路遥知马力,路就见人心). A real friendship has to go 
through a lot of tests over the time. For those self-employed people, there is 
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always a possibility that some of them will move away one day. Where can I find 
them out? Secondly, everyone knows that the relationship among nearby 
businessmen is primarily competitive rather than collaborative. This is especially 
true if we are in the same line of business. So, I do not want to waste any time 
nurturing a real friendship with them.  
Consistent with Gold’s (1985) and A. King’s (1991) arguments, her principles of making 
friends exemplified the atomizing effect that socialist regulation have imposed upon 
inter-personal relations. In her words, the workplace was not appropriate for nurturing 
reliable relations among strangers because it did not allow them to build up trust from 
scratch. Combining with the first reason that making friends in the workplace was the 
basic requirement of doing business, the respondents’ emphasis on trust suffices to justify 
my interpretation that their passive engagement in bridging social capital was not simply 
an issue of work/life conflict but rather resulted from their unwilling to do it. Noticing the 
central place of trust in their inter-personal relations, it would be interesting be examine 
its nature. This question will be fully answered when I discuss the difference between 
material and immaterial assistances later. Given the residue of socialist control on inter-
personal relations, it is necessary to examine how it has influenced the female 
entrepreneurs’ social networking experience. 
Dysfunction of China’s MDPs in Social Capital Building 
As was discussed in chapter three, the Chinese MDPs differ from pioneering 
MDPs in the other countries, because they are designed and operated by the street-level 
governments. Also, the central and local governments have promulgated a series of 
public policies in an effort to further facilitate women’s self-employment programs 
during the aftermath of the global economic crisis in 2008. As the review of prior studies 
manifests, there has been a few arguments that MDPs more or less engaged in connecting 
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their clients with each other as well as linking them with the outside community (see, for 
example, Jurik et al. 2006). Countering these arguments, my interviews with the female 
entrepreneurs suggest that neither bonding social capital nor bridging social capital 
derived from the government’s policy support. As the respondents depicted, a 
dysfunction of the Chinese MDPs in social capital building refers to their failures in 
connecting those women with each other as well as link them to the larger community 
outside the programs. 
The Chinese MDPs, as I introduced elsewhere, originally served laid-off females. 
Though they expanded the scope of their customers towards unemployed urban residents 
and rural-to-urban migrants later, the services they provided were not dramatically 
changed. As the respondents reported, these services included policy consulting, small 
business lending, basic livelihood allowance supplying, technical training, and 
employment information sharing. None of these respondents, however, said that the 
services provided by the local MDPs had helped them expand their social networks 
within the programs. For example, Mei, a prior SOE employee and currently middle-aged 
female owner of a small convenient store, described her daily practice of social 
networking as follows:  
 To pull strings (La guanxi 拉关系) is necessary for doing business. Almost every 
businessmen knows that it is very very significant for them to closely connect 
with those who possess all kinds of or much greater amount of needy resources. 
Equally significantly, if I am lucky to be able to pull strings with either a bank, 
the local bureau of industry and commerce, or the local administration of taxation, 
it is probably going to save me many troubles while turning to these organizations 
for help. Anyways, going back to your question, the local MDP has never done 
anything to assist me with either maintaining old social networks or establishing 
new ones. So far, I have not found that the officials there focus on this issue. 
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Though Mei’s response did not touch upon any service that the MDP provided, it is in 
conflict with an important role that the government expected to play in fostering bonding 
social capital. Also, Mei implicitly mentioned the possibility of applying guanxi in an 
instrumental way of linking her to cadres or institutions. For her, an establishment of such 
instrumental relations would probably produce a few benefits for her business through 
getting a much easier access to multiple resources.  
Different from Mei’s neglect of the services, Fangfang provided a detailed 
depiction of her personal experience of participating in various activities (e.g., 
professional development workshops, policy consulting sessions) organized by her 
affiliated MDP. Even though she confirmed the MDP’s effort of connecting their clients 
with each other as well as them with staff, it actually turned out to be an unsuccessful 
attempt. As she said: 
 Following the party-state's policy support, our MDP did try to urge us to 
communicate with each other within the organization. The staff of the MDP 
advocated such connections by repeatedly saying that have more friends means an 
expansion of our access to various information or resources. For many times, I 
have been required to get together with other female entrepreneurs. We were 
organized for attending professional development workshops and high-level 
government officials' presentations concerning the party-state's most recently 
issued policies and laws. The staff there were nice, and they tried to make friends 
with us when we got together for an activity. Nevertheless, we started from 'get 
together' and ended with 'get together', and nothing happened after that. It was 
almost impossible for me to make real friends with strangers in this way, because 
trust could not be arranged by the government…Every attendant clearly knows 
that we were there for fulfilling some inescapable tasks imposed by the 
government but not simply for making friends.  
According to Fangfang’s response, the MDP endorsed an instrumental approach to 
bonding social capital, emphasizing how such social connections (especially those among 
program clients) can benefit their clients businesses. Also, Fangfang clarified why the 
MDP’s efforts could not be able to facilitate their social connections with either other 
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clients or the staff. She laid stress on the crucial role of trust in extending her social 
connections within the program. All the other respondents, like Mei, found it impossible 
to know about and readily trust a female entrepreneur as their affiliated MDPs had 
expected. It is because they had classified both MDP clients and staff as strangers when 
they first got to know them. Lack of trust made it difficult for the MDPs in my sample to 
transform this type of inter-personal relationship into friendship where mutual trust is in 
the central place.  
Furthermore, my interviews with the urban female entrepreneurs indicate the 
government’s futile attempt of fostering bridging social capital. Xiaofang discussed the 
costly yet unsuccessful attempts of her affiliated MDP to associate her with individuals or 
organizations from the outside community mentioned. Like Fangfang, she attended those 
activities in the way of "fulfilling tasks imposed by the government". As she said: 
 It is not fair to negate the local street-level MDP's painstaking efforts of trying to 
connect us to the outside community. In reality, my affiliated MDP has strictly 
followed the lead of both the central government and the party especially through 
associating our female entrepreneurs with a few key officials of government 
departments and agencies. For several times, the MDP officials even rented a bus 
and took us to a brown-bag training session operated by the local bureau of 
industry and commerce. All their efforts, however, were ultimately in vein…I 
mean, it is quite easy to understand that we cannot become friends with cadres, 
because their social status are much higher than ours. That is to say, people, who 
belong to two different worlds, cannot have anything in common and thereby 
have nothing to establish a mutual trust.  
As is suggested by Xiaofang’s response, despite the central government’s plan of 
fostering bridging social capital was indeed implemented at the local level, it did not 
produce the outcome that the central and local governments had expected. Interestingly, 
she perceived cadres as located in a very high positioning in social pyramid. For her, this 
perception resulted in the impossibility that she could make friends with cadres, sufficing 
  106 
to explain her passive attitudes towards the MDP’s attempt to foster female 
entrepreneurs’ guanxi practice. 
Small business lending provides another way in which MDPs in my sample 
attempted to facilitate their clients’ connections with individuals or institutions outside 
the programs. Different from the peer lending model that was fervently advocated for the 
potential of creating social networks (Ashe, 2000; Friedman, 2001; Jurik, 2005), the 
Chinese MDPs in my sample adopted the individual lending model. Through 
interviewing the urban female entrepreneurs, it is interesting to find that many of them 
knew about the small business loan program, but none of them were willing to apply for 
any loan from the MDPs.  For instance, Xiaohua said:  
I am not interested in the small business lending program but I know it. The staff 
repeatedly introduced it to me, and they even invited me to a few information 
sessions together with other female entrepreneurs… I do not see how much 
different it is from the loans from formal financial institutions. Individual 
borrowers get loans from banks. MDPs are actually the bridge between borrowers 
and banks. Banks are in charge of a thorough inspection of potential borrowers’ 
credit history and business performance. The only benefit for borrowers is that the 
central and local government investments lower the interest rate.  
Having heard that an individual lending model rather than the peer lending model was 
adopted by the Chinese MDP, I was also curious to know if they both had the same 
potential to foster bridging social capital. As a result, I posed this follow-up question to 
Xiaohua, and she answered:  
The staff have told us for a few times that we would have a chance of making 
friends with bank clerks while going through the procedures of small business 
loan application. Personally, I do not believe it is true. Not to mention bankers, 
bank clerks earn much higher salaries. We are two completely different types of 
people. I cannot imagine what I can chat with them, leave alone making friends 
and establishing a mutual trust.  
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According to Xiaofang’s introduction to the small business loan service, her affiliated 
MDP adopted the individual lending model that ruled out the possibility of fostering 
social connections among their clients. Consistent with Xiaofang’s pessimistic comments 
on the possibility of making friends with cadres, Xiaohua’s response denied that the 
female entrepreneur could be able to make friends with bank clerks due to lack of basis 
for nurturing mutual trust.  
Overall, from the perspective of the respondents, the Chinese MDPs in my sample 
failed to foster social capital building. Despite the central and local governments’ 
repeatedly stress on the instrumental dimension of social capital building, many of the 
respondents were found to lay much more stress on mutual trust rather than on utility in 
their daily practice of social networking. Apart from lack of time and energy, it would be 
interesting to examine how mutual trust was played out in the female entrepreneurs’ 
experience of social networking. Also, I am interested in what made possible the urban 
female entrepreneurs’ resistance against the party-state’s national advocate for the key 
role of the MDPs in fostering their social capital building.  
Affective Nature of China's Social Capital Phenomenon 
The party-state's failure of fostering social capital building in the MD field makes 
it necessary to examine the complexity in the nature of Chinese female entrepreneurs’ 
daily practice of social networking. Consistent with M. Yang’s (1994, 2002) arguments 
about the affective nature of guanxi practice, my interviews with the female 
entrepreneurs suggest that their daily practice of social capital building was affection-
centered. In the affectively charged relationships, people place an emphasis on the long-
term bond of the relationship, and such a bond mainly consists of trust, inter-dependence, 
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and mutual responsibility. Despite both tangible and intangible favors are inevitably 
involved in the affection-centered relationships, they actually serve as the means rather 
than the ends of maintaining these relationships. Consequently, this research finding 
contradicts the Western instrumental approach to social capital that sees personal gains 
and losses as the ends of nurturing the relationships. Furthermore, my data on the urban 
female entrepreneurs’ guanxi practice suggest that the affective nature of guanxi derives 
from the influences of Chinese traditional culture (especially those of Confucius 
teachings), which is apparently in a dynamic interaction with not only the residue of the 
Cultural Revolution legacy on inter-personal relations but also the diffusion of neo-liberal 
ideologies in post-1978 China. 
 Among all the affectively charged inter-personal relationships, friendship is 
featured by an emphasis on trust. People involved in such relations are mutually attached 
and committed. As Fangfang's description of the long-term friendship with her childhood 
friend is illustrative of how mutual trust made her friendship different from the utility-
based inter-personal relation. She said:  
A real friendship absolutely cannot be measured by money. As I told you, my best 
friend helped me a lot when I started my own business. She lent me a large 
amount of money that I used as an important part of my start-up capital. In 
addition to this financial assistance, her emotional support was much more 
precious and important. To be honest, I could probably borrow money from 
someone else or the nearby MDP if I did not care interest. The emotional support, 
however, cannot be acquired from anyone else…I would say if she encountered 
the same difficulties, I would not hesitate to give her whatever I have as she did it 
to me. It is because we have been good friends ever since we were still in the 
primary school. We have experienced too many things together, so we share both 
good and bad memories with each other. In other words, our friendship has 
undergone innumerable tests as we grow up, and it definitely cannot be measured 
by money. That is why she is almost the most dependable person in this world for 
me, and vice versa.  
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Such an inter-dependent bond, which consists of mutual trust, serves as a good case in 
point to explicate the affective nature of the respondents’ daily practice of social 
connecting. Consistent with M. Yang’s (1994, 2002) arguments concerning the 
affectively charged guanxi practice, Fangfang's description of her friendship indicates 
that both material and immaterial resources acquiring from her friendship were absolutely 
not the ends of her friendship.  
As Fangfang declared, mutual trust was founded upon their common life 
experience, especially the ups and downs they had shared with each other. This is exactly 
the most significant reason why one would try to help the other out by any means when 
she was in trouble. Her friend’s support of her business is a good case in point. 
Significantly, her friend’s assistance made her feel grateful and got her prepared to return 
the favor in the future. By following the codes of mutual trust and inter-dependence, 
frequent exchanges of favors would repeatedly happen via the friendship. By saying “she 
is almost the most dependable person in this world for me, and vice versa”, Fangfang 
implicitly re-emphasized that mutual trust derived from and served as the basis for such 
an exchange. Consequently, I argue that an exchange of favors, as Fangfang’s example 
illustrated, was definitely not the ends but rather the means of maintaining and 
reinforcing the friendship. In this sense, Fangfang’s affection-centered friendship is 
explicitly in conflict with Putnam's utility-based concept of social capital. It is because 
Putnam’s (2000, 2001) asserted that the establishment of mutual trust is supposed to be 
contingent upon the rational calculation of costs and benefit (more specifically, the 
instrumental principle of reciprocity). In other words, personal gains are the ends of 
nurturing utility-based social relationships. 
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Moreover, Fangfang’s emphasis on the importance of common life experience 
sufficiently explains why the respondents treated “real friends” and “just friends” 
differentially. Compared with “real friends”, “just friends” shared less life experience 
with the respondents. Although they did not completely rule out the possibility that “just 
friends” would become their “real friends” in the future, there had not been reliable 
mutual trust there until then. Due to lack of mutual trust, they cared “just friends” much 
less than “real friends”. For example, Meimei and her husband, who were laid off six 
years ago, specialized in desktop repair services. She got to know a nearby 
businesswoman one year ago, and they shared a few common topics of conversation only 
because they were in the same line of business. She talked about to what extent she cared 
the nearby self-employed woman:  
I knew her just a year ago, and we are both very busy with our own businesses 
every day. Most of our communications focused on our business, because we 
shared some business information with each other…I do not really know about a 
person unless we experience a lot of things together and our friendship goes 
through many tests. That is why I do not trust her and treat her in the same way 
that I treat my best friends... Everyone, however, has a chance of having good 
friends at any time in his life, so I might get to know another real friend who is a 
businessman or businesswoman nearby as the life goes on.  
Consistent with Fangfang’s emphasis on common life experience, Meimei asserted that a 
few common topics of communication on doing business were far from being able to 
have her fully know about the nearby self-employed woman and thereby nurture mutual 
trust with her. Lack of trust resulted in much less attention that Fangfang paid to the 
nearby businesswoman. In her opinion, only through experiencing many things together, 
can people set up a real friendship based upon mutual trust.  
The difference between “just friend” and “real friend”, as the respondents (e.g., 
Fangfang and Meimei) suggested, corresponds to the rules of friendship that is defined by 
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both Chinese traditional culture and the Cultural Revolution legacy on guanxi. According 
to Confucian ethics, trust decreases in proportion to enlarged social distance when guanxi 
practice go beyond the realm of shou-ren and expand into the field of sheng-ren. In the 
respondents’ words, they were more likely to trust old friends rather than new ones. It is 
because they knew much more about old friends, and the dependability and reliability of 
their friendship had endured many tests especially during the hardest time of their lives.  
Also, treating the two types of friends differentially has to be ascribed to the 
pervasive existence of distrust and cynicism in contemporary guanxi practice. As I 
previously discussed, this reason to large degree derives from the remaining yet 
discernable impact of the Cultural Revolution upon inter-personal relations. The Maoist 
party-state’s harsh control on private communication during the Cultural Revolution of 
1966-1976 has remained to remind Chinese people not to easily trust strangers for the 
sake of self-protection. This is much more obviously illustrated in Fangfang’s 
explanation. Unless the relationship with the nearby businesswoman underwent enough 
tests, she would always assume that the businesswomen was not trustworthy. Therefore, I 
assert that this assumption not only provides a telling example of the atmosphere of 
distrust permeating the contemporary social life, but also fuels the perpetuation of such 
an atmosphere. In pretty much the same way that distrust was assumed to be predominant 
in the relationships between strangers, Chinese traditional culture and the Cultural 
Revolution legacy have combined to influence the urban female entrepreneurs’ daily 
practice of social networking. 
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Noticeably, Fangfang and Meimei both claimed that friendship had to go through 
the test of time. A few other respondents also joined to substantiate how the test of time 
would work. For instance, Yawen clarified: 
As time goes by, a few things would come up to test whether we are real friends. 
For example, friends have to be willing to share a few important business 
information with each other. Borrowing money is another good opportunity to test 
if he is your best friend. Even though she does not know if I am able to make a 
repayment, she is still willing to lend money to me. By doing this, she is your real 
friend.  
Xiaohua added: 
Being real friends is not the same as being business partners. If she is my real 
friend, I will never do a complex calculation concerning whether we earn equal 
benefits. For instance, she helped me with tax issues, and in return I shared my 
customers with her. The two favors involved in the exchange does not need to be 
equal. What is at stake is that we both appreciate each other’s favor and get 
prepared to return it in the future. As time passes by, such an exchange goes over 
and over again. In this way, our friendship will be ultimately established. 
These two responses addressed the test of time, providing another clarification of how 
friendship is gradually established. As opposed to Putnam’s (2000, 2001) utility-based 
social capital theorizing, Yawen and Xiaohua both claimed that a real friendship takes its 
root in a gradually strengthened affection-centered bond. More significantly, such a bond 
has to be able to stand the long-term test where frequent exchanges of favors take place 
between friends.  
In addition to friendship, the parent-child relationship is another kind of the 
affection-centered relationship that relies more on obligation than trust. Recalling 
Xiaowei’s and Xiaofang’s aforementioned responses, they both discussed that the parent-
child relationship was substantiated by their parents’ persistent assistance with their 
businesses. More significantly, their parents showed benevolence to them through a 
provision of both material and emotional support without an anticipation of reciprocity. 
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For instance, Xiaofang’s parents even declined her repayment by doing unpaid jobs as a 
support of her business. In this case, underlying a supply of both material and emotional 
support was the parents’ obligation of caring their child. For Xiaowei and Xiaofang, 
getting help from their parents was in fact a way to witness and experience their parents’ 
practice of showing benevolence to their children. Meanwhile, children involved in such 
a type of the affection-centered relationship have to maintain filial piety to their parents. 
For Xiaowei and Xiaofang, they paid frequent visits to their parents’ home in an effort to 
sustain the obligation code. Countering Putnam’s (2000, 2001) utility-based perspective 
of social capital, an exchange of favor was not the ends but rather the means of nurturing 
the relationships with their parents. Again, this makes clear the clash between the 
affectively charged inter-personal relations and the Western instrumentality-based social 
relations.  
It is noteworthy to point out that the parent-child relationship, as the respondents 
suggested, was considerably influenced by Chinese traditional culture. Seeing from the 
perspective of Confucian ethics, family is the most intimate inner relationship that is 
maintained by “blood, marriage, or adoption and having a common budget and common 
property” (Lang, 1946, p. 128). The rule of exchange within the realm of family was 
dominated by the code of Ren (affection and benevolent 仁). As Xiaowei’s and 
Xiaofang’s responses indicate, the code of Ren was interpreted in their parent-child 
relationships as a sense of obligation or that of mutual responsibility. Playing a parent 
role, they have to show their benevolence to their child through supporting their self-
employment careers. Importantly, parents supported their children’s businesses without 
anticipating any return. On the other side, one must be loyalty to his/her family and show 
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filial piety to his/her parents. For Xiaowei and Xiaofang, multiple ways of showing filial 
piety included buying their parents some gifts, trying to get together with their parents as 
frequently as possible, taking care of them when they were sick, and so on.  
Having examined the affective nature of the respondents’ guanxi practice, it is 
understandable that the party-state’s adoption of the Western utility-based social capital 
theorizing has not successfully fostered their social networking initiatives. The 
government shifted its attention to urban female entrepreneurs’ daily experience of social 
capital building with an emphasis on how it would benefit their businesses. Nevertheless, 
an affective bond, as the respondents suggested, still remained to be the basis for their 
social networks. To put it differently, the instrumental principles of cost-benefit analysis 
upheld by the party-state did not drown out the combined influences of Chinese 
traditional culture and the Cultural Revolution legacy on inter-personal relationships. 
To put it in the respondents’ words, trust, inter-dependence and mutual 
responsibility cannot be built up simply by a few activities organized by the local MDPs. 
Rather, they have to be gradually accumulated in their daily lives and stand the test of 
time. As Xiaowei declared: 
My affiliated MDP seems to be in a hurry to transform its training sessions into a 
best-friend assembly line, but it is doomed to be a failure. I cannot imagine that I 
would have a real friend simply by joining several sessions together with other 
self-employed females. There is no way to build up trust so fast. 
 Yawen’s words touched on the same point,  
I stayed in a session for two hours with the other twenty women. After that, I did 
know a few of them, but that is it. I really cannot be optimistic to say that we will 
be real friends, because it usually takes me at least five years to have a real friend 
if I am lucky enough.  
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Based upon these responses, I conclude that the female entrepreneurs in my sample 
insisted on their usual way of guanxi practice regardless of the overwhelming influences 
of the party-state’s public policies and propaganda.  
Furthermore, Fangfang’s response suffices to be an answer to the question why 
the urban female entrepreneurs in my sample were found to appreciate immaterial 
assistance more than material support acquired from their social networking activities. 
Since immaterial assistance (e.g., emotional support) more often than not can only be 
acquired from affection-centered social connections, the respondents tended to consider it 
to be the decisive factor that makes their social connections radically different from those 
utility-based ones. In addition to Fangfang's response, my interviews with the other 
females suggests the topic of renqing (human feelings 人情) that serve as another way of 
substantiating the abstract form of the affective bond. Meanwhile, it re-emphasizes the 
affective bond as the foundation of nurturing and sustaining social connections among the 
women participating in my study project.  
The Chinese word renqing can be roughly translated into human feelings, but it 
has much more complicated meanings contingent on the distinctive socio-economic and 
cultural context of China. As my interviews manifest, I tend to generally define renqing 
in this study as a medium of social exchange through which persons have to abide a set of 
social norms and get along with each other. Through analyzing a few quotations from the 
participants' responses, I would highlight how renqing differs from the utility-based 
principle of mutual reciprocity, and therefore reinforce my argument that the type of 
social connections among the research participants is in conflict with Putnam's 
instrumental view of social capital. First, while mutual reciprocity allows each other to 
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get a roughly equal benefit, renqing emphasizes the flexibility in the amount of exchange 
for each time. As was recalled by Hehua,  
When my parents lent money to me, they had never expected me to return it. 
Although I wanted to return it later, they refused... I love them regardless of 
whether they have given me any money. Also, I really appreciate the financial 
support that they gave to me, and do not know how to repay their 
benevolence…One year after I borrowed money from them, I earned 
approximately 20,000 yuan in total and spent 4,000 yuan buying a new television 
for them. Although it was worth much less than the money they lent to me, it was 
indeed a big surprise for them. As I said, they had never anticipate a repayment. 
They loved it so much and wanted to show it to everyone by saying “that is the 
gift given by my daughter”. 
As this quotation illustrates, the parent-child relationship absolutely cannot be equal to 
the debtor-creditor relationship. For one thing, Hehua’s parents actually gave the money 
as a support of her business in the name of loan, for another Hehua’s filial piety to her 
parents was represented in the gift for her parents. What is at stake is absolutely not a 
calculation about which side got much more from this exchange, but rather the exchange 
in itself that places emphasis on mutual obligation in an effort to strengthen the parent-
child link. 
Second, the type of favor involved in the exchange is also flexible. As I argued 
above, since the parent-child relationship does not correspond to the reciprocity code, 
parents, who show benevolence to their children in advance, do not require an equal 
benefit in return, let alone to the specific type of benefit. In Hehua’s case, giving the 
television was not the only way to repay her parent’s enormous support of her self-
employment career. As she said,   
They brought me up, spent a lot money marrying me out, and gave me almost 
every cent they had collected to support my business. I really do not know how to 
repay their benevolence. I am pretty sure that I will owe a lot to them forever. I 
will spend my whole life repaying what they did to me. My heartfelt love is 
probably the most precious thing that I can give back to them. As I told you, I pay 
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a visit to their home at least twice a week no matter how busy I am with my 
business. I take care of them whenever they got sick. I am just doing whatever I 
can do in order to let them know we care them so much.  
As this quotation indicates, Hehua in the parent-child relationship had enormous 
discretion in selecting the specific form of filial piety as a return to her parent’s 
benevolence. These possible forms included frequently getting together with her parents, 
taking care of them if necessary, and so on. This flexibility constitutes the norms that she 
observed to preserve the long-lasting connection with her parents.  
Third, the instrumental principle of mutual reciprocity requires a pre-determined 
time when the debtor should repay, but renqing does not specify when one person should 
repay the favor to the other. Like Honghong’s example that she would spend her lifetime 
repaying her parents, Hui insisted that she should devote her whole lifetime to caring her 
friend, 
When I had failed in looking for a new job for several times after being laid off, it 
was my best friend who consistently encouraged me to stand up to all kinds of 
difficulties …We used to work in the same SOE and were laid off in the same 
year. All these common experience had brought us closer to each other, and had 
made it easier for me to take her suggestions of becoming self-employed. With no 
exaggeration, her encouragement and suggestion have consisted one of the most 
important turning point in my life … Although she has never asked anything in 
reward for her help, I will never forget her favor and try to spend my whole 
lifetime to care her in the same way that I care the other family member. 
As Hui recalled, despite her best friend did not specify when she should get something in 
reward, Hui actually had started to see caring her as a lifetime task. That is to say, a 
flexibility, or more accurately, an ambiguity in the time when one should pay back is in 
fact a strategy for extending the duration of a friendship. As long as one always feels 
grateful for the other’s favor, a long-term commitment to such a relationship would last 
forever.  
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Accordingly, renqing serves as a way of concretizing the abstract form of 
affection embedded in the women’s social networking activities. In more specific terms, 
renqing takes its root in the socio-economic and cultural context of post-1978 China, 
highlighting the distinctive way and content of the women’s guanxi practice. 
Significantly, this way of guanxi practice and its content remarkably differ from the 
instrumental calculation of costs and benefits, and therefore collide with Putnam’s utility-
based social capital theorizing. 
Despite the limited and non-representative nature of this sample, my data analysis 
nonetheless generated some interesting and significant findings that can serve as 
hypotheses for future investigations. Adopting the ECM (Burawoy, 1991), the arguments 
that I make in the rest of this chapter are boiled down to a further development of my 
research findings. Basically, the ECM is utilized in this chapter to reflectively examine 
the relationship between data and theory, proposing a way of problematizing and 
improving prior theories. To put it more specifically, this chapter departs from the 
existing utility-based perspective of social capital, and then manifests how it is 
challenged by the empirical study of Chinese female entrepreneurs’ guanxi practice. It 
ends with a reconstruction of social capital concept by turning my data analysis into part 
of the new theoretical insights. 
Biopolitics-based Critique of Putnam’s Social Capital Theory 
Based upon the aforementioned research findings, the section presents a new 
critique of Putnam’s utility-based social capital theory and prepares for a reconstruction 
of the social capital concept at the end of this chapter. Noticeably, this critique differs 
from prior critical reviews by its special focus on neo-liberalism. I will argue that neo-
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liberalism, as the ideological foundation of the utility-based social capital concept, has 
been increasingly obsolete when it is recognized as being incompatible with the 
emergence of contemporary biopolitical production.  
The Western utility-based social capital theorizing has been adopted and adapted 
by the Chinese party-state as a way of intervening in women’s daily lives, repeatedly 
emphasizing how social capital building can benefit their self-employed careers. Also, it 
has served as an attempt of integrating post-1978 China with the contemporary global 
capitalism, advocating the free market philosophy of a minimalist state as a solution to 
socio-economic problems. To put it more specifically, a series of social connections, 
which bonded female entrepreneurs together as well as linked them to the outside 
community, has been planned by the party-state in an effort to replace the governments to 
be a sufficient supply of both public goods and business assistance. As explicitly 
evidenced by my data on Chinese urban female entrepreneurs’ guanxi practice, their 
social connections to some extent did ease the Chinese government’s workload of 
improving women’s socio-economic status and sustaining the state’s economic growth. 
For instance, the parent-child relationship and the relationship between friends 
both constituted a reliable supply of material and emotional support for those women’s 
self-employed careers. Also, as many of the respondents said, they made friends with 
some nearby self-employed individuals. There was a possibility that they could probably 
help each other via sharing both business information and customers. Without 
exaggeration, all these types of social networks emerging from those women’s 
entrepreneurship experience to some extent have reduced the government’s burden of not 
only fostering their economic self-sufficiency but also sustaining the state’s economic 
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development. This was especially important in the aftermath of the 2008 global economic 
crisis when the declining demand of foreign markets had caused a real problem to 
China’s export sector and the mighty manufacturing industry as a whole (Chow, 2010). 
In short, those women’s guanxi practice has actually substantiated the importance of 
women’s entrepreneurship in the state’s economy, falling prey to the party-state’s control 
and appropriation. That is to say, it has created a new way in which women’s productive 
labor is subjugated and exploited by the party-state. 
In spite of this, my data show that the respondents engaged in social capital 
building in an entirely different way from the Western utility-based perspective of social 
capital prescribes. I want to highlight that this is where the Chinese party-state’s 
embracement of Putnam’s utility-based social capital theory collides with the combined 
impacts of Chinese traditional culture and the Cultural Revolution legacy upon social life. 
In more specific terms, those women’s engagement in social capital building did not 
result from the party-state’s policy making and propaganda apparatus. My interviews 
with them clearly show that the central and local governments’ efforts (e.g., basic 
livelihood allowance supplying, small business lending, technical training, policy 
consulting) failed to foster their social networking initiatives. It is because that those 
women did not follow Putnam’s (2001) advocacy that required them to act like business 
capitalists and develop their social networks into the market type of resource exchange. 
Instead, Confucian ethics and the remnants of the Cultural Revolution legacy converged 
to gain prominence in the realm of inter-personal communication, bringing the affective 
bond to the central place of Chinese urban female entrepreneurs’ guanxi practice. 
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Theoretically, the clash between women’s affective social networks and the 
Western utility-based social capital theory poses a challenge to neo-liberal ideologies that 
are at the very core of Putnam’s utility-based social capital theory. The Chinese party-
state’s control of women’s labor force has in fact been targeted at the social dimension of 
their self-employed careers, and more accurately, their daily practice of social capital 
building. As I argued elsewhere, those female entrepreneurs’ guanxi practice to large 
extent has replaced the government’s policy support to be the driving force of women’s 
entrepreneurship in particular and that of the state’s economy in general. I can further 
extend this argument on the condition that women’s self-employment has played a vital 
role in both the contemporary global economy and China’s economic growth (Zhi, Z. 
Huang, J. Huang, Rozelle, & Mason, 2013).  Extra-market social relations, in the case of 
Chinese urban female entrepreneurs’ guanxi practice, have started to disconnect with the 
economic logic of capital and thereby get rid of the exclusive status of a valued source of 
streaming utility. Consequently, the material relations of production and exchange have 
given way to immaterial factors that are exemplified by the central place of women’s 
affectively charged social connections in social production. 
 This corresponds to the last two of the three major trends of biopolitical 
production proposed by Hardt and Negri (2009). According to these two trends, 
contemporary social production has shifted from the industrial paradigm of capital 
production to biopolitical production, relying on an exploitation of intangible socially-
owned wealth (i.e. immaterial factors) at the collective level. The female entrepreneurs’ 
daily practice of guanxi, as I discussed before, was targeted at maintaining and 
strengthening the affective bond that consists of mutual trust, responsibility, and inter-
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dependence. An exchange of both material and immaterial resources was involved in 
their daily experience of social networking, but it actually served as a means rather the 
ends of nurturing their social networks. To put it much more accurately, social capital per 
se rather than its potential of being transformed into the utility-based form of asset is 
subject to the appropriation and exploitation of the state’s economic growth. In this sense, 
those Chinese women’s participation in self-employment exemplifies the fact that 
China’s contemporary economic development—one of the top players in today’s world 
economy—has been driven and organized by an exploitation and oppression of women’s 
immaterial socially-owned wealth at the collective level (i.e. women’s collective 
involvement in social production via self-employment).  
In Hardt and Negri’s words, my research findings concretize and substantiate the 
argument that capital has no longer been able to capture and organize contemporary 
social production grounded in the common. Based upon neo-liberalism, social capital has 
become a source of utility-generating asset that has the potential of benefiting community 
well-being and productivity. Neo-liberal ideologies, however, attempt to marginalize the 
social dimension of inter-personal relations as peripheral to capitalist social production. 
From this perspective, social capital is not productive unless it is processed through the 
economist term of capital. Countering this argument, my empirical study in this chapter 
indicates that the productivity of those women’s guanxi practice has taken its root in 
affections and therefore has become independent of market principles (especially the 
economist term of capital). As a result, I argue that contemporary biopolitical capitalist 
production has exceeded the domain of neo-liberalism when capital is unable to capture 
and incorporate productive social capital in the industrial paradigm of capitalist 
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production. To put it simply, neo-liberalism has actually become a fragile foundation 
upon which Putnam’s utilitarian view of social capital theorizing is founded. This 
provides not only the rationale but also the starting point of a reconstruction of social 
capital theory. 
Re-thinking the Common and Re-theorizing Social Capital 
Since the immaterial relations of production and exchange gains prominence with 
the advance of the contemporary biopolitical production, I want to shed light on the 
possibility that social capital would ultimately stay away from the colonizing effect of 
market principles. More importantly, a re-theorizing of social capital concept should have 
the potential to redeem Tocqueville’s promise of transforming social capital into a source 
of civil society independent from both market and state. As my research findings suggest, 
this possibility has actually come into being at least in the specific socio-economic and 
political circumstance of China’s MD. Specifically, I argue that the party-state-civil-
society-market complex rather than the party-state-market complex has actually 
functioned to channel on-going social forces in the contemporary Chinese society and to 
provide the bedrock for nurturing the rise of the Chinese female entrepreneur. Consistent 
with Ngai’s (2005) argument that the post-1978 reform era witnessed an array of short-
lived, spontaneous resistances at the grass-roots level, the female entrepreneurs in my 
sample were found to take on daily initiatives of social networking as a series of 
resistances at the collective level against the ideological influences of the party-state’s 
policies and propaganda. In a circumstance in which confrontational actions at the 
collective were severely suppressed, a motley collection of spontaneous, transgressive 
actions were taken by the businesswomen to nurture social connections in a different way 
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from that is required by the party-state. I firmly believe such a form of resistance has to 
be a fertile land where relevant theoretical works should thrive.    
Though I do not intend to bring out a fully developed re-theorizing of social 
capital, I prefer to provide a possible way in which future works should follow. Hardt and 
Negri’s (2009) notion of the common could probably be an appropriate foundation of 
reconstructing social capital theory. I argue that the most important task of re-theorizing 
social capital is to revitalize civil society as a major source of rebellion against both 
market control and state coercion. Putnam successfully draws attention to the immaterial 
aspect of social connection or network, but his utility-driven perspective tends to 
conceive it as peripheral to the primary forms of capital, and more exactly, as external to 
the process of social wealth production. In contrast, the idea of the common is capable of 
bringing social capital back to the core of biopolitical social production because it has the 
potential of highlight the social production of both tangible and intangible resources as a 
real source of resistance against market and state coercions. In this way, the colonized 
civil society can be rescued through opening up a third autonomous place between 
government and market. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RULES OF BECOMING A SUCCESSFUL FEMALE ENTREPRENEUR 
Through the government’s advocacy for utility-based social capital building in the 
MD field, the daily lives of Chinese urban female entrepreneurs have been incorporated 
in the party-state configuration/re-configuration of power relations. By doing this, the 
party-state aimed to continue and justify women’s oppression during the post-1978 era. 
Adopting the perspective of social identity construction, this chapter presents another 
way of examining how the party-state’s annexation with contemporary global capitalism 
has constituted women’s daily lives. Through an in-depth investigation into those 
women’s daily experience of getting involved in entrepreneurship, I want to understand 
how the making of the Chinese urban female entrepreneur emerged, how it became 
popular, how it changed in the process, and how it constituted Chinese women’s daily 
lives.  
From the perspective of the respondents, my data depict the historical transfer 
from the socially privileged construction of the Chinese working-class woman to that of 
the Chinese urban female entrepreneur. Following the ECM principles, this transfer at the 
individual level reflects the party-state’s strategic interventions in Chinese women’s 
social identity construction during different historical periods. Also, my data on the 
making of the Chinese urban female entrepreneur provide a window into the political-
historical process of globalization. To put it more specifically, it serves as a good case in 
point to explicate how the global trend of neo-liberalism has been invested in post-1978 
China and has influenced Chinese people’s daily lives.  
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Prior concerns, still present in today’s research about the relationship between 
entrepreneurship and women’s social identities, specifically focused on the gendered 
nature of entrepreneurship, addressing how women’s business activities constitute gender 
relations and gender identities (see, for example, Bourne & Calás, 2013; Bruni et al., 
2004). My research project presented in this chapter joins this line of inquiries, exploring 
how the gendered nature of entrepreneurship has been manifested in the specific context 
of China during the neo-liberal era. Following a gender approach to entrepreneurship 
(Bruni et al., 2004), the formation of the Chinese female entrepreneur, as the data 
indicate, features the intertwined practice of doing business and doing gender. Also, 
drawing from both Foucault’s analysis of governmentality and the Bourdieusian concept 
of habitus, the data analysis attempts to shed light on the dynamic process of social 
identity construction in which both the party-state and women themselves have 
simultaneously engaged.   
The following presentation of this chapter consists of five sections. First, it 
presents a literature review that sets up the theoretical framework for data analysis. 
Drawing from Foucault’s conceptualization of governmentality and the Bourdieusian 
notion of the habitus-field-social identity complex, the theoretical framework is 
constructed in order to explicate the making of the Chinese urban female entrepreneur. In 
light of these theoretical claims, those women’s social identity making is examined as not 
only the constructive influence of the party-state’s public policies and propaganda, but 
also the self-constructive role of their agency. This is followed by the analysis of my data 
that addresses the complexity in the historical transfer from the socially privileged 
construction of the working-class to that of urban female entrepreneurs. Such a historical 
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transfer, as my data manifest, witnessed that the party-state’s construction of women’s 
social identities had shifted the focus from the working-class identity to gender. In spite 
of this change, Chinese women have never been freed from oppressions, discriminations, 
and exploitations. On the other side, the research findings suggest that the agency of the 
female entrepreneurs has been more or less constrained by the party-state’s macro-level 
influence but still has been effective in striving for a work-family balance. Based on these 
empirical findings, the third section presents two concluding remarks on the gendered 
nature of China’s MD and the interaction between gender and class. Finally, this chapter 
ends with a brief summary of the findings from this study. 
Habitus and Intersectionality in Neo-liberal China 
Intersectional Perspective of Gender and Class 
  The intersectionality perspective or the recognition of multiple interlocking 
identities, which is understood in the context of power relations, is “the most important 
theoretical contribution that women’s studies, in conjunction with related fields, has 
made thus far” (McCall, 2005, p. 1171). In a very broad sense, intersectionality is a 
heuristic device through which to understand boundaries and hierarchical structure of 
social life (Anthias, 2013). It was initially coined by Crenshaw (1989, 1991) to study the 
production and reproduction of gender oppression of women of color, and more 
specifically, the overlapping of multiple categories of domination.  Later feminist 
theories further advanced the evolution of intersectionality, expanding its application in 
non-Western social and cultural circumstances. Among them, Hill Collins’s scholarship 
has contributed the most to the unprecedented popularity of intersectionality in feminist 
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theory and method. Collins (1990) utilized intersectionality to illustrate various forms of 
interlocking oppressions in people’s daily lives.  
 However, there has been a substantial number of recent literature, disclosing the 
limitations of existing intersectionality theories and offering alternative methodological 
and theoretical approaches to research (see, for example, Anthias, 2013; Davis, 2008; 
Erel, Haritaworn, Rodriguez, & Klesse, 2011; Shields, 2008). These voices commonly 
point to the viewpoint that an intersectionality perspective often looks like a traditional 
factorial research paradigm but fails to fully take into account the notion of mutually 
constituted categories. In other words, these flawed intersectiaonality perspectives focus 
on the listing of categories that intersect, but ignore “how” questions concerning this 
plurality—how these categories intersect. This study will attend analytically to this 
plurality, utilizing Bourdieu’s notion of habitus to illustrate how gender interacts with 
class.  
Using Habitus to Explain How Gender Interacts with Class 
 Habitus is of outstanding insight in the culturally inflected approaches to class, 
and these approaches are highly sensitive to gender-based inequalities. This accounts for 
my attempt of disclosing the intersections of gender and class through critically 
embracing the Bourdieusian approach to social hierarchy. As Bourdieu (1990) suggested, 
class divisions constitute a hierarchical social space in which people “…according to [the 
objective] position they occupy…understand the logic of their practice and…how they 
will classify themselves and others...” (p. 50). Namely, class is a human-involved process 
of social stratification, combining the objective influence of social structure with the 
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constructive role of people’s corresponding perceptions and appreciations. 20 Bourdieu 
coined another term habitus to describe the way that society is imprinted and encoded in 
human subjects in the form of power-laden dispositions and becomes classed. It was 
stated as: 
systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to 
function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and 
organize practice and representations that can be objectively adapted to their 
outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery 
of the operations necessary in order to attain them. (Bourdieu 1992, p.53) 
As this definition suggests, habitus is clarified with three key points. First, habitus carries 
a historical importance. In so far as a human subject is endowed with habitus, his/her 
incorporated scheme of perception (appreciations, preferences, tastes, etc.) is the 
combined product of collective and individual history (Bourdieu, 1986, 2005). Second, 
habitus is generative due to its indebtedness to history. Since schemes of perception are 
“an active presence of the whole past”, habitus is “an acquired system of generative 
schemas” which engenders thoughts, perceptions, and actions consistent with objective 
conditions (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 95, 1992, p. 56). Third, the dialectic relation between 
“structured structure” and “structuring structure” indicates the relationality of habitus. By 
being relational, habitus makes sense only in an interaction with specific fields, which are 
various socio-economic and institutional contexts (Bourdieu, 2005). Power relations 
happen through this interaction of agency and structure so that people experience 
differentiated power relations depending what dispositions they express and reproduce in 
                                                 
20 Bourdieu (1977) thought of the constructive role as the active presence of the process in which human 
agency both influences and is limited by objective structures. In contrast, objective structures refer to the 
objective existence of (cultural, political, social, or economic) rules and systems which to some extent 
constrains the full play of human agency. 
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a given circumstance. Also, habitus is relational in another sense: a habitus interacts with 
other habitae (Lawler, 2004). Specifically, multiple habitae are in an unequal interaction 
so that some of them are normalized and the others are sidelined. Extending Collins’s 
(1990) argument that gender, race, and class are modes for the practice of power 
relations, this study adopts the Bourdieusian concept of habitus to treat gender and class 
as two different domains of power where people’s social identities are shaped. In each 
domain, people express and reproduce certain dispositions depending upon what 
outcomes the practice of power relations causes in the specific circumstance. Instead of 
treating these two domains separately, I examine the interaction among multiple habitae 
by investigating how the shifting link between two domains influences the construction 
of the Chinese female entrepreneur.  
There has been a group of British scholars (see, for example, Lawler, 1999, 2004, 
2005; McNay, 1999; McRobbie, 2004, 2004; Skeggs, 2009; Skeggs, Thumim, & Wood, 
2008) who utilized habitus to see social identity construction along the lines of gender, 
race, and ethnicity as classed. However, utilizing habitus in this way, as Anthias (2013) 
claimed, is arguably in danger of being Eurocentric and ethnocentric. In contrast, my use 
of Bourdieu in the context of China comes to serve a comparative empirical work on this 
issue and hopefully can better extend the application of his ideas in the non-Western 
world. Another limit of their studies is that they were inclined to overemphasize either 
structure or agency in social identity construction. We should look no further than 
Lawler’s study on media representations of British women’s political protests. Lawler 
(2004) stated that “…there are some people who, by virtue of their habitae, are able to 
pass judgment…on others, and to make that judgment count” (p. 113). To put it more 
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clearly, not only does objective structure construct social identities, agency also engages 
in an active self-construction. The Bourdieusian concept of habitus, however, is distorted 
by Lawler’s overemphasis on how objective structures confer certain identities on female, 
which ultimately leans towards objectivism. Also, to ignore a much closer inspection of 
agency contradicts her original intention of equally focusing on structure and agency. 
Learning from these scholars' inappropriate adoption of habitus, my study tries to pay 
attention to agency in order to keep a balanced focus on structure and agency.  
Agency is a socio-political account of experience, allowing an investigation into 
“the contradictory forms of identification and affective force that underlie these 
ambivalences” (McNay, 2004, p. 189). 21 Since agency is not simply an opposite of 
structure, its mediatory feature makes it possible to overcome the dualism of mind and 
body, physiological and psychological, and objectivism and subjectivism. Specifically, it 
is actually “a generative theory of subjectification” through which human subjects 
respond in an active way to multiple uncertainties embedded in the interaction between 
agency and social norms (McNay, 2000, p. 161). On one hand, agency is expected to be 
an emancipatory force which is able to expose the underside of objective structure — the 
state's coercive regulation of people's daily lives (Fraser, 2011). On the other hand, 
                                                 
21 Butler’s (1993) notion of performative agency has had a great influence on feminist theories of gender 
identity for her influential critique of the post-structuralist trend of equalizing human agency with the 
mechanical inscription of social orders. In this study, I prefer Loic McNay’s idea of agency because it is 
constructed upon an improvement of Butler’s theory of agency. McNay (2000) found that Butler actually 
had replicated the post-structuralist mistake because her notion of the temporality of the performative is 
equivalent to “a property of sedimented symbolic construction rather than as an anticipatory element 
inherent in praxis” (p. 35). Based on this critique, McNay (2000) claimed that gender identity is enacted at 
the preflexive level, resonating with Bourdieu’s commitment to addressing the antinomy between 
objectivism and subjectivism. By clarifying it in Bourdieu’s words, McNay saw gender identity 
construction as “a form of practical mimesis: the body believes in what it plays at: it weeps if it mimes 
grief” (2000, as cited on p. 39). Therefore, McNay’s notion of agency complements the post-structualist 
account of social identity construction through emphasizing the active role of identity self-construction. 
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agency is basically contextualized in structural and cultural properties that objectively 
shape the situations human agent involuntarily encountered (Archer, 1995, 2003, 2007; 
Valdez, 2011). On this account, this study resolves to investigate how the making of the 
Chinese female entrepreneur is shaped by the interactive relation of the party-state to 
women's daily and business lives. 
Furthermore, an inappropriate use of habitus is also caused by not systematically 
scrutinizing the complexity in the constructive role of objective structure (especially that 
of neo-liberalism). These scholars (see, for example, Lawler, 1999; McNay, 1999; 
Skeggs et al., 2008) commonly saw their works as against theories of reflexive identity 
transformation. Nevertheless, their utilization of habitus tends to romanticize agency, 
foreclosing an analysis of the fact that enacting agency inevitably gets human agents 
(especially the marginalized) involved in oppressive social norms and structures (Pfeffer, 
2012). Namely, the Bourdieusian concept of habitus emphasizes that reflexive individuals 
are inescapably embedded in and impacted by power relations. These inappropriate uses 
of habitus calls for a critical investigation into neo-liberal governmentality which has 
considerably affected gendered identity making. 
Neo-liberal China’s Construction of Women’s Social Identities 
My study of gender in this chapter draws upon a gender approach to 
entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship is historically embedded in the symbolic space of 
maleness (Bruni, 2004) and, as Connell (2005) noted, it is often constructed as a form of 
hegemonic masculinity which is an idealized Western manhood linked to such attributes 
as independent, innovative, aggressive, competitive, and indifferent to pain. Prior 
studies—even those on female entrepreneurs—engaged in “othering” the non-male, 
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rendering hegemonic masculinity invisible and therefore justifying a universal and 
agendered model of economic rationality (Bruni et al., 2004). Simply put, 
entrepreneurship comprises a gender subtext which makes gender invisible and 
reproduces the Western normative manhood (Bruni, 2004). In this regard, utilizing the 
gender approach to entrepreneur means an investigation into the gendered nature of 
entrepreneurship through identifying doing gender and doing entrepreneurship as 
intertwined practice (Bruni et al., 2004). In the case of my inquiry, I seek to explore how 
the way that the role of entrepreneur is played out relates to the performance of gender.  
Assuming a sensibility moulded by West and Zimmerman’s (2009) 
ethnomethodological take on “doing gender” and Butler’s (1993) performative concept of 
gender identity, my study  treats gender as a situated performance which is no longer an 
attribute of the individual but rather a social practice done in power-laden human 
interactions. Identity, therefore, is seen as a heterogeneous mechanism of discursive and 
material practice (Bruni & Gherardi, 2001). Under these definitions, people do gender 
within social interactions in ways that they render their gender identity legitimate but at 
the same time what can be done is confined by social norms (mainly heterosexual). In 
fact, the flexibility and fluidity of gender identity has gained prominence as the meanings 
of masculinity and femininity constantly shift among differentiated contexts. Also, 
gender is done and redone as a response to the strictly delineated norms imposing on sex 
categories (West & Zimmerman, 2009). To put it differently, human agency plays an 
active role in revising the normative expectation of how a man or woman should be 
performed. Furthermore, class provides another means of doing/redoing gender. It 
interacts with gender norms to constitute stratification schemes that socially construct 
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women of a certain social class (Trautner, 2005). My analysis of the gendered social 
identity making in this chapter aims to explicate this interaction shaped by both agency 
and structure. 
Furthermore, my inquiry into the making of the Chinese female entrepreneur has 
to be situated in globalized capitalism, and more specifically, its most recent historical 
moment—neo-liberalism. Social identity has been recognized as part of neo-liberal 
governmentality which manages populations. In the specific Asian circumstance, Ong 
(2006) contextualized Foucauldian governmentality within neo-liberalism. Specifically, 
she sees neo-liberal governmentality as a problem of optimization that pursues and 
justifies the maximization of profits from the subjugation of bodies and the control of 
populations. In practice, it is applied as two optimizing strategies—“technologies of 
subjectivity” and “technologies of subjection” which target at the making and self-
making of ideal social identities in the specific time-space context for the purpose of 
profiting from global capital (pp. 6-7).   
I argue that the two strategies actually configure relationships between governing 
and being governed, or in Bourdieu’s (2005) words, the dialectic relation between 
structured structure and structuring structure via cutting through such antinomies as 
subjectivism/objectivism and structure/agent. Ong’s ideas therefore can be utilized to 
operationalize the habitus-field-social identity complex through substantiating the 
dialectic relation between structure and agency in the specific circumstance of neo-liberal 
China. In this sense, the party-state’s domination assumes a nature, self-evident status 
through its interaction with women’s agency, which is embodied in the dispositions of 
individuals and then influences their social identities. By tying Ong’s arguments to my 
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study, I am able to examine how women’s entrepreneurship and social identities are 
constructed through the party-state’s integration with globalized neo-liberalism. On the 
other side, women’s agency may be where women are found as disturbing the party-
state’s impact. 
Disappearance of the Working-class 
 Since I was born and grew up in a working-class family, I got used to hearing that 
people around me were inclined to frequently use the term “working-class people” in 
their self-descriptions. Take my father for example, when I was little, he repeatedly 
talked to others, “I, as a working-class person, am employed in a large-scale SOE and 
have to make a contribution to the state’s economic growth”. I still remembered that such 
an association of the working-class identity to the employment status had remained to be 
effective in SOE employees’ self-descriptions of their social identities until the early 
1990s. Due to this personal experience, I became interested in how the urban female 
entrepreneurs in my sample would consider the working-class identity when they were 
not employed by the SOEs. 
When I talked to my respondents, they did not mention anything about the 
working-class identity. This absence of class further motivated me to investigate their 
perceptions of the working-class identity. When I asked them about how they considered 
their relationship to the working-class identity, it quickly became clear that all 
respondents—whether from the urban or rural areas associated their affiliation with the 
SOEs as the main criterion of their working-class identity. Twenty-six of them with the 
original urban household registration had been affiliated with the SOEs in the past but 
had been laid off within the past decade. Since they were not SOE employees any longer, 
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they did not consider themselves to be working-class people. It was also clear from their 
responses that working in the SOEs had delivered the promised gender equality of the 
pre-1978 era. 
Mei’s response is largely representative on this issue. As introduced in chapter 
four, Mei was laid off from the SOE nearly eight years ago, and was running a small 
convenient store. When I asked why she decided to become self-employed, Mei recalled 
the experience of being laid off: 
The economic pressures forced me to start my own business…I used to work in a 
SOE. Before I was laid off, everything was OK and everyone was equal…We 
were all working-class people, enjoying a life-tenured employment as well as 
steady income and benefits… I am not saying that everyone was absolutely 
equal… Everyone knows that our traditional culture privileges men over women 
at many aspects….Equal pay for women, however, allowed you no chance to 
make any complaints…Since the mid-1990s, more females than males have been 
laid off. I lost my job 10 years ago. Since then, everything has changed… 
Witnessing China’s political and socio-economic reforms in 1978, Mei provided a vivid 
image which accurately depicts how the party-state’s ever-changing policies and 
propaganda have affected Chinese women’s daily lives. Although working in a SOE used 
to raise her positioning in the social pyramid considerably influenced by Chinese feudal 
remnants, the restructuring of SOEs broke off her liaison with the SOE and abruptly left 
her a worsening life of grinding poverty.  
Similarly, the other 25 women with original urban residency status reported that 
gender inequality was dramatically yet incompletely disguised by working for SOEs and 
the accompanying illusion of class equality before the mid-1990s. Also, they all 
experienced the worsened gender inequalities when Chinese female workers were 
disproportionately laid off due to the 1978 socio-economic reforms. For instance, 
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Xiaofang, the middle-aged urban female owner of a small-scale laundry, recalled her past 
experience of working in a SOE: 
Having a job in an SOE might not be able to completely change a Chinese 
woman’s fate, but I suppose it is still much better than nothing. After being laid 
off, I lost a monthly income and other stable benefits. Not to mention gender 
equality, I almost could not feed my daughter.  
Like Mei, Xiaofang insisted that the problem of gender equality was absolutely not 
alleviated but rather worsened with the advance of the restructuring of SOEs. Consistent 
with the arguments (see, for example, Hershatter, 2004) concerning gender inequality in 
pre-1978 China, their responses indicate that gender inequality was never eradicated by 
class equality and in fact has been worsened since the party-state’s policies and 
propaganda of class equality were subsumed by the economic restructuring.  
The benefits of the working-class identity (e.g., a life-tenured employment) for 
the original urban women attracted my attention, motivating me to ask all respondents if 
they still consider themselves to be working-class women. When I posed this follow-up 
question to Mei, she replied: 
I do not think that the old-fashioned word of the working-class would occur to my 
mind again…I was laid off. I used to be a working-class person by working in that 
SOE. But now, this link was cut off, so I am absolutely not a working-class 
woman.  
The other 25 original urban women agreed that their definition of the working-class was 
synonymous with an affiliation to SOEs. Also, they thought that the working-class has 
already disappeared. For the reason of being laid off, they did not consider themselves to 
be working-class people. Agreeing with Mei on this point, Fangfang defined the working-
class identity simply “an employment status”, which was deprived of by the nation-wide 
restructuring of SOEs in the 1990s.  
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For the 23 rural-to-urban female migrants, they have never seen themselves as the 
working-class. Apart from defining the working-class as working for SOEs, they added 
that the working-class identity was the past privilege of urban residents because only 
urban residents were able to be recruited by SOEs. Due to the current self-employed 
status, they did not believe that they were working-class women. Given that working in 
SOEs would never bring any privileges as it did before, they claimed that there was no 
reason to emphasize the working-class identity nowadays. Take Xue for example, she 
migrated from a small village in the Northeastern part of China to Haikou in the late 
1990s. She decided to start a small restaurant together with her husband because she 
could not able to be admitted to the SOEs due to her original rural household registration. 
Nevertheless, it is explicit from her response that working in a SOE was not very 
necessary and important to her: 
I originally come from a village… The working-class used to be the title of SOE 
employees… I have never been a SOE worker, so I am not a working-class 
woman… Moreover, it was a privilege for only urban residents because an urban 
residency status is the prerequisite requirement of being admitted to 
SOEs…Though you are a SOE worker now, people would seldom ascribe that 
title to you because it is nothing. Working in SOEs does not make you more 
privileged than anyone else.  
Agreeing with the respondents (e.g., Mei) with the original urban household registration, 
Xue considered an affiliation with a SOE as the most significant criterion of becoming a 
working-class person. She refused to be self-described as the working-class because she 
had never been employed by any SOE. Also, her discussion of the past privilege 
reinforced her argument that she was not a working-class female. As she suggested, the 
privilege of working in a SOE served as another important criterion of a working-class 
person.  
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Furthermore, the past privilege of becoming a working-class person evidenced the 
argument that gender inequality existed prior to the 1978 reforms (see, for example, 
Hershatter, 2004). Gender inequality in pre-1978 China could be even worse for the 
reason of the urban-rural divide: rural women (comprising nearly 85% of the Chinese 
female population) found it almost impossible to be admitted to SOEs due to the 
restriction of the HRS. Comprising the vast majority of Chinese women, rural females 
found it much more difficult to envision and achieve gender equality even during the pre-
1978 period when the working-class identity could seemingly constitute an ideological 
illusion of class-based women’s liberation.  
Ruonan’s personal experience provided another evidence that indicate how the 
urban-rural divide had deteriorated women’s oppressions during the pre-1978 era. 
Ruonan left her hometown in the rural area of a southwestern province at the age of 25, 
and had relocated in Nanjing for almost 15 year. Her entrepreneurial experienced to a 
large degree constituted a typical example of the successful self-made rural-to-urban 
female migrant, who achieved economic self-sufficiency through running a small 
computer repair store and earned the urban household registration. In spite of this 
success, she still remembered that the original rural household registration had caused 
barriers to her earlier life in Nanjing. As she said: 
In my opinion, the stringent urban-rural divide was consistently maintained by the 
HRS, and this turned out to the fact that our rural women lived a much harder life 
than those urban ones… we should look no further than the qualifications 
specified by the SOEs during the pre-1978 era. Due to this reason, I would never 
consider the possibility of working in a SOE when I first came to Nanjing… In 
this way, I had to deal with two kinds of difficulty in the job market. First, all 
males—whether from the urban and rural areas were more likely than females to 
be tracked into the higher-paying, more skilled vocations across all sectors had I 
had no choice but to start from some low-paying jobs. Second, urban females 
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were more likely than rural ones to get high-paying jobs by being employed by 
the SOEs. As a result, I had to start from the lowest-paying, least skilled jobs 
during the first few years in Nanjing. After that, I started to do my own business 
in order to make more money and change my life.  
Consistent with Xue’s response, this quotation indicates that the original rural household 
registration caused one of the main barriers to working in the SOEs. More seriously, 
Ruonan’s response illustrated the double difficulty endured by rural-to-urban female 
migrants. To put it in her words, all males and urban females had advantages of 
competition in the job market during the pre-1978 era, and therefore this situation made 
rural-to-urban female migrants the victims of both socialist control on internal population 
migration and the Chinese feudal patriarchal legacy.  
 Refusing to be self-described as a working-class woman was also found in the 
responses of the three urban respondents with college degrees. As noted much earlier in 
this chapter, these three college graduates had become good friends ever since they were 
studying in the college. Rather than look for a job and work for someone else, they 
preferred to start a Western-style bakery specializing in selling fresh-baked breads and 
sweets. Since the three respondents and I were about the same age, we shared many 
common conversation topics with each other. When I shift to the topic about my father’s 
past use of the working-class identity in his self-description, they all claimed that the 
working-class identity was almost silenced in the contemporary social life. In addition to 
the reason of not working in SOEs, they contextualized the disappearance of the working-
class within the historical context of the 1978 reforms. As Lily explained: 
Before the reform, you were called a working-class person by working for a 
SOE... Afterwards, the working-class identity has gradually been silenced in the 
new political and social culture by the progress of privatization, so nobody is 
identified as the working-class now. Instead, the identities that we use to describe 
others have proliferated. For instance, you call me a young female entrepreneur, 
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and I call you a Ph. D. student…All these identities are the same thing as the old 
working-class identity. 
Lily’s response suggested that the working-class identity had been removed from the new 
political and social culture with the advance of the 1978 socio-economic reforms. 
Further, she lay emphasis on the multi-dimensionality of social identity construction by 
stating that the working-class identity had been replaced by many other dimensions of 
identity (e.g., entrepreneurship, gender, and educational experience). 
Consistent with my memory of my father’s class-based self-description, Rong 
emphasized the past association of the working-class identity with their parent’s 
employment status. As she noted, “The working-class identity used to be a label 
belonging to my parents before they retired from their affiliated SOEs, but it does not 
make any sense to me because I am not and will never be employed there”. Yuan further 
clarified how the new generation at her age perceived the working-class identity, “I 
firmly insist that the working-class identity does not appeal to persons at my age, because 
a stable employment status, if any, is not as attractive as other jobs like self-employment 
from which we can earn much more money”. Similar to the female entrepreneurs with the 
original household registration, Yuan did not care any advantage of working in a SOE 
(e.g., a stable employment status), so there was no reason for her to be self-described as 
the working-class and take pride in doing that. 
With hindsight, Lily’s words of “the same thing as the old working-class 
identity”, for me, signify more interpretations than simply a title change. Such a 
possibility of interpreting “the same thing” in other ways aroused my interest in 
examining the complexity in the historical transfer from the socially privileged 
construction of the working-class people to that of the Chinese urban female 
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entrepreneur. In order to shed light on the nature of this historical transfer, I asked the 
respondents a few more questions about their personal experience of the 1978 socio-
economic reforms as well as their perceptions of the link of the reforms to the rise of 
Chinese urban female entrepreneurs. On this issue, my research findings would be able to 
answer the question whether or not the working-class identity simply disappeared without 
a trace.  
Complexity of the Historical Transfer 
I asked my respondents about how they compared the importance of the working-
class identity with that of the Chinese urban female entrepreneur. It is clear from their 
responses that the latter was incorporated into the respondents as classification schemes 
in much the same way as the former was adopted by the past SOE workers. As I was told 
by Lily: 
The newly emerging social identities, such as female entrepreneurs, are the same 
thing as the previous working-class identity. That is because a female 
entrepreneur is advocated by our country as a very positive image in the exactly 
same way that a working-class person was depicted… I agree with the 
government on this point because our business successes have contributed to our 
nation’s socio-economic progress as much as those working-class people did. I 
am very proud of being a business-woman. 
As this quotation illustrates, Lily stressed two points when explaining “the same thing”. 
First, the party-state, as she stated, directed the making of the Chinese female 
entrepreneur and the working-class for the same reason of sustaining the state’s socio-
economic growth.  
This research finding partially differs from Ong’s (2006) arguments concerning 
the practice of neo-liberal governmentality. Promoting the making of ideal social 
identities for the well-being of a state is not the invention of the neo-liberal era, but rather 
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has existed in pre-1978 China. Second, Lily demonstrated that the making of the 
working-class woman resembles to that of the contemporary urban female entrepreneur. 
Like the former, the Chinese female entrepreneur is basically a class-based social identity 
making which privileges one group of citizens over the others as much more important to 
the well-being of the state. For her, the key features of female entrepreneur (e.g., 
supporting the state economy) were linked to her social identities, enabling her to classify 
others and herself.  
The resemblance of the working-class to the female entrepreneur is much more 
apparent in the lived experience of the middle-aged respondents, especially for those who 
experienced both the state-directed making of the working-class and female 
entrepreneurs. This speaks to the historical importance of habitus (Bourdieu, 1986, 2005) 
since women’s social identity making is at least to some extent the historically contingent 
product of the party-state’s social engineering. Take Ying for example, she was a middle-
aged woman with the original urban household registration. She experienced the 1978 
socio-economic reforms and the accompany restructuring of SOEs in the 1990s, and was 
laid off from a medium-scale SOE in the mid-1990s. Although she underwent a really 
tough period of economic difficulty after being laid off, she ultimately launched a 
successful entrepreneurial career by operating a stylish florist shop. When I asked about 
her experience of being laid off and participating in self-employment, it is evident from 
her response that she dealt with all these difficulties in a very self-confident, optimistic 
way. As she said: 
I take pride of my business success in the same way as I used to be proud of being 
a SOE worker…A female entrepreneur is highly respected by many people and 
even our government in the same way as a SOE employee was in the past… A 
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title change does mean a decline in the importance of our female labor force. In 
fact, we have remained to make contributions to the state’s economic 
development…After I was laid off, I did have to encounter economic difficulties 
in sustaining my family life, but I never lost the hope of striving for a much better 
life. God helps those who help themselves… Ultimately, I have already retrieved 
my honor by becoming a successful female entrepreneur. 
Her experience of ups-and-downs directly speak to the resemblance. For her, these two 
idealized identities gave her almost the same type of classification scheme through which 
she classified others and self-classified herself as socially honorable. The only difference 
lies in the different historical moments when these two are honored.  
The party-state’s role in leading the transformation of women’s social identities 
was also evidenced by such responses as “setting up a successful self-made female 
entrepreneur as a role model” (Hua), “the prize of Female Re-employment Star awarded 
by the RSC to those who self-dependently succeeded in their entrepreneurial careers” 
(Aili), “the government’s praise of female entrepreneurs for their contributions to both 
job creation and the state’s economy” (Shanshan). With hindsight, these words illustrate 
the way that the party-state has connected neo-liberal values (e.g., self-management, self-
enterprise) to the symbolic space of entrepreneurship, and sealed them together into the 
making of the Chinese female entrepreneur. Therefore, these women were depicted by 
the party-state as good citizens of neo-liberal China, who are capable of boosting the 
state’s economy through job creation and economic self-sufficiency.  
Moreover, this description suggests that the party-state’s ambitious interferences 
with women's lives complies with Bruni’s (2004) and Connell’s (2005) findings 
concerning the masculine stereotype of entrepreneurship—principally, that of the 
entrepreneur as innovative, aggressive businessmen who engage in a competition for 
market shares. As noted by the quotations from Hua’s, Aili’s and Shanshan’s responses, 
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the central and local governments’ description of a successful urban female entrepreneur 
actually turned a blind eye to their gender roles especially in family life, such as the 
wives of their husbands, the mothers of their kids, and so on. By contrast, all of them 
were actually middle-aged laid-off women, and enjoyed a good family life through 
maintaining a strong blood tie (Xueyuan guanxi 血缘关系) with their husbands and kids. 
Through placing an overemphasis on the seemingly agendered (gender-neutral) set of 
neo-liberal values, the party-state’s policy making and propaganda apparatus 
tremendously downplayed the importance of gender roles in social identity construction 
and therefore disguised the feminine dimension of women’s participation in 
entrepreneurship. Consequently, the party-state has intended to adapt and reproduce the 
order of the Western normative manhood in the field of China’s MD via the agendered 
making of the Chinese urban female entrepreneur. Also, it is the agendered nature that is 
at the very core of the party-state’s essentialized construction of women’s social 
identities. 
In this way, the party-state’s attempt of constructing female entrepreneurs, as 
Poster and Salime (2002) assert, has actually contextualized the global trend of MD in 
China so as to tap the enormous potential of women for the interests of the state’s 
sustainable socio-economic development. Given the party-state’s previous 
transformations of women’s social identities prevalent in the pre-1978 period, I argue that 
this attempt evidently has continued the domination and exploitation of Chinese women, 
but has been noticeably in a different form through adopting neo-liberal ideologies within 
the specific circumstance of neo-liberal China. Substantiating the habitus-field-social 
identity complex, which is elaborated by Ong’s (2006) optimizing strategy of 
  146 
“technologies of subjection”, the party-state’s interventions with women’s social identity 
making are basically a time- and context-contingent process. In this process, the 
influences of the party-state’s policies and propaganda at the macro level have been 
exerted upon a set of women’s acquired schemes of perceptions, dispositions, and 
appreciations through its inscription in the specific field of neo-liberal China, which is 
then embodied in the habitus of individuals and determines women’s social identities.    
It is especially noteworthy to mention the middle-aged respondents who 
experienced both the state-led restructuring of SOEs and the state-advocated making of 
the Chinese female entrepreneur. Their experience show that they would rather appreciate 
the party-state’s support of their businesses than blame the governments for their 
agonizing memories of being laid off. It is because they ascribed their better-off lives to 
their self-employment careers which were largely under the guidance and encouragement 
of the local governments and their affiliated MDPs.  
For instance, Aili, who owned a small florist shop after being laid off eight year 
ago, talked about the nearby MDP’s support of her entrepreneurial career. She said, “I 
was laid off due to the state-led economic restructuring, but the governments have 
compensated my loss with a policy support of my business”. Xiaomei’s response further 
suggested that she was inclined to perceive being laid off not simply as a setback in her 
life, but rather as a turning point of her fate. As she said, “Being laid off might not be a 
bad thing since our government has wisely assisted me to become wealthy through self-
employment”. As this quotation narrates, she lost her job at in her thirties and then started 
a small restaurant together with her husband. By doing business, she earned much more 
than she did in the SOE. Sharing the similar personal experience with Xiaomei, Shanshan 
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owned a small computer repair shop close to her community. She response re-
emphasized how the government’s support policies and propaganda had influenced 
women’s lives:  
If you do not know where to go and what to do next, the best bet is always to 
listen to the government's teachings. My personal story of starting my own 
business is a good case in point. When I felt hopeless after being laid off, I chose 
to follow the local MDP's instruction and it ultimately turns out to be one of the 
most brilliant decisions I have ever made in my life.  
It is also clear from Mei’s response that my respondents were willing to perceive the 
central and local governments’ interventions with their lives as a support. As she 
discussed: 
  I have no idea what a socialism would look like even though Mao presented an 
attractive image of socialist dream to us in the past... Anyways, what is at stake is 
that the central and local governments will never desert our common Chinese 
people. Even if we have to sacrifice a little bit comfort for the state's grand plan, 
we would certainly be compensated later. 
Like all of these respondents, the other middle-aged respondents to a large degree were 
willing to follow the party-state’s public policies and propaganda concerning women's 
massive participation in self-employment, either being re-employed in the sector of self-
employment or doing non-agricultural self-employed jobs after a rural-to-urban 
migration.  
The other respondents were also found to be more or less willing to take the local 
MDPs' suggestions through which to start and run their own businesses, though they were 
not in an outspoken support of the party-state's policies and propaganda as the middle-
aged ones did. Partially different from the middle-aged respondents' uncritical advocacy 
of the nearby MDPs' guidance, the other respondents in fact tended to see self-
employment as the last resort that they could be able to come up with while encountering 
  148 
serious economic difficulties in their lives. Especially for the rural-to-urban migrants in 
my sample, the party-state's influential adoption of the MDP model in post-1978 China 
appears to be the only choice available to them, after migrating into the urban areas and 
staying away from their previously familiar agricultural production. As I was told by 
Ruonan: 
I really had no idea about what I was able to do when I first came into the city in 
the early 1990s. I used to enjoy my expertise in doing agricultural works, but it 
did not help me at all with hunting for a non-agricultural job in the urban area. 
The only option for me was to take the government's suggestions and start my 
own business.  
Like Ruonan, Xue even compared her decision of becoming self-employed to a gamble: 
It is just like there is no way out. When I had to earn some money and feed my 
family after first migrating into the city, the only option available to me was to go 
after the government's lead and lay my own business off the ground. Even if there 
was no guarantee, I would still have to take a try. Only in that way, could I have a 
little chance to win. Fortunately, I won the gamble in the end.     
Drawing from these responses, I assert that their advocacy (either uncritical or 
tacit) of the party-state’s policies and propaganda was in fact complicit in the party-
state’s interventions with women’s social identity construction, and more exactly, the 
party-state’s regulation of their productive bodies. In accordance with Ong’s (2006) 
optimizing strategy of “technologies of subjectivity”, these women are exactly the active 
reproducers of the macro influence of the party-state’s propaganda and policies, whose 
self-government collaborates with the government on the regulation and exploitation of 
their own business lives. In order to further substantiate Bourdieu’s (1992, 2005) 
arguments concerning the habitus-field-social identity complex, the making of the 
Chinese female entrepreneur, as their responses (especially Aili’s and Xiaomei’s) 
indicate, is also a practice of agency. That is to say, these individuals actively responded 
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to the objective influences of the party-state through self-governing their own way of 
living as a businesswoman according to the government-stipulated entrepreneurship 
norms. Therefore, to socially construct these women’s social identity is not only the 
result of the party-state’s strategic adoption of neo-liberal ideologies, but also the practice 
of their agency.  
Apart from making an important decision of starting their new business career, to 
sacrifice family life for their businesses serves as another typical instance to exemplify 
the practice of agency. Consistent with Archer’s (1995, 2003, 2007) and Valdez’s 
arguments about structured agency, it is evident that a large portion of the respondents’ 
entrepreneurial activities was conditioned by the imperative of maintaining a dual 
presence at work and family life. In order to juggle the two domains and needs, these 
businesswomen, as their responses manifest, acknowledged a double-responsibility for 
both work and family life while obsessing over guilt of sacrificing much of family life. 
This situation was reported by almost every respondent. For example, “doing business 
takes me too much time which should have been spent taking care of my family” (Hui); 
“being a good businesswoman involves a trade-off between doing business and relaxing” 
(Ruru); “my parents often blamed me for not having a boyfriend at the age of 27, but it is 
not my fault… I really want to get married with someone and enjoy family life, but I do 
not even have time to know a man and date with him” (Rong).  
Again, such a type of sacrifice illustrates Ong’s (2006) two optimizing strategies, 
and more exactly, the practice of habitus: these human agents behave in the business 
world through embracing its norms to consciously or unconsciously develop the 
dispositions of coping with the dual presence at work and family life. Consistent with 
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McNay’s (2000) and Pfeffer’s (2012) arguments, it also indicates one aspect of agency—
human actor’s adoption of social norms, and such an enactment of agency is found 
among those females who have been undergoing the party-state’s gender oppression and 
economic marginalization. 
Making sacrifices, however, does not necessarily rule out the possibility that the 
women were to some extent aware of inequalities and thus engaged in a contested 
relationship to the party-state. Instead, to sacrifice foreshadows these women’s awareness 
of and even resistances to the inequalities caused by the party-state’s interferences with 
economic activities, and more exactly, adumbrates the other aspect of agency to be 
resistant (McNay, 2000; Fraser, 2011). The resistance has its value in illustrating West 
and Zimmerman’s (2009) definition of doing gender: gender is not only done but also 
redone by these businesswomen to modify the party-state’s expectation of a good female 
entrepreneur. For instance, Yueyue sobbed when she talked about her son: 
I cannot imagine how my son went through these years when I could not be a 
good mother… Especially during some important traditional festivals, it would be 
super hectic in my restaurant…I can only buy some instant food right before the 
holiday dinner…My son is so good that he understood why I did that…I would 
often recall the government official’s words when I felt depressed. She is 
probably the first and most important person that showed me the way to start my 
business. She said for many times that I have to do trade-offs. So, I think that is 
fair.  
As this quotation illustrates, she complained that her business career was unfair to her son 
since he did not get as much care as other children did.  
Such a complaint about women’s double burden can be found in every research 
participant’s response. For instance, “I really feel sorry for my negligence of my family 
because doing business is really time-consuming and energy-consuming” (Hui); "To 
achieve economic sufficiency absolutely is one side, and to take care of my family is the 
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other thing. It is just like a coin with two coins. I always feel helpless because I really do 
not know how to keep a balance between these two sides. Indeed, I owe too much to my 
family" (Fangfang). Being counted as a contribution to the state’s economy, these women 
were at the same time expected to take care of their families. Complying with Poster and 
Salime’s (2002) argument, they were treated as docile laborers important to both their 
family lives and the state’s adoption of globalized neo-liberalism. In this sense, all 
respondents are actually desperate yet somewhat regretful to pursue their business 
successes, and therefore differ from the party-state’s description of the Chinese female 
entrepreneur as persistent, independent, hardworking and indifferent to pain. To put it 
differently, these women’s agency has been effectively practiced to counter and modify 
the normative influences of the party-state’s policies and propaganda, and more 
significantly, they have engaged in a self-construction of their own social identities 
through adding another disposition of being regretful about their sacrifices. 
Moreover, it is interesting to find in the instance of the sobbing mother (Yueyue) 
that her regret was ultimately relieved by not only the government official but also the 
self-soothing strategy of praising her considerate son. Similarly, the respondents’ 
negative feelings, if any, were reported to be offset by either the government’s 
propaganda, their self-soothing practice, or the combination of the two. From this point of 
view, the dual presence of work and family life required these women to set fuzzy 
borderlines between the two different domains which are not completely dichotomized 
but rather blurred. While physically alternating between the two domains, these women 
managed to comply with the neutral yet fundamentally masculine entrepreneurial 
attributes and to ultimately facilitate a perpetuation of masculine entrepreneurship.   
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Intertwined Practice of Doing Gender and Doing Business 
 Having discussed how these women’s participation in self-employment has 
affected their social identities, I wish to propose a summary description of the gendered 
nature of entrepreneurship in neo-liberal China through identifying the interactive 
relation of doing business to doing gender. In accordance with Bruni et al. (2004) 
argument, my research findings in this chapter manifest that doing business involves a 
gender performing, and more exactly, gender is performed as a set of situated practice 
contingent on how entrepreneurial rituals and norms influence human subjects. In order 
to continually profit from the domination and exploitation of women’s labor force, the 
party-state has undertaken an essentialized construction of Chinese women’s social 
identities, enticing them to comply with the seemingly neutral yet apparently masculine 
set of neo-liberal attributes.  
A dual presence (work/family; businesswomen/housewives), however, is found to 
highlight the role of agency in modifying the influence of the party-state’s interferences. 
As opposition to the party-state’s deployment of the Western normative manhood, 
feminine features, which the party-state tried to downplay, have been noticeably shown in 
these women’s deep regret about not taking good care of their family lives and then 
embodied in their social identity construction as the Chinese female entrepreneur. Thus, I 
argue that the apparent existence of femininity in China’s MD has considerably 
undermined the party-state’s attempt of othering the non-male and legitimizing the 
agendered, universal model of women’s participation in self-employment. Women’s self-
employment managed to frequently cross, transgress, and blur the symbolic dichotomy 
(e.g. masculinity/femininity, businesswoman/housewife, family/business) for the purpose 
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of coping with both economic burden and the influences of the party-state’s policies and 
propaganda. This process, as I argue, illustrates the indivisibility of gender and 
entrepreneurship as two intertwined social practice. More significantly, to undertake 
entrepreneurial activities necessitates an appropriate performance of gender.  
Intertwined Stratification Schemes of Gender and Class 
 In this chapter, my study draws upon the relationality of habitus to uncover how 
gender interacts with class. During the pre-1978 era, class was the predominant field 
where Chinese people encountered the party-state’s official ideologies. Such an 
encounter resulted in their perceptions, dispositions, and appreciations which were finally 
embodied in the habitae and influenced their social identities. Here, class does not follow 
Marx’s realist notion of class that sees class as a clearly defined social group. Rather, it 
complies with the Bourdieusian concept of habitus, referring to a dynamic, human-
engaged process of social stratification. That is to say, the working-class identity was the 
result of the interaction of the working-class people’s habitae with the class-based field, 
and more importantly, was utilized by these people (e.g., Lily) as a set of stratification 
schemes to classify others and self-classify themselves as socially honorable. 
Unlike the women’s responses concerning the disappearance of class and class 
divisions, I find that class has never been a dead category of analysis in feminist 
theorizing concerning social identity construction. Having undergone a historical transfer, 
it has actually been dispersed and penetrated into gender. In this way, a new set of 
stratification schemes have been constructed along the lines of gender and class to 
reorganize social hierarchies. The social hierarchies, which used to be articulated through 
the working-class, have been recently transformed and rearticulated through the gendered 
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making of the female entrepreneurs. This transfer implies that class divisions have been 
individualized as multiple differentiated gendered identity constructions, and these 
identity makings are hierarchized based upon their contributions to the state’s socio-
economic development. Simply put, gender has become classed so that the two 
dimensions of identity has collectively constructed Chinese women’s social identities and 
ultimately perpetuated the gender and socio-economic oppressions. In this way, my 
research finding furthers the development of intersectionality theories via clarifying the 
how gender interacts with class. 
Conclusion 
 My study in this chapter has explored the historical, political and socio-economic 
process in which the global phenomenon and idea of the MDPs has been invested in 
China. The making of the Chinese female entrepreneur provides a typical case to disclose 
China’s contingent, strategic adoption of the imported phenomenon and idea in order to 
constantly produce ideal citizen. By doing this, the party-state can maximize the profits 
from the exploitation of populations. As a matter of matter, the global financial crisis of 
2008 just provided another favorable chance for China so that it can reorganize social 
hierarchies for continuing to capitalize on Chinese citizens (especially women).  
The research findings have addressed the theoretical problem—how gender 
interacts with class. I argue that class has never been a dead category of analysis in 
feminist theorizing concerning social identity construction. In contemporary China, class 
is no longer the sole dimension of identity through which to construct social 
stratifications. Rather, it has been individualized and penetrated into other dimensions of 
identity. For instance, the research findings illustrate that it can be transformed and 
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rearticulated as gender identities, shaping political, socio-economic, and gender norms. 
This linkage of class to gender is significant in recognizing and further developing the 
instability of feminist analytic categories. Feminist theorists’ attention is attracted to 
those gender inequalities which would probably be disguised by deemphasizing class.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
Making of the Chinese Urban Female Entrepreneur Revisited 
My study examined the making of the Chinese female entrepreneur lying at the 
heart of the national and international promotion of the MDP model. It engaged with a 
few important discussions concerning China’s liberal politics during the reform era, the 
global trend of neo-liberal capitalism, and the social construction of a new worker-
subject—the Chinese female entrepreneur shaped by the hybrid marriage of state politics 
and global capital. During the post-socialist, neo-liberal era, what are the meanings and 
practice of becoming the Chinese female entrepreneur appropriate for both the state’s 
economic growth and the global diffusion of neo-liberalism? These matters are vital for 
grasping the ever-shifting matrices of power relations and governing practice to regulate 
society.  
Recent scholarship on governmentality as discourses (see, for example, Ong, 
2006), under the influence of Foucault, endeavored to identify the specific forms of 
control geared up to the production of ideal citizens (the production of appropriate 
worker-subjects in the case of post-1978 China). Significantly, this production 
exemplifies biopower—the contemporary way of governing that optimizing human life at 
the population level for the purpose of justifying and maximizing of the state’s profits 
from subjugating and exploiting human bodies. My investigation into the making of the 
Chinese female entrepreneur provided an in-depth study of this issue, furthering an 
understanding of how the global trend of neo-liberal governmentality has been invested 
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in a specific national context, and how the daily lives of its citizens have been influenced 
by this diffusion of neo-liberal ideologies.  
Furthermore, the research findings from this research project contributed to the 
tradition of feminist theories, which endeavors to explore the relationship between neo-
liberalism and gender. As my data indicated, neo-liberal ideological forces have 
considered the gendered making of women’s social identities as a new source of capitalist 
accumulation. Specifically, the Chinese urban female entrepreneur served as an image of 
ideal citizen who incorporated neo-liberal values (self-management, independence, self-
enterprise) and thereby contributed to the state’s socio-economic development. Also, 
those women’s daily practice of social networking illustrated that the lines between 
public and private spaces have become fuzzy: one the one hand, since their social 
networks were affectively charged, sociability still remains to be embedded in the private 
space; on the other hand, exchange of both tangible and intangible resources involved in 
guanxi practice suggested that sociability has been appropriated by neo-liberal ideologies 
as a profitable terrain of social production. To put it much more bluntly, gender to large 
extent concretizes the ways in which neo-liberalism has attempted to function in the way 
of governmentality as discourses in an effort to capture the productivity of women’s 
labor. 
Chapter two briefly introduced the methodology and detailed the research 
methods utilized in this research project. The ECM allowed the analysis of the urban 
female entrepreneurs’ daily experience as the departure point, and more importantly, 
traced the link of their participation in entrepreneurship to the Chinese party-state’s 
strategic advocacy for the diffusion of neo-liberal ideologies. Semi-structured interviews 
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were the primary data gathering method through which to collect qualitative data for 
answering the research questions. Also, participatory observations and secondary data 
searching were conducted to gather convergent data bearing on the same research object 
of Chinese urban female entrepreneurs’ daily practice. Such a combined use of multiple 
data gathering methods enhanced the accuracy of data analysis through cross verification 
from multiple sources of data. Following the principles of GT, the process of data 
analysis in this study was basically recursive: I collected data, sorted them, paid special 
attention to the emerging significant topics, and then repeated earlier steps over and over 
again. 
In order to historically contextualize my study, chapter three illuminated on the 
gendered nature of the party-state’s grand narrative of the PRC’s history. Beginning in 
the second half of the twentieth century and into the new millennium, gender inequality 
and women’s oppression have never been eradicated by the party-state’s laws, public 
policies and propaganda. Even though gender equality was officially promoted by the 
Maoist party-state’s legal regulation and propaganda apparatus, women’s disadvantaged 
socio-economic positioning in social pyramid was hardly changed (Hershatter, 2004; 
Rofel, 1999). In fact, the Maoist rhetoric of “holding up half the sky” actually launched 
the party-state’s subjugation and exploitation of Chinese women throughout the PRC’s 
history primarily through directing women’s social identity construction.  
During the pre-1978 period, the Maoist rhetoric of gender equality constituted a 
reductionist theory of women’s liberation with an exclusive focus on their potential to be 
productive in social production. Especially in the workplace, Chinese women had to 
make their own way by proving that they could be able to contribute to the state’s 
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economy as much as their male counterparts. It is only in this way that women were 
transformed into part of the working-class and were considered equal to men based upon 
their common working-class identity. Consequently, the Maoist party-state downplayed 
gender equality to be a by-product bequeathed by the rise of the working-class in the 
industrialized and modernized China (X. Li, 1999; Rofel, 1999). Although the party-state 
during the Mao era never stopped to advocate women’s liberation as a fundamental 
justification for its socialist regime in China, gender issues were frequently sidelined at 
each period of either economic downturn or political unrest without any recognition that 
such a type of deliberate treatment gradually devalued the Maoist language of state 
feminism to be a hallow slogan. 
Like the working-class woman socially honored during the Mao era, the urban 
female entrepreneur emergent in post-1978 China was also subject to the party-state’s 
essentialized construction of worker-subject. Principally, the party-state incorporated 
agendered neo-liberal values (e.g., self-management, self-enterprise) in the social 
construction of the Chinese urban female entrepreneur, especially disguising women’s 
gender roles in family life. Also, such an exemplar of social identity construction was 
advocated as the role model for all the other Chinese women (especially those laid-off 
women and rural-to-urban migrant females). In this way, the party-state’s regulation and 
appropriation of women’s labor force was practiced in a way of emphasizing women’s 
certain dispositions of productivity and differentiating productive ones from the other. 
Given the fact that a few dispositions and activities of Chinese women were selectively 
emphasized and geared up to the contingent demands of the state’s economic growth, the 
making of the Chinese female entrepreneur was undertaken in much the same way as that 
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of working-class woman of the past. They both exemplify the way in which the party-
state throughout the PRC's history has always been engaged in generating a series of 
gender norms so as to morally regulate women's entry into the state’s social production. 
The historical review of women’s ever-changing socio-economic status in chapter 
three ends with two questions, and each was addressed in chapters four and five 
respectively. In chapter four, my study focused on Chinese women’s social networking 
activities while participating in self-employment. In this way, the diffusion of the 
Western-centric concept and phenomena of social capital building provided a 
perspective, through which to answer the question how female human bodies were 
inscribed in the configuration of power relations geared up to the party-state’s integration 
with global capitalism during the post-1978 period. Endorsing the ECM approach, I have 
examined the experience of Chinese urban female entrepreneurs in Nanjing and Haikou, 
and attempted to map the link among their self-employment careers, their social 
networking activities, and the larger picture of the Chinese party-state’s configuration of 
its relation to global capitalism. Drawing upon the data from in-depth interviews, 
participatory observations and secondary data searching, my research findings manifested 
that the research participants were found to consider affections (e.g., inter-dependence, 
obligation, and mutual trust) as the foundation of establishing and maintaining their 
social networks regardless of the party-state’s influential advocacy of the Western utility-
based social capital concept.  
Meanwhile, this findings foretold Chinese women’s resistance against the party-
state’s public policies and propaganda. Though their daily and business life were to a 
large extent in the grip of the party-state’s governing practice, I argued that if 
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opportunities emerged they would never hesitate to carry out everyday struggles in a 
nuanced, plural, and generally unrecorded way. In the case of Chinese urban female 
entrepreneurs, my research findings revealed that an exchange of both tangible and 
intangible resources had frequently happened in their routine practice of guanxi, 
considerably easing the government’s burden of facilitating women’s entrepreneurship. 
Such an exchange, however, was actually not the ends but rather the means of 
maintaining and strengthening their social networks. This was explicitly in conflict with 
the utility-based social capital theory promulgated by the party-state’s policy making and 
propaganda apparatus. To put it simply, the Chinese urban female entrepreneurs in my 
sample undertook their guanxi practice in a completely difference way that the 
government had expected.  
Theoretically, my empirical research in chapter four opened up a new way of 
challenging and reconstructing utility-driven social capital concept. Following the ECM 
principles (see, for example, Burawoy, 1991), those women’s affectively charged 
experience of social networking posed a challenge to the hegemonic impact of neo-
liberalism, which is at the very core of utility-based social capital thesis. Given the vital 
role of women’s self-employment in both the contemporary global economy and China’s 
socio-economic growth (Zhi et al., 2013), my research findings, to a large degree, 
evidenced Hardt and Negri’s (2005, 2009) argument that neo-liberalism—the ideological 
foundation of Putnam’s social capital theorizing—has already been fragile because the 
material relations of production and exchange gave way to immaterial factors. Consistent 
with two of the three major trends of biopolitical production proposed by Hardt and Negri 
(2009), those Chinese women’s participation in self-employment exemplified the fact 
  162 
that China’s contemporary economic development—one of the top players in today’s 
world economy—has been driven and organized by an exploitation and oppression of 
women’s immaterial socially-owned wealth at the collective level (i.e. women’s 
collective involvement in social production via self-employment). In other words, such a 
type of exploitation and oppression have in fact transcended the realm of women’s 
entrepreneurship, expanding to all the other individuals (e.g., family members, 
schoolmates, prior colleagues, and best friends) involved in those women’s intimate 
social relations.  
At the end of chapter four, I argued that the most important task of re-theorizing 
social capital was to revitalize civil society as a major source of collective rebellions 
against both market control and state coercion. With the advance of the biopolitical 
capitalist accumulation, the reconstruction of social capital theory, as my empirical study 
suggested, had to incorporate the concept of the common. This concept can provide a 
viable way of emphasizing the productivity of both tangible and intangible resources in 
the biopower-based social production. In this sense, intangible resources, which used to 
be downplayed by neo-liberal ideologies, would be brought to the central place of 
contemporary social production. By doing this, social capital could be able to gain an 
opportunity to realize Tocqueville’s dream of a third place of civil society free from the 
coercions of both market and state. 
From the perspective of social identity construction, chapter five focused on the 
politico-historical process in which the party-state’s repeated inventions in women’s 
social identity making have influenced their daily lives. Specifically, it examined how the 
party-state’s strategic embracement of neo-liberal ideologies has given birth to the 
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making of the Chinese urban female entrepreneur. Through interviewing and observing a 
few female entrepreneurs, the research findings explicated the interaction between gender 
and class, emphasizing it as one of the most salient sites where ideal citizens of China are 
imagined and constructed. Following the approach of the ECM, my study in this chapter 
sought to analyze the respondents’ personal experience that directly reflected the 
historical transfer from the centrally-planned economy to the contemporary market-
centered economic structuring. Also, it mapped out the link of the respondents’ daily 
experience to the much broader context of China’s integration with globalized neo-liberal 
capitalism.  
Drawing from my interviews with the urban female entrepreneurs, the research 
findings manifested that class used to be the predominant field where Chinese people 
encountered the Maoist party-state’s official ideologies. Such an encounter resulted in 
their perceptions, dispositions, and appreciations which were finally embodied in the 
habitae and influenced their social identities. Here, class does not follow Marx’s realist 
notion of class that sees class as a clearly defined social group. Rather, it complies with 
the Bourdieusian concept of habitus, referring to a dynamic, human-engaged process of 
social stratification (Bourdieu, 1986, 1990). That is to say, the working-class identity was 
the result of the interaction of the working-class people’s habitae with the class-based 
field, and more importantly, was utilized by these women as a set of stratification 
schemes to classify others and self-classify themselves as socially honorable. 
Further, I found that the social hierarchies, which used to be articulated through 
the working-class, have been recently transformed and rearticulated through the gendered 
making of the Chinese urban female entrepreneur. This transfer implies that class 
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divisions have been individualized as multiple differentiated gendered identity 
constructions, and these identity makings are hierarchized based upon their contributions 
to the state’s socio-economic development. Simply put, gender has become classed so 
that the two dimensions of identity has collectively constructed Chinese women’s social 
identities and ultimately perpetuated the gender and socio-economic oppressions. In this 
way, my research finding contributed a lot to the development of intersectionality 
theories by clarifying how gender and class converge in directly feeding into socio-
economic hierarchy. To be more specific, this linkage of class to gender is significant in 
recognizing and further developing the instability of feminist analytic categories. 
Feminist theorists’ attention is attracted to those gender inequalities that would probably 
be disguised by deemphasizing class. 
Business Failure and Women’s Entrepreneurship 
As I mentioned the limitation of my research project in chapter one, the 
importance of studying failure is not sufficiently addressed. During the past few years, 
there has been a consensus on the importance of studying failure in developing a more 
holistic understanding of entrepreneurship (R. Smith & McElwee, 2011; Singh, Corner, 
& Pavlovich, 2007). In spite of this, the experience of venture failure remains to be an 
underdeveloped field of inquiry. Actually, there has been a much greater focus on 
business survival and success than on failure in entrepreneurial activities (Shepherd, 
2003). Moreover, prior literature on entrepreneurial failure have mainly sought for 
various reasons of failure so that the possibility of entrepreneurial success can be raised 
(Ahmad & Seet, 2009; Borchert & Cordozo, 2010). Generally, these reasons include 
economic hardship (Carter & Auken, 2006; Ekanem & Wyer, 2007), lack of business-
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related skills or experience (Abdullah, Hamali, Deen, Saban, & Abdurahman, 2009; 
Hogarty, 1993; Hiemstra, Kooy, & Frese, 2006), problems with service and product 
(Bruno, Mcquarrie, & Torgrimson, 1992; Hogarty, 1993), and unfavorable political and 
socio-economic environment (Zacharakis, Meyer, & DeCastro, 1999). 
Shifting their attention to women’s mass participation in self-employment around 
the globe, policy makers have been specifically concerned about various barriers that 
hinder their entrepreneurship-related activities. Given the gendered division of labor and 
the widely existence of gender-related discrimination in both at home and in the 
workplace, the search for reasons of women’s unsuccessful entrepreneurial experience 
has primarily revolved around two salient issues—funding and family support. Since 
females have to meet much higher standards than males in getting loans from formal 
financial institutions (Hisrich & Ozturk, 1999), lack of capital has beaten down many 
promising female entrepreneurs. Even though venture capitalists have started to 
appreciate women’s potential in doing business and increased their investment in women-
led businesses, it is still paltry. In the first half of 2013, only 20% of venture capital 
investment went to women-led businesses (Stengel, 2014). This funding gap illustrates a 
major market failure in efficiently allocating resources, which prevents women from 
achieving a high-level entrepreneurial success.  
Furthermore, family structure involves critical familial and societal variables that 
are imposed upon women to form the gendered nature of women’s entrepreneurship. In 
the previous chapters, my study examined how women’s double burden has been caused 
by the combined influence of the state’s macro-level interventions and Chinese feudal 
remnants. In such a situation, working in the workplace became disconnected to 
  166 
housework, with women constrained within the province of supportive domestic work for 
male bread-earners. Many empirical studies on this issue (see, for example, Fernandez, 
1981) have proven that women would usually distract from doing their own businesses 
when encountering a dilemma between continuing their self-employment careers and 
supporting their husbands. 
Given the central focus of this study on the recent emergence of Chinese urban 
female entrepreneurs, my future research will turn towards those women’s lived 
experience of venture failure. This would probably generate new research findings on 
how Chinese urban female entrepreneurs (including those unsuccessful ones) have been 
shaped by the hybrid marriage of the state’s governing and global capital. For instance, 
on condition that the gendered making of the Chinese urban unsuccessful female 
entrepreneur was not socially privileged for being unable to serve the state’s economy 
through job creation and economic self-sufficiency, it would be interesting to explore if 
multiple dimensions of identity (e.g. gender, class, urban-rural divide) interact with each 
other in the same way as they have done in the make of the Chinese successful urban 
female entrepreneur. Also, my future study on failure can assist policy makers, 
educational institutions, and MDPs to better understand the real demands of existing and 
budding female entrepreneurs. 
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DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS 
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Demographic profile Variable Number 
Age 20-30 7 
31-40 10 
41-50 19 
51-60 13 
Marital status Single 3 
Married  46 
Education Primary school 20 
High school 26 
College 3 
Line of business Bakery 5 
Florist shop 13 
Barber’s shop 5 
Convenient store 7 
Computer repair 10 
Restaurant 9 
Type of ownership Self-owned 33 
Family-based 13 
Commonly owned with 
non-relatives 
3 
Original hukou Urban 26 
Rural 23 
 
  190 
APPENDIX B  
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AND CONSENT FORM 
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Note: The serendipitous questions were not listed here 
1. When did you join this program? 
2. How did you know about the program? 
3. How does the program reach you? 
4. Could you please tell me why you join this program? 
5. Do you know about the goals of your program? 
a. If yes, could you please tell me how the purpose of program fits what you 
expected before you joined? 
b. If no, I will read the purpose of program that I get from the interview with 
the program leader to the client, and ask “what do you think of this 
purpose?” and “could you please tell me how the purpose of program fits 
what you expected before you joined?” 
6. Does your program do anything to bond you with other clients within the 
program? 
a. If yes, what kind of services or assistances does your program provide to 
serve for this goal? 
What kind of benefits for the business do you get from this connection to 
other clients within your program? 
Could you please tell me how your reasons for joining the program fit 
program’s efforts to connect you to other clients? 
I. If the loan is provided, what type of lending do they 
provide? 
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How about the amount of loans? What is the cost of getting 
a loan?  
II. If the program offers continuing education or technical 
assistance, what type of these services? 
b. If no, why not? 
What kind of services or assistances does your program provide for 
clients? 
I. If the loan is provided, what type of lending do they 
provide? 
How about the amount of loans? What is the cost of getting 
a loan?  
II. If the program offers continuing education or technical 
assistance, what type of these services? 
7. Does your program do anything to get clients together with institutions or persons 
outside your program? 
a. If yes, what kind of services or assistances does your program provide to 
serve for this goal? 
With whom you are connected to? 
What kind of benefits for the business do you get from this connection to 
the outside community? 
Could you please tell me how your reasons for joining the program fit 
your efforts to link your clients with the outside community? 
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I. If the loan is provided, what type of lending do they 
provide? 
How about the amount of loans? What is the cost of getting 
a loan?  
II. If the program offers continuing education or technical 
assistance, what type of these services? 
b. If no, why not? 
What kind of services or assistances from the outside community does 
your program provide for clients? 
I. If the loan is provided, what type of lending do they 
provide? 
How about the amount of loans? What is the cost of getting 
a loan?  
II. If the program offers continuing education or technical 
assistance, what type of these services? 
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This consent form outlines my rights as a participant in the study of Examining the 
Implications of Micro-enterprise Development on Social Capital Building conducted by 
Nancy C. Jurik and Dongling Zhang, Justice and Social Inquiry, School of Social 
Transformation, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-4902. 
 
The interview will study the implications of Micro-enterprise Development Programs 
(MDPs) for micro-enterprise owners who are clients of the program in China’s urban 
areas. We are interested in the services and the assistances that program clients receive 
from the program.  
It will take about 40 minutes. 
 
 
I understand that 
 
1. Taking part in this study is entirely voluntary.  
2. It is my right to decline to answer any question that I am asked.  
3. I am free to end the interview at any time.  
4. I may request that the interview not be taped.  
5. My name and identity will remain confidential in any publications or discussions.  
6. My name will not appear on any tapes or transcripts resulting from the interview.  
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APPENDIX C  
IRB APPROVAL 
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